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Editors’ Preface
Foreword
For the 5th year in a row we met together in Foligno (at Nemetria 
Association) to honour the memories of Dr. Guido Carli and Prof. Alberto 
Predieri. This time we discussed the issues related to the growing links 
between money and derivatives and possible inﬂuences on innovation 
and growth.
Once again, the twofold meeting purpose was met:
  • to exchange friendly and openly our points of view, through the 
discussion of original pieces of scientiﬁc research,
  • to prepare a better explanation for the public opinion on 
the implication of ﬁnancial developments and technological 
innovation on world growth.
The excellent group of scholars whom we invited this year 
prepared some papers, memos and comments which converged on the 
common view that there are possible links among the 4 variables that 
the profession is not yet ready to fully understand. The discussions that 
we had have been dominated by the impact on money and growth of the 
recent subprime credit crisis which adds new problems to the already 
quite complicated developments on global markets. The possibility to 
forecast these developments escape from any econometric research 
and lay largely on the intuition of students and policy makers, i.e. 
“metaeconomics” is bypassing economics!      
A large part of the merit to achieve the goal of the meeting goes 
again to Iftekhar Hasan and Cristiano Zazzara who took care of the 
scientiﬁc organization and to Monica Degl’Innocenti who bore with the 
Nemetria staff the entire logistic burden in a very excellent way and 
made possible these proceedings of the Fifth Colloquium in a very short 
time.
Associazione Guido Carli
Fondazione Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri
Editors of the Journal of Financial Stability

7Mario Draghi
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Your chosen subject — the role of ﬁnancial innovation and speciﬁcally 
derivative markets, their relation with money and their impact on 
economic growt1i is a highly topical one, as witnessed by the recent 
ﬁnancial market turbulence. From the central banker’s perspective it is 
crucial owing to its implications for the stability of the ﬁnancial system 
and the conduct of monetary policy. 
Derivative instruments have become an essential element of the must 
advanced ﬁnancial systems. Their use has grown further in the last 
decade and their total notional value is now equal to ten times world 
GDP. 
As hedging instruments, derivatives allow market participants to 
unbundle the various risks and price and allocate them among a multitude 
of investors. Derivatives are also used to leverage portfolio risks and to 
bet on future market movements. The transfer of risk through derivatives 
may be in the interest not only of the seller but also of the buyer. For 
instance, the latter may improve portfolio diversiﬁcation at small cost or 
improve asset-liability matching. This reciprocal advantage is at the root 
of the success of derivative contracts. 
The potential beneﬁts are not limited to market participants but may also 
extend to households and ﬁrms at large. First of all there is an indirect 
effect that operates by enhancing the efﬁciency, scope and resiliency 
of ﬁnancial markets. Speciﬁcally, derivatives broaden the range of 
investment strategies available to investors and, in normal times, make 
ﬁnancial markets more liquid, thus helping to curb ﬁnancial volatility. 
Many observers argue that they have raised the productivity of the 
ﬁnancial system, just as new production technologies have boosted that 
of the real economy. Derivatives also have a direct impact on the real 
economy, notably by changing the risk management practices of ﬁrms. 
Placed as they are at the crossroads of so many ﬁnancial ﬂows, however, 
derivatives and their use have crucial implications for ﬁnancial stability. 
The turmoil now affecting global ﬁnancial markets is a reminder that 
Mario Draghi
Governor of the Bank of Italy
and Chairman of Associazione Guido Carli
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the growing reliance on derivatives entails signiﬁcant risks. 
Some of these risks are well known. Concerns may arise if, for example, 
derivatives are used by investors – intermediaries, investment companies, 
ﬁrms, even individual investors – not mainly to hedge existing risks but 
to increase portfolio leverage or the volume of risks assumed. Moreover, 
credit derivatives can modify the modus operandi of the banks that 
use them. If lenders transfer part of the risk to others, the incentive to 
evaluate borrowers’ creditworthiness may be weakened. A clear lesson 
comes from the recent developments in the subprime mortgage market 
in the United States, where the transfer of risk is commonplace. Finally, 
like other ﬁnancial instruments, if not properly used derivatives may 
become a source of instability. In this respect, intermediaries have to 
help customers to select the appropriate instruments, provide complete 
information and thoroughly explain the risks embedded in these complex 
products An improper use of derivatives by customers may expose the 
intermediary to legal and reputational risks, undermine its proﬁtability 
and jeopardize its stability. 
The recent market turbulence has drawn attention to some other possible 
implications for ﬁnancial stability. First, the transfer and dispersion of 
credit risk, which may reduce asset price volatility and risk premia in 
normal times, can have the opposite effect in times of stress: as we have 
seen in recent weeks, the market participants’ very uncertainty over which 
institutions ultimate sustain the losses, can lead to an indiscriminate 
widening of credit spreads for banks and ﬁnancial institutions and, 
most worrying, to market illiquidity. One factor that played a major role 
in amplifying the recent ﬁnancial turbulence is the fact that some of 
the structured products based on credit derivatives, in particular CDOs, 
became illiquid when it was most necessary to trade them. This sudden 
evaporation of liquidity was due in part to the exceptional complexity 
of these instruments and came despite the fact that CDOs are rated by 
major agencies, with some trenches being assigned a high investment 
grade. 
Let me now turn to important changes that derivatives and the rise 
of’ new players have brought to the way monetary policy is conducted, 
communicated and transmitted to the economy. 
Through the securitization of loans and their sale to institutional 
investors, banks can ease funding constraints for new lending and reduce 
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their capital requirements. A recent study by the Bank of Italy and the 
ECB using microdata on a large sample of euro-area. banks over the 
last eight years shows how this affects the transmission mechanism. The 
banks that make more use of securitization are sheltered from the effects 
of monetary policy changes: in response to rises in ofﬁcial rates, their 
lending activity shrinks less than that of other institutions. 
The interpretation of variables that represent a traditional reference for 
monetary policy becomes more complicated. This applies particularly 
to money and credit aggregates, as these are signiﬁcantly affected by 
the new products and players In the past, most of M3 in the euro area 
was held by households and ﬁrms, whose behaviour as money-holders 
we understood reasonably well. Today an increasing share is held by 
non-bank intermediaries, whose demand for money is likely to respond 
to different needs and is harder to interpret. Moreover, marketable 
instruments represent a growing component of M3; they are held for 
portfolio purposes and are less directly connected to transactions and 
spending on goods and services. 
These developments require a new approach to monetary analysis, based 
on a larger set of data and attentive to the impact of ﬁnancial innovation. 
Ongoing research at the Bank of Italy uses multivariate techniques to 
exact information from the common trend of a large set of monetary 
indicators (not only M3, but also its components, the monetary holdings 
of different sectors of the economy, and the counterparts of M3, including 
credit). The preliminary results indicate that this common trend conveys 
useful information on future inﬂation, conﬁrming that the analysis of 
monetary indicators remains essential to an appropriate monetary 
policy, provided it is not restricted to a single variable. 
Financial innovation also implies a greater role for expectations and 
monetary policy communication in the transmission of monetary policy 
and in the decision-making process of central banks. The wide range 
of information we can extract from ﬁnancial markets enables us to 
estimate market expectations on inﬂation, growth and policy actions, the 
uncertainty surrounding those expectations, and even investors’ attitude 
towards risk. This is a crucial ingredient of the information set we use in 
our decision-making. 
Owing to more complete and efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets, monetary 
policy is transmitted swiftly through asset prices. Not only actual but 
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also expected changes in ofﬁcial interest rates very quickly affect a wide 
range of ﬁnancial assets, in turn affecting consumption and investment 
decisions. In this context, policy communication becomes critical. On 
the one hand, if guided by proper communication, market reactions 
may partly “do the job” for central banks. On the other hand, errors in 
communication can be more costly than in the past, as they can easily 
increase volatility and, in extreme cases, induce a widespread portfolio 
shift, with potentially disorderly effects on liquidity and asset prices. 
The importance of changes in market expectations and of proper 
communication by the central banks was conﬁrmed this summer, when 
the crisis originating in the US subprime mortgage market produced 
a heightened preference for precautionary liquidity by banks and 
consequent strains in the interbank market The Eurosystem monitored 
the developments and acted to ensure the orderly functioning of the 
money market, providing liquidity when needed. At the same time 
it made it clear that its monetary policy stance would continue to be 
based on the macroeconomic outlook and threats to price stability in the 
medium term. 
The summer’s events have conﬁrmed that many of the implication for 
both ﬁnancial stability and monetary policy transmission of the changes 
in ﬁnancial markets in recent years still need to be understood fully. This 
Colloquium is timely indeed, as in-depth reﬂections on these issues are 
urgent and important. As Eurosystem central bankers we pay a good 
deal of attention and research to the themes treated in this Conference. 
To judge by the programme and the highly qualiﬁed speakers, the debate 
will unquestionably provide valuable insights into these developments. 
I wish you a very fruitful day of work.
11Ginevra Cerrina Feroni
Ladies and Gentlemen,
as board member of the Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri Foundation, I am 
extremely pleased, to replace today Professor Giuseppe Morbidelli, whose 
I had the honour of being the pupil, in the same way he has been pupil 
of the late Professor Alberto Predieri, from whom the Foundation takes 
its name. 
Mine is indeed only a welcome greeting, since I am a Professor of 
Constitutional Law and my knowledge about the Country of our kind 
guests and friends is limited to the Supreme Court, to checks and 
balances, to the presidential powers, to the themes of  implied powers, 
and of commerce clause; yet I would say that the matter which is closer 
to the themes dealt with in our Convention is that which starts from 
Alexander Hamilton and is bound to the birth of the National Bank of 
America and to the creation of a single monetary system. Not only does 
he recognize the substantial power of the market to produce economic 
wealth, but also the necessity of aids and cautious encouragements on 
behalf  of the government to promote and direct the market forces.
Obviously from Hamilton onwards the bank activity has become  extremely 
varied and reﬁned. I am just thinking of  the central role today played 
by the ﬁnancial derivatives and of that complex amount of  “ﬁnancial 
engineering” progressively increasing and evolving whose function is 
still that one of representing protection values, in order to reduce the 
aleatory price of a correlated value. These are all instruments allowing 
a wider liquidity in the capital markets, supporting the development of 
international commerce. Moreover they are a powerful means of economic 
growth.
An issue - I could also omit it - that however raises legal, economical 
and political questions of great importance pertaining to the structure of 
intermediation; and in fact the interests that lie behind are unmeasurable 
and the crises of the derivatives are able to create crises of the Stock 
Exchange system, crisis of the economical system and recessions of whole 
countries.
Ginevra Cerrina Feroni
University of Florence
and Board Member of Fondazione Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri
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Let’s think of the frequency with which banks and Financial Brokers 
are sued for damages having encouraged inexperienced customers to 
invest in highly speculative transactions on ﬁnancial by-products such 
as Swaps, Futures, Options, Hedge Funds, Trading. This has brought a 
strong impact on the whole system and its credibility.
Naturally all these activities can be regulated and kept under check 
through doctrinal coordinates; however, the spectre of the self-assured 
use of these ﬁnancial products, cyclically, crops up. If I wanted to make 
a comparison with the theory of the constituent power, I could say crises 
are always ready to burst out just like the constitutional power: “a ﬁre 
that smoulders under the ashes can always re-emerge”, the theorists of 
the French revolution said.
It is  up to us then to identify some more effective reporting and monitoring 
mechanisms, since the exponential growth of the derivatives over the last 
few years highly jeopardizes the control of the single national supervisory 
authorities  on the ﬁeld without any national borders.
The problem never solved is here: imposing restrictions to the markets or 
keeping promoting the self-regulation of the Bank system? It seems to me 
that up to now the policy of the American Central Bank has followed the 
latter pattern.
“Both central Banks and the supervisory Authorities should resist 
to the temptation to issue ad hoc rules for every kind of new ﬁnancial 
instrument or institution” (so said two years ago the President of the 
Federal Reserve about suggestions of the strict regulation concerning 
derivatives and edge funds). 
The answer has been that existing rules are sufﬁcient. 
This is quite a crucial issue. I must say that our Foundation has 
investigated the same subject, together with the Guido Carli Association. 
In fact, I recall the second International Conference on the theme of  “The 
new architecture of the International money system” held in Florence in 
October 1999, planned and wanted, by the far-sightedness of Professor 
Savona and on this subject it’s important to focus again. 
That’s the reason why, together with the Guido Carli Association, we 
have organized today’s Conference where a real “parterre de roi” attends 
in the persons of famous experts of the discipline from all over the world 
and the representatives of institutions.
13Ginevra Cerrina Feroni
The synergy, between the academic world, ﬁnance and institutions, has 
always been one of the targets of our conventions.
It is a great pleasure and an honour to open the workshops of this 
morning. I want to thank you for attending this meeting. 
Best wishes for everyone.
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The problem. Scholars and authorities alike are in favour of the 
free operation of the derivatives market, as in their opinion the properties 
of these instruments are such as to improve market efﬁciency and make 
risk management more rational.
They are convinced that derivatives have  
1. stabilizing effects on the price volatility of the underlying monetary 
and ﬁnancial assets;
2. price discovery properties that reduce uncertainty and so improve 
market participants’ choices;
3. abilities to lower asymmetric information, helping more rational 
choices on the part of market agents and monetary authorities;
4. power to curb  bid-ask spreads and transaction costs;
5. power to reduce frictions and noise-component in exchanges and 
price-settings.
Following the grave crises provoked by their improper use 
during the last decade – from Barings (“UK Her majesty’s bank”) to 
the US subprime mortgage market – the authorities are now paying 
greater attention to the problem and are oriented towards more incisive 
regulatory intervention. However, regulation cannot do without an 
understanding of the role played by these ﬁnancial innovations in the 
functional mechanisms of the economy and in economic policy choices.
The monetary authorities now acknowledge that derivatives 
have reduced the signiﬁcance of the indicators that guide their policy 
choices and have altered the mechanism whereby their decisions are 
transmitted.
Fiscal policy makers appear to be less fully aware of the impact of 
derivatives on their own choices.
Associazione Guido Carli has been working on both aspects for 
over a decade and has gone further, analyzing the effects of derivatives 
on investment, and thereby on real economic growth, income distribution 
and price-setting.
Ignoring the existence of ﬁnancial derivatives reduces the 
heuristic capacity of studies in economics.
Paolo Savona
Associazione Guido Carli
and University of Rome “Luiss Guido Carli”
16 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Our view of the problem. The macroeconomic potential effects fo 
derivatives is represented in the following logical scheme
Flows’ Chart of the Derivatives’ Macroeconomic Effects       
This is an elementary version of a more complex scheme, but 
it reﬂects our idea of what constitutes the “heart” of the question in 
macroeconomic terms. In a nutshell, derivatives affect interest rates 
in somewhat the same way as Keynes’s liquidity preference. Using the 
“Tobin’s q” paradigm, it follows that derivatives also affect the rate of 
capital formation, hence real economic growth and (using the “Sraffa 
paradigm”) prices in the oligopolistic markets. Another effect stems 
from the burgeoning use of derivatives in public debt management, with 
an increasing inﬂuence on current public spending.
Essentially, ﬁnancial derivatives have so great an impact on 
market volumes and prices that the many empirical studies that fail 
to take them explicitly into account contribute little or nothing to our 
understanding of the functioning of economic mechanisms and produce 
fallacious predictions.
We do not concentrate on the use of derivatives as a way of 
hedging risk but as instruments for rational portfolio management 
by public and private operators and for low-cost speculation free from 
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regulatory constraints. We agree that risk hedging via derivatives offers 
substantial beneﬁts for the market management of resources, but we 
cannot fail to note that someone is always left “holding the bag” of excess 
or “unforeseeable” risk, which exists even if you ignore it.
 If derivatives play a role in the transmission of monetary and ﬁscal 
impulses or the effects of market agents’ choices, as the logic and the 
empirical evidence suggest, then it is necessary to comprehend this 
role and supplement the rules for monetary and ﬁscal policy and, more 
generally, the pursuit of growth and employment.
 
Derivatives and money. The demand for derivatives works an 
efﬁcient substitute either for the speculative and transaction demand 
for money. Then they are subject to the perils of Keynes’s “liquidity 
paradox” whereby everybody thinks he is liquid, in part because they 
hold derivatives, but the system as a whole is not. Naturally, today’s 
central banks are not those that caused or at any rate aggravated the 
crisis of 1929. They know they must serve as lenders of last resort when 
the market suspects that the system overall may not be liquid and tests 
it in the area of derivatives used for monetary and other purposes; or 
when it is swept by panic originating in the derivatives sector. Hunter 
and Marshall (1999) highlighted the delicate nature of this role. Again, 
let us cite in support of this thesis the massive interventions by central 
banks in the subprime mortgage crisis, after seeing how effective they 
were in resolving the LTCM crisis (but less in the Asian crisis).
It is hard to deny that derivatives alter investors’ preference 
schedule in monetary matters, hence their balance-sheet equilibria. 
The authorities should seriously consider bringing the derivatives 
market into their forecasting models to perfect the logical and empirical 
foundations of their policy decisions, as they did following the Second 
World War when they saw the need for models to explain the working 
of the economy. A comparable process of inquiry on derivatives is 
hampered by the lack of statistics, itself the product of the persistence 
with which their macroeconomic effects have been neglected and their 
microeconomic beneﬁts exalted.
Derivatives and ﬁscal policy. The problem of the macroeconomic 
effects of derivatives goes beyond the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, and the Guido Carli Association’s research project dealt 
with ﬁscal policy as well, analyzing the effects of derivatives on capital 
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formation, the heart of the growth mechanism.
A ﬁrst inquiry into the use of derivatives by ﬁscal policy makers 
found some techniques that can assist in the proper conduct of 
budget policy, but also some that have all the earmarks of devices for 
circumventing orthodox ﬁscal policy constraints, and still others that 
would appear to be outright accounting abuses. The positive techniques 
– though still, in our view, ﬁscally improper – include Italy’s mega-
swap on public debt interest rates in 1998, whose very substantial 
revenue enabled the country to bring the deﬁcit below the Maastricht 
threshold of 3% of GDP. The deﬁnitely deleterious techniques include 
the derivative transactions effected by some Italian local governments 
during election campaigns, procuring ready cash for “electoral” spending 
and deferring the cost to future budgets, to the evident detriment of 
municipal ﬁnances, especially when the cost would have to be paid by a 
new set of incumbents. Elsewhere, governments have used derivatives 
to inﬂate the size of their ofﬁcial reserves, so greatly confusing their 
valuation as not to realize the potential repercussions they were facing. 
This (together with excessive resort to short-term borrowing) was 
one feature of the Asian crisis of 1997, threatening an international 
contagion and a possible systemic crisis.
It is worth underscoring that these ways of circumventing the 
rules, these abuses of the instrument, are suggested by market agents 
themselves; it is unlikely, in fact, that governments, especially local 
governments, could have thought them up and requested them. Anyway, 
in politics the learning process through word-of-mouth is extremely 
rapid, and many central and local governments quickly mastered a series 
of sophisticated transactions that they are now capable of requesting.
The study of derivatives’ impact on ﬁscal policy concludes that 
like monetary indicators the public debt and budget balances, which are 
the crucial ﬁscal policy indicators, have lost signiﬁcance. Ultimately the 
nature and size of traditional budgetary packages escape understanding, 
with an undoing or at least weakening of the empirical relation between 
instruments and objectives not unlike that decried by Alan Greenspan 
for monetary policy. Fiscal policy-making is already complicated enough 
owing to the cumbersome democratic process and the political and 
social pressures that are brought to bear; the last thing it needs is to be 
further burdened by the improper use of derivatives. The logical limits 
and practical rules on the use of derivatives by ﬁscal policy-makers 
therefore need to be deﬁned; that is, the operation of this market within 
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the ﬁscal policy transmission mechanism must be taken into logical and 
theoretical account. In this sphere, much remains to be done.
Derivatives, capital formation and growth. The circle of this 
wide-ranging study of derivatives closes with a projection of the results 
for monetary and ﬁscal policy onto the real economy. We assume that 
“Tobin’s q” provides a serviceable explanation for investment decisions 
and derive some conclusions concerning the relation between proﬁt 
rates and interest rates.
If, as we hold, derivatives affect the rate of interest, it necessarily 
follows that they also affect the real rate of capital formation. As we know, 
Tobin’s q indicates that if the rate of return on existing investments is 
higher than the rate of interest, investors will prefer to invest in real 
capital goods; if it is lower, they will buy securities representing existing 
capital, driving their market value up. Accordingly, it is not enough to 
know how much derivatives affect interest rates, and in what direction; 
we must also know how they relate to the return on real capital.
On the second question – who causes what – Associazione 
Guido Carli has formed a working group under Professor Giangiacomo 
Nardozzi of Milan Polytechnical University to inquire into the direction 
of causality between proﬁt and interest rates. Its two progress reports 
(Nardozzi 2002 and 2007) offer support for the thesis that the interest 
rate dominates the proﬁt rate, especially recently when the “ﬁnancial 
sector has made a fundamental contribution to economic growth” as 
Governor Draghi notes (Banca d’Italia 2007). But this dominance differs 
by area and by period, according to a theory with which we largely agree. 
There is no permanent condition of economic relations, especially when 
money is involved.
Derivatives and price. The idea that we share is that set forth 
by Piero Sraffa in a short chapter to The Production of Commodities by 
Means of Commodities (1960). Sraffa holds that there is a force driving 
the income distribution – which, combined with technical innovation, is 
the source of prices and the engine of growth – that depends alternatively 
on entrepreneurs or on the monetary authorities. If the former are 
strong enough to set the proﬁt rate at the level they want, the rate of 
interest must adapt. If this power rests in the hands of the monetary 
authorities, the reverse happens. As democratic parliaments (if they are 
democratic) originated in order to determine the distribution of income 
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via the budget or legislation and thus have the power-cum-duty to do 
so, this analysis raises highly delicate problems concerning the limits 
to market freedom and the rationale for the independence of central 
banks.
Without denying the importance of these questions, we leave the 
response to other occasions and other disciplines, principally political 
philosophy. Here we need only argue on the rational plane that since the 
development of ﬁnancial derivatives nothing is the same in economics 
or economic policy. Without taking derivatives into account, no economic 
reasoning can be either logical or realistic – no economic reasoning 
whatever. Yet even in monetary economics writings that ignore this 
stricture abound and stake their claims to authority.
Not even the repeated crises or the warnings of authoritative 
market participants and leading policy makers have moved the economics 
profession. On the one hand, macroeconomic forecasters continue to 
make their predictions without factoring in the role of derivatives; and 
on the other, the academic world studies every possible phenomenon 
except for derivatives, and in teaching about them mentions only the 
microeconomic aspects or their market positioning. The macroeconomic 
effects on investment and real growth are ignored.
21Paolo Savona
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Abstract
We examine the relationship between real and ﬁnancial integration 
using new measures of each. Real returns to labor and capital across 
countries from 1982 to 1997 are measured using productivities of 
capital and labor from trade data. The black market exchange rate is the 
particular measure of ﬁnancial integration which we suggest and use. 
We ﬁnd an increase in the black market premium seldom is associated 
with a relative increase in the productivity of either labor or capital. We 
also ﬁnd more evidence of convergence to equality for returns to capital 
than for returns to labor.
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In this paper, we use the relative factor content of international 
trade to estimate the productivities of capital and labor and examine how 
changes in them from 1982 to 1997 are related to ﬁnancial integration. 
There is little information available on factor returns that is comparable 
across countries but available data on factor returns are correlated with 
these productivities of labor and capital computed from trade data.1
We start with a standard international-trade model: the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model. In this standard model of an integrated 
world in which all countries produce all goods, trade in factor services 
is a function of a country’s endowments relative to its consumption of 
factor services, and trade in goods is a substitute for direct trade in 
factor services and for migration of factors. With identical technologies, 
the HOV model implies that 1. A country has a comparative advantage 
in producing goods that use its relatively more abundant factors, 2. A 
country is a net exporter of its relatively abundant factors’ services and 
3. Factor returns are equalized across countries.2
Empirical tests of the HOV model examine the relationship 
between endowments and the observed pattern of trade and ﬁnd that 
the HOV model explains little of the direction or magnitude of trade.3 
In addition, violations of absolute factor price equalization are virtually 
self-evident in the data on measured wages across countries.
Hence, there must be explanations of the factor content of trade 
besides the simple HOV model.
Half a century ago, Leontief (1953) suggested a possible 
explanation for the HOV model’s poor performance — some countries 
may use factors of production more efﬁciently than others. An 
innovative series of papers by Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) 
and Treﬂer (1993, 1995) followed Leontief ’s suggestion and introduced 
technological differences into the HOV model. Treﬂer (1993) shows that 
factor-augmenting technology can equate actual trade in factor services 
and the theoretically implied trade in factor services. Allowing for 
factor-augmenting technological differences implies that factor prices 
are equalized in terms of relative efﬁciency units. For example, if labor-
1 Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2007) provide references.
2 At the level of aggregation used for the countries in this paper, there are no industries 
with zero production. This suggests to us that the conditions for factor price equalization 
are likely not to be wildly unrealistic in the context of the differences across countries 
envisaged in the theory.
3 A partial list of these studies include Maskus (1985) Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskus 
(1985), Treﬂer (1993, 1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001).
27Scott L. Baier and Gerard P. Dwyer Jr.
augmenting technology is ﬁve times higher in the United States than in 
Mexico, workers in the U.S. will receive a wage that is ﬁve times greater 
than the wage paid to workers who are in Mexico and otherwise identical. 
Treﬂer presents evidence that there is a strong relationship between 
relative factor payments and relative factoraugmenting productivity.
In an earlier paper, Robert Tamura and we (Baier, Dwyer and 
Tamura 2007) also show that these measures of factor-augmenting 
technology obtained from trade theory are related to total factor 
productivity. Theoretically, factor productivity implied by trade is 
similar to total factor productivity in the following sense: If factor 
productivity indicates that a unit of capital in the United States is twice 
as productive as a unit of capital in the Philippines, then the return to 
capital will be twice as high in the U.S. as in the Philippines. Similarly, 
for a given level of capital in the U.S. and the Philippines, if total factor 
productivity in the U.S. is twice as high as total factor productivity in 
the Philippines, then capital and labor’s returns can be twice as high 
in the U.S. Therefore, total factor productivity has the same effect on 
the returns to capital and labor as factor productivity from the HOV 
model.
In that earlier paper, we examined the determinants of factor 
productivity across countries. We found that protection of private 
property rights is the single most important explanation of cross-country 
differences in factor productivity in 1997.
Democracy has little relationship with trade productivities once 
property rights are included in the analysis. Measures of geography 
other than distance to a large market are not important.
In this paper, we examine changes in the productivity of capital 
and labor over time and how they are related to a particular measure of 
ﬁnancial integration.
We ﬁnd that capital productivities around the world are more 
similar than labor productivities in 1982 and also show much more 
evidence of converging from 1982 to 1997. Measuring ﬁnancial 
integration for a set of countries that includes many different levels of 
development of ﬁnancial markets is difﬁcult. We suggest black market 
exchange rates as a measure of ﬁnancial integration. Overall, black 
market exchange rates deviate less from ofﬁcial exchange rates by 1995 
than they did in 1980.
We ﬁnd some evidence that this convergence of black market 
exchange rates to ofﬁcial rates has been associated with convergence of 
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capital productivities.
In the next section, we summarize how the productivities of labor 
and capital are computed. We then summarize the data on black market 
exchange rates and examine the data for an association of changes in 
black market exchange rates and capital and labor productivities.
PRODUCTIVITIES OF LABOR AND CAPITAL
The productivities of labor and capital are those implied by 
international trade in goods given assumptions about technology and 
consumption of goods across countries.
HOV Theory and Productivity Differences
The details of the computation of labor and capital productivities 
are available elsewhere (Treﬂer 1993; Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 2007.) 
In this section, we outline how the productivities are computed.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of trade can be used to 
generate measures of productivity based on a comparison of the 
measured factor content of trade and a predicted factor content of trade. 
The basic analytical construct is a transformation of trade in goods into 
implicit trade of the factor services used to produce the goods.
The computations assume that countries have identical constant 
returns to scale production functions, markets are perfectly competitive, 
and the world is free from barriers that distort trade. This means 
that the measures of productivity reﬂect tariff and non-tariff barriers 
or inducements to trade. To rule out corner solutions in which there 
is no trade in some goods, the analysis assumes that endowments of 
factors across countries are distributed in such a way that there is an 
integrated world equilibrium with all countries producing some of all 
goods. The analysis proceeds by comparing the measured factor content 
of trade and a predicted factor content given the endowment of factor 
services in a country.
The measured factor content of trade is determined from actual 
trade in goods at a detailed level. A presumed common technology of 
an input-output matrix of coefﬁcients for the United States is used to 
determine this measured factor content of trade.
The predicted factor content of trade is a function of factor 
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availability, production and domestic consumption. In the baseline HOV 
model, there are no differences in how efﬁciently factors are used across 
countries and resources are fully employed. If people in all countries 
have identical and homothetic preferences, country i’s expenditure is 
proportional to its share of world expenditure. The predicted factor 
content of trade is factor use in domestic production minus factor use in 
domestic consumption.
The measured factor content of trade need not equal the predicted 
factor content of trade. These differences are the basis of the numerous 
tests of whether the HOV model characterizes actual trade.
An alternative way of posing the issue is to ask what differences 
in technology or productivity are necessary for the measured and 
predicted factor content of trade to be the same, an innovation due to 
Treﬂer (1993.) The measured factor content of trade is the same as 
the measured content of trade based on the common technology above. 
Suppose that technology differences are factor augmenting and the 
same across industries in a country. Then the predicted factor content of 
trade by a country adjusted for differences in productivity involves the 
unknown productivities for each factor for each country. Equating the 
measured and predicted factor contents of trade provides a productivity 
matrix for all countries for all factors.
A normalization is necessary because the productivities can 
be determined independently for all but one country.4 It is standard 
to normalize the productivities to one for the United States, which is 
natural given that the “common technology” is measured from United 
States input-output tables. Measuring the productivities by the average 
for all the countries is one obvious alternative normalization. For our 
purposes of measuring productivities over time, it is more informative 
to measure the productivities relative to the average for all countries 
rather than relative to the U.S.
If measured relative to the U.S., then productivity change in 
a country is measured relative to productivity change in the U.S. If 
measured relative to the average, then productivity change in a country 
is measured relative to productivity change in the average country.
4 While not obvious from this development, the estimates of productivity for a factor 
are independent of mismeasurement of the quantities of other factors and their 
productivities.
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Data
As is standard in most empirical trade research, the data used 
in this study are drawn from a variety of sources. All data are for 79 
countries in each year based on up to 32 industries of traded goods. The 
data on trade ﬂows are from Feenstra (2000.)
For inputs, we use data for the capital stock and the labor force 
measured in effective labor units. The capital stock measures are 
constructed using the perpetual inventory method with an annual 
depreciation rate of 13.3 percent, as in Leamer (1984), using real 
investment data from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). Aggregate labor 
force is converted into effective labor force units by multiplying the 
labor force by exp(    (educi, experi)) where educi is the number of years of 
schooling for the average worker in country i, experi is the average level 
of experience in country i and exp(     (educi, experi)) reﬂects returns to 
education and experience.5 Data on the labor force are from the World 
Bank (2002) and data for the conversion to effective labor are from 
Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006).
Our construction of the direct and indirect input requirement of 
factors to produce goods is standard (Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas 
1987). Input requirements are based on the 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 
input-output tables for the United States. The stocks of capital by 
industry in the U.S. are from the U.S. series “ﬁxed reproducible tangible 
wealth.” To equate the total of these capital stocks and our computed 
U.S. perpetual-inventory aggregate capital stock, the capital stock in 
each industry is multiplied by the ratio of the U.S. perpetual-inventory 
aggregate capital stock to the total of the U.S. capital stocks from ﬁxed 
reproducible tangible wealth. This results in a sum of the capital stocks 
by industry in the U.S. equal to our estimate of the aggregate U.S. 
capital stock. Data for the U.S. labor force employed in each sector are 
from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States 
and the Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2002) productivity database for 
1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. The total labor force is adjusted to equal 
5 The derivatives of     (educi, experi) are the returns to an additional year of schooling or 
experience that can be estimated from Mincerian wage regressions. As in Hall and Jones 
(1999), Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006), we assume 
that the return to education for the ﬁrst four years of schooling is 13.4 percent, 10.1 percent 
for the second four years and 6.8 percent for all years of education above the 8th year. As in 
Bils and Klenow (2000), we assume the return to experience is quadratic.
31Scott L. Baier and Gerard P. Dwyer Jr.
theWorld Bank’s estimate of the U.S. labor force (World Bank 2002). 
Data on workers’ average education by industry for the U.S. are from 
the 1990 Census (Ruggles, Sobek et al. 2003). Income per capita and 
population are from the World Bank (2002).
Each country’s share of world consumption is its share of 
absorption of goods and services in all countries.
CAPITAL AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITIES
Estimated Productivities
Table 1 shows the list of countries for which we have computed 
productivities. The countries are from quite different parts of the world, 
with quite different levels of incomes and associated development.
Figure 1 shows the labor and capital productivities for each of the 
countries for 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. All of these productivities are 
normalized so that the average productivity of labor and the average 
productivity of capital are unity in each year.
It is apparent from Figure 1 that there is a substantial amount of 
variation that at ﬁrst glance has little to do with the productivity of labor 
and capital as commonly understood. For example, Madagascar — MDG 
in the graphs — has the highest capital productivity in the world in 
1982, 1987 and 1992 and one of the highest in the world in 1997. Why? 
With the exception of being an importer of crude oil and an exporter 
of petroleum products, Madagascar primarily exports agricultural 
products and imports goods for use on the islands. Switzerland (CHE 
in the ﬁgures) has the highest labor productivity in the world. These 
ﬁgures are not obviously implausible. It is arguable that, at least in 
some cases, the productivities are distorted by resources such as oil 
deposits that are not included in the calculations.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the productivities. The 
standard deviation of the productivity of labor increases from 1982 to 
1987 and then changes little by 1997. The range increases with the 
lower end of the range lower in 1997 than in 1982 and the upper end 
of the range virtually the same in 1982 and 1997. In some ways, this is 
surprising given the emphasis on globalization. The standard deviation 
of the productivity of capital, though, declines from 1982 to 1997. The 
range of the productivities of capital declines due to a decrease in the 
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maximum. Probably the standard deviations are a better indicator of 
the changes in the distribution than the ranges, which can be affected 
by idiosyncratic variation in individual countries, but there is little 
evidence of convergence of the labor productivities.
It might seem that the apparent convergence of capital productivity 
could be a reﬂection of the decline in the calculated productivity of capital 
in Madagascar. Such is not the case. The standard deviations of capital 
productivity without Madagascar for each year are 1982, 0.809; 1987, 
0.788; 1992, 0.492; and 1997, 0.523. While not as large as the decline in 
Table 2, the decrease in the standard deviation still is substantial.6
The median labor productivity has declined, which means that 
labor productivity in the typical country has not increased as rapidly as 
it has in these countries on average.
At the same time, the median capital productivity has increased, 
approaching one by 1997. This is an interesting difference.
The correlations of labor and capital productivities increase 
consistently from the low value of 0.04 in 1982 to the highest value of 
0.39 in 1997.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a different perspective on the distributions 
of capital and labor productivities.
The distributions of labor productivity and capital productivity 
are quite different.
The labor productivities are skewed, with more countries below 
the average than above it. This ﬁgure provides some perspective on the 
reason for the different behavior of the medians of the distributions of 
labor and capital productivity. Median labor productivity actually fell 
from 0.62 in 1982 to 0.48, 0.49 and 0.50 in 1987, 1992 and 1997. At the 
same time, median capital productivity rose from 0.72 and 0.70 in 1982 
6 Steven Ongena suggested treating some additional high capital productivity countries 
as outliers.
We deleted high initial capital productivity countries in addition to Madagascar, namely 
Trinidad and Tobago, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With these 
additional observations deleted, the standard deviation of capital productivities decreases 
uniformly from 0.667 to 0.448. The estimated coefﬁcients of autoregressions similar to 
those in Table 3 show less mean reversion for capital productivity, which is to be expected. 
(The autoregressive coefﬁcient is 0.87).
Interestingly, the constant term in the regression for labor productivity is small relative to 
its mean with these four countries deleted.
The more general issue of the effects of natural resources and specialized production 
arrangements on these estimated productivities is an interesting question that we are 
examining in our continuing research.
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and 1987 to 0.89 and 0.97 in 1992 and 1997. The arithmetic averages, of 
course, are one throughout.
Standard convergence regressions also lead to the conclusion that 
capital productivity has converged and labor productivity has not. Table 
3 presents a variant of standard unconditional-convergence regressions, 
which basically are unit-root tests.
The regressions are run for 1997 as the ﬁnal year and 1982 as the 
initial year. It is most informative to present the regressions in levels 
with the t-ratio for the Dickey-Fuller test and we do that in the table. 
The autoregressive coefﬁcients themselves highlight the difference. 
The coefﬁcient for labor in 1982 is very close to one. The coefﬁcient 
for capital in 1982 is well below one.7 The constant term in the labor 
regression suggests that there is a very large downward trend in labor 
productivity, which is dubious at best given Figure 2.8 There deﬁnitely is 
a downward moment of the relatively low labor productivities, but this 
cannot translate into a downward trend because the productivities have 
a lower bound of zero.
There are, of course, lots of reasons to be dubious about these 
regressions for generating conclusions.9 Nonetheless, the results 
are striking in terms of the question under consideration. A natural 
result of integration of economies is convergence of returns to factors 
of production. Has there been integration in the sense that capital 
productivities have become more similar? The answer fairly clearly is 
“yes”. Has there been integration in terms of labor productivities? Not 
obviously!
In one sense, this result is not surprising. Financial markets have 
become more integrated and this can have a fairly direct effect of raising 
low returns to capital in some countries by supporting an outﬂow and 
lowering high returns in other countries by supporting an inﬂow.
In another sense, this result is surprising if taken at face value. If 
the marginal product of capital increases because of inﬂows of capital, 
this increases the demand for labor and the marginal product of labor 
should increase unless the elasticity of supply of labor is inﬁnite.
Are capital and labor productivities this disconnected? A little bit 
7 Regressions for the logarithms of the productivities lead to the same conclusion concerning 
convergence of productivities.
8 We thank Jouko Vilmunen for pointing this out to us.
9 Not the least of these reasons are shortcomings in this context of classical statistical 
analysis compared to a Bayesian approach along the lines of Dwyer et al (2007).
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of evidence says not. The correlations of changes in labor and capital 
productivities are indeed positive. The correlation of changes in labor 
productivity and capital productivity is 0.38 from 1982 to 1997. While 
hardly overwhelming, this correlation is not zero.10 The correlation of 
changes in the logarithms of the productivities is quite a bit higher, 
0.80, suggesting that there is quite a bit of force to this argument, the 
seeming disconnect between the changes in the distributions of the 
productivities aside.
Figure 4 illustrates the issue in a different way. Figure 4 shows 
the growth rate of labor and capital productivity in each country for 
1982 to 1997. Many countries had rising labor and capital productivity. 
More than a few countries had falling labor and capital productivity. It 
is worthwhile recalling that the productivities are measured relative 
to the average in each year, so falling productivity does not mean that 
returns to labor and capital falls. Falling productivity in Figure 4 means 
that returns to labor and capital fell relative to the average. While not 
as bad as falling absolutely, falling behind hardly is attractive. More 
than a few countries also had falling labor productivity and rising 
capital productivity. Only two, Cyprus and Singapore, had rising labor 
productivity and falling capital productivity.
Perhaps a measure of ﬁnancial market integration will be 
informative about the integration of capital markets, and possibly labor 
markets as well.
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
With such a disparate set of countries, it is not immediately 
obvious how to measure ﬁnancial integration.
The best measure would be the set of prices of various risk factors 
in foreign markets.
This has a solid theoretical basis and an unambiguous 
interpretation. Such measures based on markets for stocks and bonds 
are not likely to be very useful for our set of countries though. A country 
such as Vietnam for example is unlikely to have representative data 
from ﬁnancial markets to permit reliable and comparable estimation 
10 The p-value for a test that the correlation is zero is 0.06 percent, far less than usual 
statistical signiﬁcance levels.
35Scott L. Baier and Gerard P. Dwyer Jr.
of the prices of risk factors. The same statement can be made for many 
other countries in our set of data.
An alternative measure is the openness of domestic ﬁnancial 
markets to foreigners. This is the path followed by Edison and Warnock 
(2003). Examination of their data reveals though, that even this measure 
is not available for many markets, no doubt because some of our countries 
do not have organized exchanges with data available. Instead of going 
down this road, we examine the foreign exchange market as a plausible 
candidate for informative data.
We suggest that the black market premium is likely to be a useful 
measure of ﬁnancial integration. A black market is prima facie evidence 
of an imperfectly functioning market for foreign exchange. In addition, 
a black market for foreign exchange implicitly indicates that some 
transactions occur at more favorable exchange rates, which is itself an 
indication of likely favoritism in the allocation of preferential exchange 
rates and corruption in at least some cases. Finally, a black market in 
foreign exchange is likely to be associated with other policies that hinder 
the efﬁcient operation of a country’s economy and would be reﬂected in 
low productivities of labor and capital.
Data on Black Market Exchange Rate
The data on the black market exchange rate are from a compilation 
of black market premia by Gwartney and Lawson (2005). These data 
primarily are from various issues of the MRI Bankers’ Guide to Foreign 
Currency. In this source, the black market exchange rates are estimates 
for the parallel domestic market for foreign exchange (Monetary Research 
Institute, 2005). Gwartney and Lawson (2005, p. 177) supplement these 
data by data from other sources when necessary.
Preliminary Analysis of the Data
Figure 5 shows the black market premia for 1980 and 1995. 
These dates are two years before the ﬁrst and two years before the 
last measures of capital and labor productivities. To facilitate later 
analysis, the ﬁgures show gross premia in percent, which means that 
the “premium” is the black market exchange rate relative to the ofﬁcial 
exchange rate in percent. As a result, a gross premium of 100 percent 
means that the “black market exchange rate” is the same as the ofﬁcial 
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exchange rate.
It is immediately obvious in Figure 4 that the frequency of 
black market exchange rates well above the ofﬁcial rate has decreased 
markedly over the ﬁfteen years covered by the ﬁgure. Many countries 
had substantial black market premia in 1980 and not many had much in 
the way of black market premia by 1995. This strikes us as prima facie 
evidence of greater effective ﬁnancial integration among economies.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the black market premia in 
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. It is clear that there is substantial movement 
toward black market gross premia close to 100 percent.
In one sense, the histograms are less revealing than they could 
be. Even in 1995, there are quite a few countries that have gross premia 
above 100, in fact 41 countries.
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the black market premia 
for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
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Figure 7 shows the relationship between changes in the black 
market premium from 1980 to 1995 and capital productivity from 1982 
and 1997. The ﬁgure shows relative capital productivities and the 
relative black market premium. An increase in capital productivity is 
an increase in capital productivity relative to the average for the world. 
The gross black market premia are never less than 100 percent, so a 
decrease in the relative black market premium is a decrease toward one 
hundred in all cases and an improvement in integration. The horizontal 
and vertical reference lines divide the ﬁgure into four quadrants. The 
upper left quadrant represents an improvement in capital productivity 
and the black market premium, the upper right quadrant represents an 
improvement in capital productivity and a worsening of the black market 
premium, the lower left quadrant represents a worsening of capital 
productivity and an improvement in the black market premium and the 
lower right quadrant represents a worsening of capital productivity and 
a worsening of the black market premium.
Few countries have higher black market premia in 1995 than in 
1980. In fact only Haiti, Venezuela and Nigeria have black market premia 
that increased substantially over those years. Each of these countries 
has a lower relative capital productivity in 1995 than in 1980.
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It is clear that a fall in the black market premium is not a 
guarantee of an improvement in relative capital productivity. Countries 
with improvements in their black market premia have increases and 
decreases in relative capital productivity. Relatively few countries have 
higher black market premia in 1995 than in 1982, but all of the countries 
with large increases in black market premia have lower relative capital 
productivity in 1997 than in 1982. No country with a higher black 
market premium in 1995 has a higher relative capital productivity in 
1997.
Figure 8 shows a similar graph for labor productivity. Venezuela 
and Nigeria also have lower labor productivity, although Haiti has 
higher labor productivity.
Does this pattern hold for subperiods?
Figure 9 shows the changes in capital productivities and black 
market premia for the three subperiods. There are a few exceptions, but 
it still is true that increases in capital productivity are seldom associated 
with increases in the black market premium.
Figure 10 shows a similar result for labor productivity.
Table 5 presents the results of Chi-square tests of association 
between changes in black market premia and changes in labor and 
capital productivities. The changes in black market premia are divided 
into three classes: falling, unchanging and increasing.
No change is quite likely since some countries never have any 
deviation from ofﬁcial exchange rates.11 The changes in productivities 
are divided into two classes: rising and falling. Because it is a test of 
association, these test results do not impose any constraints such as 
linearity. We interpret the p-values in Table 4 as providing some support 
for the importance of black market premia for productivity.
CONCLUSION
Some results seem clear, even though more deﬁnitive conclusions 
await further research.
Capital productivities around the world have tended to converge 
more than labor productivities from 1982 to 1997. This is so even though 
11 The fraction of countries with no change in the black market premium is 20 percent from 
1980 to 1985, 25 percent from 1985 to 1990 and 38 percent from 1990 to 1995.
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capital productivities were more similar than labor productivities in 
1982.
Financial integration is a possible explanation for the convergence 
of capital productivities.
Measuring ﬁnancial integration for a set of countries that 
includes many different levels of development of ﬁnancial markets 
is difﬁcult. We suggest black market exchange rates as a measure of 
ﬁnancial integration. Black market exchange rates deviate less from 
ofﬁcial exchange rates by 1995 than they did in 1980. We ﬁnd some 
evidence that this convergence of black market exchange rates has been 
associated with convergence of capital productivities.
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Table 1
Countries in This Dataset
Algeria Kenya
Argentina Korea
Australia Madagascar
Austria Malawi
Bangladesh Malaysia
Bolivia Mauritius
Brazil Mexico
Bulgaria Morocco
Cameroon Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
Chile Niger
Colombia Nigeria
Congo Democratic Republic of Norway
Congo Republic of Pakistan
Costa Rica Panama
Cyprus Paraguay
Denmark Peru
Dominican Republic Philippines
Ecuador Portugal
Egypt Romania
El Salvador Senegal
Finland Sierra Leone
France Singapore
Gabon South Africa
Germany Spain
Ghana Sri Lanka
Guatemala Sweden
Guyana Switzerland
Haiti Taiwan
Honduras Thailand
Hong Kong Trinidad and Tobago
Hungary Tunisia
India Turkey
Indonesia Uganda
Ireland United Kingdom
Israel United States
Italy Uruguay
Jamaica Venezuela
Japan Zambia
 Zimbabwe
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Table 2
Summary Statistics on the Estimated Labor
and Capital Productivities
Mean Median Minimum 
Value
Maximum 
Value
Standard 
Deviation
1982 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.619 0.069 3.751 0.902
1987 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.484 0.040 4.908 1.082
1992 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.495 0.042 4.327 1.090
1997 Labor Productivity 1.0 0.499 0.029 3.755 1.049
1982 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.717 0.235 8.132 1.143
1987 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.696 0.102 6.296 0.988
1992 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.891 0.126 5.809 0.734
1997 Capital Productivity 1.0 0.971 0.112 3.391 0.540
Correlations of Productivities
1982 .038
1987 .098
1992 .304
1997 .393
There are 79 countries for each of the years. By construction, the mean labor 
productivity and mean capital productivity for each year are one.
Table 3
Convergence of Productivities to Means
1982 to 1997
Dependent Variable Constant Coefﬁcient 
1982 
Productivity
t-ratio 
for 
change
R2 se
1997 Labor Productivity -8.011 1.011 0.017 .753 .521
(.088) (.065)
1997 Capital Productivity 0.731 0.269 -16.538 .324 .447
(.067) (.044)
The t-ratios of parameters are in parentheses.
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Table 4
Summary Statistics on Black Market Exchange Rates
1980 to 1995
All Black Market Exchange Rates
Year Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation
1980 145.9 106 728 100 99.5
1985 165.8 107 1346 100 175.9
1990 124.3 104 516 100 61.5
1995 109.1 101 386 100 39.4
1997 109.5 101 371 100 34.5
Black Market Exchange Rates Not Equal to Ofﬁcial Exchange Rate
Year Number of 
Observations
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation
1980 61 159.4 116 728 101 109.8
1985 61 185.2 119 1346 101 196.3
1990 47 140.9 113 516 101 75.6
1995 41 117.5 103 386 101 53.6
1997 48 115.6 104 371 101 43.3
Table 5
Tests for Association Between Productivities
and Black Market Exchange Rates
1982 to 1997
Changes Chi-square Chi-square 
p-value
Productivity Black Market 
Exchange Rate
1992 to 1997 Labor Productivity 1980 to 1985 3.779 .151
1992 to 1997 Labor Productivity 1985 to 1990 8.313 .016
1992 to 1997 Labor Productivity 1990 to 1995 3.847 .146
1982 to 1987 Capital Productivity 1980 to 1985 3.785 .151
1987 to 1992 Capital Productivity 1985 to 1990 9.944 .007
1992 to 1997 Capital Productivity 1990 to 1995 5.834 .054
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Figure 1
Productivities of Capital and Labor
45Scott L. Baier and Gerard P. Dwyer Jr.
Figure 2
Labor Productivities in 1982 and 1997
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Figure 3
Capital Productivities in 1982 and 1997
47Scott L. Baier and Gerard P. Dwyer Jr.
Figure 4
Growth Rates of Labor and Capital Productivities
1982 to 1997
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Figure 5
Gross Black Market Premium
1995 and 1980
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Figure 6
Distribution of Black Market Premia
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995
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Figure 7
Relative Black Market Rates, 1980 to 1995,
and Relative Capital Productivites, 1982 to 1997
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Figure 8
Relative Black Market Rates, 1980 to 1995,
and Relative Labor Productivites, 1982 to 1997
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Figure 9
Relative Black Market Rates and Relative Labor Productivites
By Five-years Periods
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Figure 10
Relative Black Market Rates and Relative Labor Productivites
By Five-years Periods

The paper by Baier and Dwyer calculates normalized capital 
and labor productivity growth for the years 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 
for 84 countries. The paper ﬁnds conversion in capital but not labor 
productivity and establishes an association between conversion in 
capital productivity to black (foreign exchange) market premia. The 
paper then asks the question if this conversion is related to ﬁnancial 
integration? Clearly the paper addresses a very important topic.
The questions I have pertain to the calculation of productivity growth 
and the use of the black market premia. I also have some suggestions 
for additional or alternative empirical speciﬁcations.
1. Calculation of Productivity Growth
One of the key assumptions in the calculation of productivity 
growth is the presumed common technology of an input-output matrix of 
coefﬁcients for the United States that is used to determine the measured 
factor content of trade. This assumption may or not be innocuous but 
it may be fruitful to document the robustness of the results to this 
choice, especially because this paper compares productivity growth over 
somewhat longer time windows. Maybe other papers have demonstrated 
the robustness of ﬁndings and ranking to this assumption, in which 
case these papers should be cited.
A second issue in the calculation of productivity growth concerns 
the possible presence of outliers.
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Gerard P. Dwyer Jr. Financial and Real Integration
Steven R.G. Ongena
Professor of Banking and Finance
Research Fellow of the CENTER, Tilburg University, Netherlands
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Figure 1 - Productivities of Capital and Labor
Visual inspection reveals the potential importance of one to three 
countries that may determine the ﬁndings that variation decreases (the 
lines on the ﬁgure are drawn to correct for the differences in scaling). 
These countries themselves (Madagascar and Uganda for example) are 
somewhat unexpected in obtaining a high capital productivity, but in 
addition their change in productivity may drive the main ﬁndings of 
convergence.
While difﬁcult to tackle, and not uncontroversial in itself, a closer 
analysis of the impact of these data points seems warranted. Statistical 
tests could be used to determine if removal is reasonable (Chatterjee 
and Hadi (1986)), after which the convergence regressions should be 
re-run.
2. Black Market Premia
To use black market premia is clearly very nice. Though the 
motivation for its use is somewhat weakened if one realizes that in 
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many countries convertibility drives the premium to zero, or “100” in 
the authors’ normalization. Hence it is not clear from an econometric 
point of view if there is more information in the black market premia, 
than in stock or bond market information which the authors choose not 
to use, as a few countries do not feature active security markets with 
reliable price information. My suggestion would be to also examine the 
subset of countries that do have security price information.
Given that black market premia are not that often used as a 
measure of ﬁnancial integration it may also be interesting to discuss 
this market further to explore whether there were shifts in demand or 
supply or changes in the micro structure of this market that coincided 
with the trends of ﬁnancial integration, i.e., to discuss whether there 
are omitted variables that need to be considered when assessing the 
association between changes in capital productivity and ﬁnancial 
integration.
3. Association to Causation?
Finally, it may be interesting to explore why and how convergence 
in capital productivity growth occurs. In particular, from a policy point 
of view it may be key to understand which policy measures results in 
the quickest convergence.
Using the Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political 
Events in Emerging Markets compiled by Bekaert and Harvey (2004) or 
indicators compiled by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) one potentially 
could for many countries identify key regulatory events of ﬁnancial 
market opening to regress the difference in year t between the maximum 
and the country i’s capital productivity growth        on
ﬁnancial market openness indicators for country i in year t-1. While 
legal and regulatory changes are never fully exogenous (as domestic or 
foreign parties lobby and intervene in the law making process), initial 
changes in emerging markets were often inspired or guided by exogenous 
common market programs or international institutions. In this way the 
paper can aim to identify which changes are mostly affecting capital 
productivity growth.
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4. Conclusion
This is clearly an interesting paper that broaches key topics in 
the ﬁnance and growth literature. The use of the black market premia 
is clever. Nevertheless, many extensions seem possible.
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Very interesting Paper. Correlation between real and Financial 
Integrations have not been done by the past. It is a new idea and new 
concept.
1. Real Integration
Concept:
If the variation of the productivities of Capital and Labor across 
countries are getting smaller, there is an real integration.
=> operational deﬁnition:
If std (productivities of K or L) becomes smaller then, there are 
convergence across countries.
=> Table 2
Real Integration in K: Capital Productivity: Sd decreases; yes
Real Integration in L: Labor Productivity: sd does not decrease; NO
Table 2
Summary Statistics on the Estimated Capital and Labor Productivities
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Gerard P. Dwyer Jr. Financial and Real Integration
Chung-Hua Shen
Professor of Banking and Finance, National Taiwan University
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There are 79 contries for each of the years. By construction, the mean labor productivity 
and mean capital productivity for each year are one.
2. Financial Integration
Measure:
• black market premium
= black market exchange rate/ofﬁcial exchange rate
(data are from Gwartney and Lawson, 2005)
• 100% means that black = ofﬁcial exchange rate
• > 100% : black market premium
• 1985: many countries > 100%
• 1995: more and more = 100%
• Yes, there is a ﬁnancial convergence;
Convergence to 100% denotes the Financial Integration
3. Are they related?
• Weakly yes in capital productivity
• No in labor productivity
Some Discussions
• Do we need to separate the countries into regions?
productivities and their std dev.s are quite different in different 
regions.
There are high and low level prod. regions.
• Will high level of productivity countries have low std dev. and thus 
converge fast? Or vice versa?
(In income convergence literature, high GDP per capital countries grow 
slowly)
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Figure 4
Growth Rates of Labor and Capital Productivities
1982 to 1997
And their studies to explore
• Why is labor productivity not convergent
• Std(labor prod) = f(x1, x2...)
• Std(capital prod) = f(z1, z2..)
• Though this is not the purpose of this paper, this helps us to 
investigate why labor market integration is not correlated with ﬁnancial 
integration.
4. The non-convergence of Labor productivity could cite some 
anecdotal evidence, reports etc from
• The International Labor Organization (ILO) says:
• While productivity levels have increased worldwide over the past 
decade, gaps remain wide between the industrialized region and most 
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others, although some regions have begun to catch up, a new ILO report 
says, adding that major cause of world poverty is waste of workers’ 
productive potential
• http://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm
• ILO is the tripartite UN agency that brings together governments, 
employers and workers of its member states in common action to 
promote decent work throughout the world.
5. Black market premium (BMP):
black market of exchange rate exists because of capital control.
Once the country deregulates the capital control, most of time, black 
market will be gone.
• Thus, in developing country, BMP could be more like a step function:
more than 100% before the deregulation and is close to 100% after it.
In some countries BMP change little, like US
In some countries, BMP are step function, converge, like Taiwan
In some countries, BMP remain large
If we have time series data, it might be a step function for some countries 
and changes little for other countries
Figure 5
Gross Black Market Premium
1995 and 1980
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6. maybe, we could cite some studies from Literature of Income 
Convergence?
• For example:
• Is the convergence here more related to
• the sigma convergence?
• If yes, they most often use the variation of coefﬁcient, not std dev. (this 
paper talks about std dev, but I may overlook it)
• Sometimes, using Theil index
• Also, they use bootstrap to construct the conﬁdence interval
7. could the paper consider the possibility of Club convergence?
Beta:
Club: Some countries form a group, such as OECD countries, and might 
have K-club convergence and L-club convergence
• Their ﬁnancial integration may also converge in a group basis
Ref: “Sigma Convergence Versus Beta Convergence: Evidence from 
County-Level Data,” Young, A.T., M.J. Higgins and D. Levy, (2007),
8. Table 3 examines the convergence by regression; it mentions 
about the unit root ...
• Is it the panel unit root test? In the text, it says the unit root
• But seems slightly different from the standard panel unit root
• It seems to me that it is more like a beta convergence
• Negative relationship between the growth rate and the value of initial 
income
• I might be wrong but slightly clariﬁcation would be better
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Table 3
Convergence of Productivities to Means
1982 to 1997
The t-ratios of parameters are in parentheses.
9. This is an Association Study between real and Financial 
Integration, could it be possible to investigate:
• Is the correlation changing over time?
• Can correlation be accounted for by some variables?
• Are there any threshold effects if a multiple regression is used?
10. More literature discuss the rationale of why two deﬁned 
integrations will be linked would be helpful
• Is it because ﬁnancial liberalization?
• Is it particularly true in EU because of elimination of trade barrier?
1. Introduction
The hedge fund “industry” began when Alfred Winslow Jones 
founded the ﬁrst such fund in 1949. Growth was slow for many years 
thereafter. In 1968, an SEC study reported 140 operating hedge funds; 
a 1984 industry survey identiﬁed only 68 (Connor and Woo (2003)). 
By 1990 (2000), approximately 500 (4,000) hedge funds had USD 40 
billion (500 billion) in assets under management (Hildebrand (2007)). 
Hedge fund investing then exploded. By the end of 2006, the estimated 
number of funds stood at 9,500 worldwide, controlling assets of nearly 
USD 1.6 trillion. Although hedge funds originated in the U.S., they also 
operate in Europe and Asia. Between 2002 and 2006, the U.S. share of 
worldwide hedge fund assets fell from 80% to 65%, while the European 
and Asian shares rose to 24% and 8% respectively (FSF 2007, page 8). 
Ryback (2007, page 144) reports that Asian-domiciled funds’ assets 
under management grew from about USD20 billion in 2002 to USD130 
billion at yearend 2006, when 335 Asian hedge funds owned more than 
USD50 billion in emerging Asian markets’ assets (that is, those outside 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand).
This overall growth in the hedge fund sector obscures an important 
fact: even while many new funds have emerged, many old funds have 
closed their doors. Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005) estimate that the 
annual attrition rate for hedge funds varies between 5.2% and 14.4%, 
depending on the fund’s investment strategy. The Financial Stability 
Forum (2007, page 7) reports that 1,518 new hedge funds were founded 
in 2006 and 717 were liquidated. Both entry and exit were thought to 
Thanks to Adrian Tobias for providing data. My discussants (Robert Marquez and Bob 
DeYoung) and the Colloquium participants offered helpful comments and suggestions. The 
usual disclaimer applies.
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have been higher in 2005. The 2007 BIS Annual Report opines that 
“Investor interest in the sector appears to have leveled off over the past 
couple of years, and closures have outnumbered new funds launched.” 
(page 123)
Of course, the main driver of hedge fund growth was the potential 
for large net returns. The promise of high, market-neutral returns was 
especially alluring after the stock market crash of 2001, when market 
interest rates (and risk premia) fell to historically low level under 
such market conditions. Figure 1 plots monthly hedge fund returns, as 
estimated by the Bank for International Settlements.1
Figure 1: Hedge Fund Returns
Source: BIS 77th Annual Report (2007), page 123. The indicated returns are annualized, 
36-month rolling averages of the hedge fund returns net of fees and the return on 3-month 
U.S. Treasury bills.
1 Hedge fund return series computed from standard data sources suffer from several 
potentially important biases, relating to selective reporting, asset misvaluations, rare-
events type of risks (like insurance catastrophe bonds), and the lack of adjustments for 
correlations with other asset classes. See, among others, Malkiel and Saha (2005), Stulz 
(2007), Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005).
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As the number of funds and AUM have expanded, it seems likely 
that the additional competition exerts downward pressure on realizable 
returns. The declining return trends in Figure 1 are consistent with this 
idea.
Figure 2 compares the “all funds” rolling returns from Figure 1 
to that on the S&P 500 index (again net of the return on 3-month bills). 
Over this period the average hedge fund provided a higher mean return 
(6.96% vs. 1.74%) and lower variability.
Figure 2: Hedge Fund and S&P500 Index Returns
Source: BIS 77th Annual Report (2007), page 123 and author’s calculations. The indicated 
returns are annualized, 36-month rolling averages of returns net of fees and the return on 
3-month U.S. Treasury bills.
Despite their rapid growth, the hedge funds’ estimated 
$1.6 trillion assets under management (AUM) in 2006 is only a 
small fraction of U.S. (much less global) debt and equity securities 
outstanding. At the end of 2005, the entire hedge fund industry had 
fewer assets under management than the sum of the ﬁve largest banks’ 
proprietary trading desks (Hildebrand (2007), page 69). The deﬁning 
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feature of hedge fund investments is that they specialize in taking 
risky, undiversiﬁed positions in what they believe to be mis-priced 
securities.2 In taking and managing these positions, hedge funds trade 
very actively. Despite their relatively small proportion of ﬁnancial 
wealth under management, hedge fund account for a large proportion 
of the trades in certain risk markets, including equities, distressed 
debt, credit default swaps (CDS), and the lower (residual) tranches of 
asset-backed securities.
The impact of hedge fund operations on ﬁnancial markets is 
difﬁcult to identify. First, the funds are opaque. So no one knows their 
aggregate positions. Second, at least some hedge fund activities displace 
trades that had previously occurred through different channels. Connor 
and Woo ((2003)) point out that
some hedge fund strategies (for example, ﬁxed income arbitrage) were previously 
the proprietary domain of investment banks and their trading desks. One driver 
for the growth of hedge funds is the application of investment bank trading desk 
strategies to private investment vehicles. (page 17)
All commentators agree that hedge fund trading has generated 
some positive externalities for other traders. Arbitrage strategies tend 
to make market prices more accurate and revealing. The funds’ trading 
also supplies the market with liquidity, which facilitates other investors’ 
diversiﬁcation efforts. This liquidity has been particularly important in 
some formerly obscure contracts, such as CDS or catastrophe bonds, for 
which hedge fund trading has effectively created new markets. Other 
traders therefore have a new place to hedge.
Despite these apparent beneﬁts during normal market 
operations, there remain suspicions that hedge fund activities are 
not always benign. Indeed, they have sometimes been viewed as 
disruptive. Some observers blamed hedge fund speculators for the 
Asian currency devaluations in 1997. A more recent concern involves 
the potential for exaggerated market volatility if events move against 
large hedge fund positions. For example, in 1998 ofﬁcials feared that 
rapidly closing LTCM would generate large price swings in world 
ﬁnancial markets. The New York Federal Reserve Bank therefore 
facilitated an agreement among the fund’s creditors to assure an 
2 In this regard, the hedge funds compete with the proprietary trading desks of major 
money center banks.
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orderly liquidation of its portfolio. More recently, wellpublicized 
hedge fund losses have occurred with dramatic speed. One fund 
(Amaranth) lost $6 billion in October 2006 after betting the wrong 
way on natural gas futures. In June 2007, Bear Stearns closed two 
funds it was advising because subprime credit losses had drastically 
reduced their value. BNP Paribas suspended withdrawals from three 
of its own funds when the market for subprime mortgage securities 
largely disappeared.
This paper will describe the formation and operation of hedge 
funds, and discuss the policy issues associated with their activities. 
Section II describes the hedge fund industry’s institutional features and 
its positive effects on ﬁnancial market operations. Section III describes 
the main dangers of hedge fund activities perceived by market observers, 
and Section IV evaluates the likely effects of hedge funds on emerging 
market economies.
2. Institutional Features and Market Effects
Hedge funds organize themselves to minimize their exposure 
to explicit government oversight. Consequently, we have no unique 
deﬁnition for a “hedge fund.” Moreover, no regulator collects aggregate 
statistics; the available data describing this sector should be viewed as 
approximations.
A. Institutional Features
It is best to characterize hedge funds as “pools of investable capital 
organized to implement some risky investment strategies with limited 
diversiﬁcation.” In order to avoid double taxation of earnings, most U.S. 
funds are formed as a partnership, whose tax obligations accrue only 
at the partner level. Outside the U.S., funds are commonly organized in 
low-tax jurisdictions. Hedge funds require access to ﬁnancial markets, 
but this places few constraints on the legal and tax regimes under 
which they choose to operate. In order to avoid public scrutiny of their 
portfolios, hedge funds eschew public offerings; they sell partnership 
shares only to qualiﬁed investors through private placements. An 
investment adviser organizes a fund, which then hires the adviser to 
manage its capital. In the U.S., investment advisers with fewer than 15 
clients need not register with regulatory authorities, and a hedge fund 
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counts as only one client.3
It is tempting to deﬁne hedge funds in terms of their similarities to 
mutual funds or unit trusts. Both organizations seek attractive returns 
on invested capital, and both organizations are structured to avoid 
corporate taxation of investment income. Beyond these two features, 
however, the differences between mutual funds and hedge funds are 
more important than the similarities. The Investment Company Act of 
1940 requires that publicly-offered mutual funds incorporate explicit 
investor protection features (Edwards (2006)). Funds wishing to solicit 
investments from the public must disclose their investment strategies 
and report their holdings on a regular basis. They may not change 
their basic investment strategies without approval from the current 
shareholders.
Investors can trade shares of the fund at the end-of-day estimated 
net asset value (for open funds) or at current market prices (for closed-
ended funds). Mutual funds’ use of leverage and short sales are limited 
by law and regulations, and they may not compensate investment 
advisers on the basis of performance results.4
Hedge funds differ from mutual funds in all four of these 
dimensions. They solicit investment privately from “qualiﬁed” 
individuals and institutions, which can (presumably) assess the 
fund’s risk-return tradeoff without mandated information disclosures. 
Hedge funds provide little public information about their investment 
policies or positions, and require advance notice before investors are 
permitted to withdraw contributed capital. Hedge fund management 
fees are typically 1-2% of assets plus 20% of realized proﬁts.5 Lehmann 
(2006) argues that this compensation system is extremely important in 
aligning the incentives of managers with investors. Further alignment 
is assured because many advisers invest a substantial proportion of 
their own wealth in the fund.
3 In 2004, the SEC required that hedge fund advisers register as investment advisers but 
this regulation was invalidated by a federal court in June 2006 (Brown et al. (2006)). SEC 
(2003) describes which regulatory requirements do – and do not – apply to hedge funds.
4 Almazan et al. (2004) document a number of other restrictions placed on mutual fund 
investment advisers, and ﬁnd that these restrictions are more common in situations with 
weaker governance structures. They conclude that additional investment restrictions 
constitute part of the broader mechanism by which investors seek to align their interests 
with those of their investment managers.
5 In many agreements, proﬁts must exceed a treasury rate or some high-water market 
before performance fees are earned.
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Hedge funds follow a wide variety of investment strategies, 
broadly separated into three categories:
1. Directional, sub-divided into “long-short equity hedge,” 
“dedicated short bias,” “global macro,” “emerging markets,” and 
“managed futures.”
2. Event Driven, e.g. funds seeking arbitrage proﬁts from 
mergers or distress situations.
3. Market Neutral, including “ﬁxed income arbitrage,” 
“convertible bond arbitrage,” and “equity market neutral.”
The so-called “funds of funds” allocate their investors’ money into 
hedge funds pursuing one of more of the above strategies. Figure 3 plots 
the proportion of hedge fund assets under management in each of these 
strategic categories over the period 1990-2004. The Directional funds 
have fallen from 60% of AUM to 40%, while Market Neutral funds have 
more than doubled their share, from 6% to 16%. The Event Driven funds 
remained relatively ﬂat, with 10 – 15% of AUM.
Figure 3: Hedge Fund Assets Under Management, by Investment Style
Source: Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005). Proportions do not add to unity because “funds 
of funds” asset holdings are excluded.
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Hedge funds often seek out high-volatility positions and trade 
frequently to manage their risk exposures. For example, hedge funds 
make an estimated 30% of all U.S. equity trades, but only 15% of U.S. 
ﬁxed income trades (FSF (2007)). Within the ﬁxed-income class, however, 
they concentrate in the riskiest securities. Hedge funds are involved 
in 45% of trades in emerging market bonds, 47% for distressed debt, 
58% for credit derivatives, and 89% for convertible bonds. The funds’ 
taste for risk is further indicated by their holdings of high-risk assets: 
they own 51% of the nonaccrual loans originated by U.S. banks (Cole et 
al. (2007)), one-third of leveraged bank loans, and 66% of outstanding 
distressed debt (Kambhu (2006)).
Many hedge fund positions are taken in relatively illiquid 
securities. Their ability to take these positions is facilitated by various 
“lock in” periods, which limit their investors’ ability to withdraw capital. 
Funds vary widely in the particulars of their withdrawal constraints, 
which often differentiate between contributed capital (which has a lock-
in period) and earned capital (which can be withdrawn at the end of the 
month or quarter). Even when an investor’s capital is not subject to a 
lock-in period, most funds require 30 to 90 days advance notice before 
capital can be withdrawn.
B. The Prime Brokers
The hedge fund industry is closely intertwined with a relatively 
small number of prime broker-dealers, which provide many key 
services. As illustrated in Table 1, traditional investment banks head 
the list (Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, and Goldman Sachs), while the 
second echelon includes several prominent commercial banking ﬁrms 
(Citigroup, ABN Amro, Bank of American, and JPMorgan Chase). The 
range of prime broker services is summarized in Table 2. The prime 
broker starts by assisting with the hedge fund’s legal and operational 
setup, and then provides transactions, reporting, auditing, and valuation 
services. A recent SEC study explains how prime brokers are used:
Less established hedge funds tend to have arrangements with a single prime 
broker, which is often the ﬁrm that assisted in the hedge fund’s start-up. More 
established hedge funds and those with more complex investment strategies 
are more likely to use multiple prime brokers. Hedge fund advisers may also 
use multiple broker-dealers in order to ensure only limited exposure of their 
investment strategies and portfolio holdings to any one broker-dealer. (fn 185, 
page 53)
The hedge funds’ propensity to trade makes them valuable customers. 
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Not only does the prime broker earn commission income, but he also 
acquires a counterparty that provides liquidity in most situations. 
One estimate put 2006 hedge fund revenues at 15-20% of investment 
banking revenues, with most of it accruing outside the prime broker 
relationship (Financial Stability Forum (2007)).
C. Hedge Fund Effects on Financial Markets
Hedge funds perform a specialized role in the capital markets: 
taking risks that are too extreme or too poorly understood for other 
investors. Because markets are generally quite efﬁcient, identifying 
expected proﬁt opportunities is expensive. The investment advisers 
hire extremely talented individuals and utilize the very best technology 
and data processing systems. In order to make a proﬁt above those 
substantial costs, the fund must regularly identify mispriced situations, 
and then take large positions. Leverage is sometimes used to magnify 
expected returns. Risky, levered positions are not unique to hedge 
funds. Many money-center banks operate proprietary trading desks 
with similar investment strategies. The hedge fund innovation was to 
move that trading strategy outside a formal organization, and to raise 
funds from “outside” investors. A hedge fund’s unusual capital structure 
permits it to wait patiently for price anomalies to reverse themselves.
Kambhu (2006) provides a clear example of how a hedge fund 
aims to make positive returns and how it affects market prices in the 
process. He speciﬁcally discusses a so-called “convergence trade” based 
on the spread between Treasury rates and swap market rates. The 
proﬁtability of a convergence trade depends on some type of market 
imperfection(s), which permits temporary demand ﬂuctuations to affect 
the rate spread. If the swap rate is relatively high, the hedge fund buys 
the ﬁxed side of an interest rate swap and sells short treasury securities. 
This transaction by itself tends to push the spread back toward its 
“normal” level. Regardless of which way overall interest rates move, 
this position can be closed out at a proﬁt provided the spread converges 
back to its “normal” level.6 Levering this spread position increases its 
expected proﬁts. Beneﬁts accrue to other traders from the hedge fund’s 
6 Suppose both rates fall, but the swap rate falls by more to close the spread. The initial 
swap can be closed out (offset) by sale of a similar swap at the lower ﬁxed rate. The fund 
must repurchase a more-expensive treasury security to close its short position, but the loss 
on this leg of the transaction will be smaller than the gain on the other leg if the spread 
has narrowed.
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spread trades:
The use of swaps by market participants to meet their hedging objectives depends 
on a stable relationship between the interest rate swap rate and other interest 
rates; convergence trading activity that stabilizes the swap spread therefore can 
have wide-ranging beneﬁts to the economy. (page 2, emphasis added)
I return to this example in the following section to illustrate how failed 
convergence trades can generate “excess” volatility in the affected 
securities’ prices.
The Bank for International Settlements’ credits hedge funds with 
improving the market for credit default swaps (CDS). Their willingness 
to write such swaps permits lenders to protect themselves against 
default risk. With lower retained risk, lenders can expand their loan 
books.7 The hedge fund’s interest in buying the lower (equity) tranches 
in LDOs has also facilitated the securitization of credit in the U.S. – 
for good or ill. Similarly, their willingness to buy “catastrophe” bonds 
issued by insurance companies has substituted for a loss of reinsurance 
capacity that would otherwise have driven insurance premia higher.
Convergence trades, credit default swaps, and risk transfer 
arrangements facilitate innovation and efﬁciency in ﬁnancial markets. 
Nearly all observers agree that hedge funds add liquidity and risk-
bearing capacity which, at least under “normal” circumstances, 
improves market conditions for all traders.8 But what about unusual 
market circumstances? Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005) summarize 
the standard view:
Under normal conditions, hedge funds contribute to the liquidity and efﬁcient 
functioning of ﬁnancial markets. However, in certain cases, especially in small or 
medium-sized markets, their actions can be destabilising. (page 43)
3. Policy Issues/Questions
Ofﬁcial discussions of hedge fund actions generally express 
concerns about two things: investor protection and the potential for 
hedge fund trading to de-stabilize ﬁnancial markets.
In the United States, the SEC protects investors by mandating 
disclosure of strategies and portfolio holdings for investment (mutual 
7 The Bank for International Settlements (2007) asserts that:
Hedge funds have become key suppliers of liquidity in these markets through active 
trading, while their willingness to take on risk has supported the hedging operations of 
those institutions that are more focused on originating and servicing the underlying assets. 
(page 123)
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fund) advisers that wish to sell directly to the public. An exemption has 
always existed for ﬁrms wishing to deal with “qualiﬁed investors,” who 
are presumed to be sufﬁciently informed to protect themselves. In the 
1980s, the SEC deﬁned a qualiﬁed investor as one who reports annual 
income in excess of USD200,000 and assets above USD1 million.9 
Such individuals are permitted to deal with sellers of unregistered 
investments after warranting that they understand the risks of hedge 
fund investments and can afford the potential losses. One might question 
whether these thresholds are sufﬁciently restrictive (although the 
EU’s thresholds are lower), and perhaps investors should be required 
to demonstrate their ﬁnancial sophistication more formally. But these 
issues lie beyond the scope of narrow economic analysis (and of this 
paper).
It is important to limit hedge fund participation to “qualiﬁed” 
investors so that the potential investment losses are concentrated 
among a group that can absorb them with relative ease. For example, a 
USD100 billion loss to bank depositors would cripple a banking system, 
because depositors expect safe returns. In the stock market, however, 
a similar loss does not disturb institutional arrangements because 
investors accept such losses as part of the usual risk-return tradeoff. 
Indeed, during the past 5 years the U.S. stock market has experienced 
one-day losses exceeding USD100 billion 167 times – approximately 
13.3% of all trading days.10 The point is that large losses per se do 
not threaten the ﬁnancial system. Large losses within the hedge fund 
industry are unlikely to cause widespread ﬁnancial distress per se. Yet 
the funds’ use of high leverage and short sales presents a danger ﬂag 
for many observers because these two techniques have been associated 
with price instability since (at least) 1929. If hedge funds were forced 
to unwind their (relatively illiquid) positions quickly, it is feared that 
extreme price movements might harm other participants in worldwide 
ﬁnancial markets.
The potential for hedge funds to impair the ﬁnancial system 
operates through two main channels. First, the banks serving as prime 
brokers might suffer losses on the loans that help to ﬁnance hedge fund 
positions. Large losses could compromise the brokers’ ability to conduct 
9 In December 2006, the SEC proposed raising the wealth limit to $2.5 million beyond the 
value of the investor’s home. As of July 2007, this rule had not been adopted.
10 As a rule of thumb, one point in the Wilshire 5000 index corresponds to one billion USD 
of equity market value.
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other aspects of their businesses, such as securities underwriting or 
lending. This, in turn, could adversely affect real economic activities. 
Second, speculative positions might be unwound quickly if the market 
moves against the hedge funds, accelerating and exacerbating the 
resulting price changes.11 Other investors with similar positions would 
also suffer. More importantly, excess price ﬂuctuations may distort the 
effects of hedge transactions put on by risk-averse traders. I’ll discuss 
these two channels of inﬂuence separately.
Most broker-dealer (bank) loans to hedge fund are secured by 
speciﬁc security transactions (Cole et al. (2007), pages 13-14). Initial and 
variation margin requirements are imposed by the lender, reﬂecting his 
assessment of the position’s volatility. The banks’ credit losses should 
thus be limited by the presence of collateral (margin).12 Kambhu et al. 
(2007) point out that competition for hedge funds’ (proﬁtable) business 
might impair a broker’s risk management judgments, so that these 
margin positions become inadequate.13 Bankers’ proﬁts should not be 
threatened by this competition because the higher expected losses 
resulting from lower margins should be no larger than the proﬁts earned 
elsewhere in the hedge fund relationship. Indeed, recent estimates put 
the potential credit risk exposure of prime brokers to hedge funds at 
a few percent of the brokers’ total capital. Ferguson and Laster (2007, 
page 51) report that “In the wake of LTCM, the Basle Committee found 
that the potential to disrupt markets indirectly was of greater concern 
than the possibility of having a direct impact on ﬁnancial institutions.” 
See also Kambhu (2006, page 12) and Ryback (2007, page 146).14 In 
11 It seems clear that such price ﬂuctuations need not be conﬁned to the relatively illiquid 
assets in hedge fund portfolios. Rather, if those positions fall in value and the funds need 
cash (e.g. to post additional margin), they may be forced to sell other, more marketable 
positions. This tends to make security returns more correlated across traditional market 
boundaries.
12 Margin requirements depend to some extent on a fund’s overall position, which may 
seem riskier than it really is if the fund employs multiple prime brokers in order to keep 
its positions conﬁdential.
13 The Financial Stability Forum (2007) reports that
Initial margin requirements are under competitive pressure. In some cases, core 
ﬁrms are offering large hedge funds the ability to engage in some repurchase and 
OTC derivatives transactions without requiring initial margin. Any uncollateralized 
potential exposure resulting from the absence of initial margins is charged against 
the counterparty’s internally monitored credit limit. (page 14).
14 This position contrasts with Tsatsaronis’ (2000) assertion that “the main channel 
through which a fund’s difﬁculties may be transmitted more widely: its effect on creditors.” 
(page 68).
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short, the direct credit losses from lending to hedge funds do not appear 
to be a major threat to ﬁnancial stability.
The second (indirect) avenue by which hedge funds might 
endanger other ﬁnancial players occurs through the potential effect of 
hedge fund leverage and short sales on price volatility.15 The potential 
for excess volatility resulting from hedge fund investments is readily 
illustrated with the convergence trade presented by Kambhu (2006) 
and summarized in the preceding section. (See also Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2006)). To proﬁt from an expected decline in the spread 
between swap and Treasury rates, the hedge fund has bought swaps and 
sold Treasuries short. If the spread widens, this position loses money 
and the fund may need to post additional margin. If the fund is not “fully 
levered” the margin is easily posted. If the fund wishes to maintain its 
spread position it simply pledges some unencumbered assets as security 
for the loans associated with the spread transaction.
However, the example of LTCM indicates that a fund can lose 
enough value that all of its assets are already pledged as collateral 
against some loan. A further loss requires that some asset be liquidated 
in order to reduce the fund’s aggregate margin requirement. A narrow 
view suggests that the losing asset will be the one sold; the fund will 
reverse some of its bet that spreads will narrow by selling a swap and 
purchasing Treasuries.16 This transaction itself tends to widen the 
spread just after it has already widened on its own. It therefore seems 
possible that some initial losses on a convergence trade could generate 
further trades that worsen those losses by driving the spread still 
further away from “normal.” Exacerbating price changes, particularly 
in a losing direction, must be counted as one potential cost of hedge fund 
type trades (Xiong (2001)).
Of course, the fund need not sell securities related to its convergence 
trade when the swap spread moves against it (Kyle and Xiong (2001)). 
If it continues to believe that the swap spread will eventually narrow, 
it may choose to sell other assets to meet margin calls on its spread 
position. More generally, if the affected positions are illiquid the fund 
may choose to sell its more liquid assets to meet the margin call. Any 
such sale tends to depress the sold asset’s price. Hence one (potentially 
15 This possibility could be exacerbated by low margins, even if the lenders themselves 
earn sufﬁcient expected returns across the entire hedge fund relationship.
16 The wider spread could also lead some funds to re-consider their forecast that the spread 
would return to normal.
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problematic) feature of hedge funds pursuing multiple strategies is that 
cross-market returns may be more highly correlated when one (illiquid) 
market starts to deteriorate.
Note that a return spiral will follow initial margin calls only if 
some large fund(s) is fully levered. In fact, most hedge funds do not 
operate with extreme leverage – at least, not when things are going 
well for them. Van Hedge Fund Advisors estimated that “20% of hedge 
funds used no leverage while 50% used leverage (borrowed money) of 
less than 1-to-1 (including short positions as leverage).” (Ferguson and 
Laster (2007), page 52). Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005) report
In the TASS database, about one-third of single hedge funds provide information 
on average and maximum leverage (as speciﬁed in offering documents or 
voluntarily set by managers). Of those, about 10% have a ratio of average to 
maximum leverage in excess of 0.9. (page 45)
In other words, nearly all hedge funds operate with average 
leverage below 90% of their maximum.17 Indeed, operating without a 
capital cushion would reﬂect quite poor risk management, precisely 
because it might force the fund to sell desirable positions into a falling 
market. (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) model this possibility with great 
insight.)
The LTCM example again bears on this analysis. They started 
out well capitalized, but losses accumulated to leave them with little 
equity and the need to sell assets to cover margin calls. Even if several 
important hedge funds found themselves in this situation, a downward 
price spiral can be avoided if other investors (hedge funds) have equity 
available and will purchase the sold assets with only a limited price 
decline. Forced asset sales can provide attractive buying opportunities. 
Amaranth sold its energy book to Citadel and JP Morgan in late 2006; 
within a few weeks the buyers had substantially closed out the positions 
for a proﬁt. When Bear Stearns encountered large losses in its mortgage-
related securities in 2007, Citadel again purchased the portfolios in 
order to liquidate them in an orderly manner – that is, in a way that 
minimized the impact of liquidation on market prices. After Goldman 
Sachs’ Global Equity Opportunities fund lost 28% of its value in a single 
month during the summer of 2007, the investment bank and a group 
17 A Financial Services Agency survey of London prime brokers found an average hedge 
fund ratio of assets-to-equity of about 2.4 (Fergueson and Laster (2007, p. 46)).
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of individual investors contributed USD3 billion to the fund, to assure 
that it had the resources to take full advantage of “good investment 
opportunities.”
This discussion of selling pressure explains why observers track 
hedge fund leverage so keenly to identify the potential for downward 
spirals in certain markets. Yet on-book leverage provides a very noisy 
indicator of potential selling pressure. Consider the difference between 
a long stock position and an option on the same stock. An investor with 
$100 of equity could borrow another $100 to hold a margined position 
in stock. A second investor with $100 of equity could obtain the same 
exposure by purchasing an option on that stock whose delta is one-half. 
The option position requires no borrowed funds. Despite the difference 
in on-book leverage, these institutions have the same risk. Without 
understanding the assets held in portfolio, it is therefore impossible 
to know how much risk is associated with an observed amount of 
leverage.
Hedge funds are famously secretive and opaque, and these 
characteristics may also contribute to market fragility. Investors and 
lenders collectively may understand the total amount of risk in the 
ﬁnancial system, but they may not be conﬁdent about the ultimate 
bearers of that risk. Such uncertainty makes it much more difﬁcult 
for lenders to extend credit to new customers on short notice. This can 
compromise private credit allocations and tempt regulators or central 
bankers to enter the market as direct lenders.
4. Hedge Funds and Emerging Economies
At the end of 2006, the TASS database lists approximately 200 
hedge funds claiming some type of “emerging markets” strategy. They 
control an estimated USD49 billion of assets in these markets and 
appear to be a major, and growing, source of external capital funds.18 
Figure 4 provides some historical perspective. Emerging market funds 
had by far their greatest importance within the hedge fund industry 
between 1994 and 1997.
18 The BIS (2007, page 48) reports that “Large funds and institutional investors from 
developed markets, as well as hedge funds, account for the bulk of gross portfolio inﬂows 
into emerging market economies.” (emphasis added).
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Figure 4: Asset Share of “Emerging Markets” Hedge Funds
Source: Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005).
The hedge funds’ ability to control large portfolios via levered 
investments raises the possibility of market manipulation. Although 
such manipulation might occur in any security market, the concern is 
greater for relatively small markets with few large, informed investors. 
This fear has previously focused on exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
When the British pound was driven out of the ERM in 1992, George 
Soros’ Quantum Fund held a USD10 billion short position in sterling. 
“Speculative attacks” were alleged again in 1997 when Asian currencies 
depreciated so rapidly. Eichengreen et al. (1998) expressed doubt that 
hedge funds had been at the leading edge of the 1997 developments.
A few years later, Fung et al. (2000) examined the pattern of hedge 
fund returns during those events, and concluded that other investors’ 
pursuit of the carry trade generated most of the pressure on the Thai 
bhat.19
Following the Asian crisis many countries let their exchange rates 
ﬂoat, which substantially increases the risk of taking large positions in 
a currency. When a government is trying to maintain a ﬁxed exchange 
rate, speculators have little risk of loss and large potential gain. Figure 
19 Those other investors included proprietary bank trading desks, which reinforces the 
general point that the absence of hedge funds does not imply the absence of trades that 
might affect prices or volatility.
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4 indicates that emerging market hedge funds lost market share after 
1997.
Hedge funds can play a positive role in emerging market 
economies, which many investors consider too complex or illiquid to be 
attractive. Indeed, a long stream of ﬁnance literature documents how 
international differences in shareholder and creditor rights affect the 
form of ﬁnancial contracts (LaPorta et al. (2002)). Effective investment 
in emerging markets therefore requires specialized local knowledge and 
the ability to ride out periods of substantial illiquidity. Both market 
conditions tend to raise the cost of capital for emerging market ﬁrms. 
However, this situation seems perfectly suited to hedge funds, which 
specialize in holding assets that are difﬁcult to understand and are 
therefore illiquid. The presence of hedge fund investors in an emerging 
market should encourage others to invest as well because hedge fund 
actions tend to limit random price ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, hedge 
funds may accept (insure against) certain risks that are large relative 
to the emerging market economy, freeing domestic investors to absorb 
local risks. On net, hedge funds’ willingness to hold emerging markets’ 
obligations seems likely to improve the functioning of those markets.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Hedge funds represent an innovative and exciting investment 
vehicle, available to sophisticated investors in most countries around 
the world. Their relatively undiversiﬁed positions in risky, illiquid 
securities have realized some impressive returns, which have attracted 
investors and investment capital rapidly during the past ﬁve years. 
Observers generally agree that hedge funds improve liquidity, risk-
bearing, and price efﬁciency in normal times. The effect of hedge fund 
trading behavior during abnormal times raises some weighty questions. 
The most substantial dangers from hedge funds do not derive from the 
potential for large losses to fund owners. Rather, the danger lies in the 
funds’ potential effects on asset price volatility. Under certain conditions, 
asset sales to meet margin calls could cause prices to spiral away from 
“fundamental values.” But these conditions are pretty extreme, and the 
hedge funds themselves hold capital (“dry powder”) to protect against 
the need to sell securities into a falling market.
Whether or not policy makers believe that hedge funds are net 
84 THE ROLE OF HEDGE FUNDS IN WORLD CAPITAL MARKETS
positive forces, curtailing their activities would require draconian 
restrictions, which that would impose large inefﬁciencies on markets 
and investors. Hedge funds are organized as private entities because 
they wish to avoid taxation and close scrutiny of their (proprietary) 
investment strategies. These investors can operate effectively from a 
variety of tax havens. They can, and will, move their activities offshore if 
a government tries to control them. Consequently, policymakers’ should 
seek to understand and monitor hedge fund activities, so they can act to 
stabilize markets if required to do so.
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Table 1: Selected prime brokers number of hedge fund customers (sorted 
by the associated funds’ total capital under management)
Morgan Stanley 398
Bear Stearns 299
Goldman Sachs 341
Citigroup 69
ABNAMRO 72
Lehman Brothers 60
Merrill Lynch 39
Deutsche Bank 67
UBS 98
Banc of America 128
MAN Group 54
Credit Agricole 34
CSFB 53
JPMorgan Chase 11
Refco 27
Barclays 7
SEB 4
Banque Populaire 7
HSBC 15
NCB 7
KBC 6
AIG 5
Bank of Ireland 10
Societe Generale 37
ING 14
All Selected prime brokers 1,862
Others (including undisclosed) 1,402
Total number of hedge funds 
in the database
3,264
Source: Garbaravi ius and Dierick (2005)
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Table 2: Services provided by prime brokers to hedge funds (Descriptions 
quoted or paraphrased from source: SEC Study, pages 53-4).
1. Streamlined Trading. The hedge fund maintains its funds and 
securities in an account with the prime broker. ... Transactions 
placed with executing brokers are effected through accounts with 
those brokers in the name of the prime broker for the beneﬁt of the 
hedge fund. ... the prime broker, who clears the trade and provides 
custody of the securities.
2. Securities Lending. Prime brokers use their relationships in the 
banking and brokerage communities to locate and acquire securities 
to lend to their hedge fund customers for short selling purposes.
3. Margin Lending. Prime brokers are generally required to maintain 
collateral to secure margin loans to hedge funds as a result of 
regulatory requirements and internal limits on risk exposure, which 
are constantly monitored for changes.
4. Capital Introduction. Introduce hedge fund advisers to potential 
hedge fund investors.
5. Hedge Fund Start-up Services. Introductions or referrals to lawyers, 
accountants and other service providers. In addition to assisting 
these hedge fund advisers with back ofﬁce support, the broker-dealer 
may provide the hedge fund adviser with ofﬁce space.
6. Customized Reporting. E.g. (1) end of day pricing of securities; (2) 
risk management information for investment advisers; and (3) 
reports that allow fund advisers to provide investors with some 
limited transparency information.
7. Research. Most broker-dealers offer to provide proprietary and 
third-party research and other soft dollar arrangements related to 
individual securities and particular market sectors of interest to the 
hedge fund’s investment adviser.
8. Valuation. Price estimates for certain types of (or individual) 
securities.
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9. Technology. Facilitate the start-up of new hedge funds by offering 
or recommending providers of reporting systems, software, 
trading systems, connections to ECNs, ﬁxed connectivity and risk 
management systems.
10. Operations Services. (1) advice regarding minimum and maximum 
amounts of investor subscriptions required to be raised and rates of 
returns expected by investors; (2) preparation of offering materials 
and reports to investors; (3) information on strategies to assist in 
obtaining investments; (4) advice as to appropriate investment 
alternatives for excess cash; and (5) referrals of requests for 
information from potential investors.
In this most recent work, Professor Flannery provides a broad 
overview of the activities of hedge funds and of their role in world 
markets. The paper presents a balance of issues, focusing not only on 
hedge funds’ perceived ability to exert a destabilizing force through 
their speculative activities – an issue that has been part of the policy 
debate of late – but also on the positive side through their provision of 
market liquidity, risk sharing opportunities, and helping to improve the 
accuracy of market prices.
There is an implicit question in this work in that, given both the 
positive as well as the negatives sides of hedge funds’ activities, it is not 
obvious how these institutions should be regulated, and even whether 
they should be regulated at all. The argument in favor of regulation 
focuses on their tremendous growth, an aspect documented in this paper. 
This growth has been not just in terms of the number of funds, but also 
in terms of the assets under management (AUM) for hedge funds. For 
instance, this can be clearly seen in the following ﬁgure, taken from 
Cole, Feldberg, and Lynch (2007).
Hedge fund growth
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It is clear from the ﬁgure that the growth in hedge funds has 
been astronomical, and has accelerated in recent years. Focusing on this 
data, one is tempted to say that this growing market must be regulated 
in order to protect investors.
On the other hand, a slightly different picture is painted when 
one focuses on hedge fund assets as a percentage of global debt and 
equity instruments outstanding. As the ﬁgure below makes clear (ﬁgure 
is taken from Ferguson and Laster, 2007), as a percentage of global 
assets hedge fund holdings are actually not very large, not having 
exceeded 2% of the total value of these instruments outstanding. From 
this perspective, hedge funds are an important but perhaps small part 
of the global market, with most of the assets held by so-called “qualiﬁed” 
investors who are supposed to have both the expertise for understanding 
the risks involved, as well as the wealth to tolerate a certain amount of 
risk in their portfolios. As such, there may be no need to regulate these 
institutions, as that would likely only hamper their activities without 
offering additional protection – who is there to protect?
Hedge fund assets have been growing rapidly
A closer look at hedge fund portfolios
While the previous section offers a broad overview of hedge funds’ 
holdings, here we take a slightly more detailed look and focus on the 
possible risks associated with the growth of hedge funds.
One concern that has been raised recently in the ﬁnancial press, 
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and documented in this paper, is that while hedge funds may only be 
a small part of the overall market, they may be “big” in particularly 
sensitive markets. These include the market for credit derivatives, such 
as credit default swaps, as well as the market for asset backed securities, 
including those backed by subprime mortgages. They also seem to have a 
fairly large presence in the trading of distressed debt. To the extent that 
these types of securities are riskier and more volatile, there is greater 
concerns of instability in hedge fund portfolios. Moreover, it appears 
that many of the counterparties in these transactions are commercial 
banks, creating concern that instabilities for hedge funds may translate 
into problems for these banks.
Different perspectives have been espoused concerning the 
trading of derivative securities. For instance, while chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan was quoted 
as saying, in reference to the increasing use of derivatives, “These 
increasingly complex ﬁnancial instruments have especially contributed, 
particularly over the past couple of stressful years, to the development 
of a far more ﬂexible, efﬁcient and resilient ﬁnancial system than 
existed just a quarter-century ago” (Washington Post, March 6, 2003). 
A very different perspective is offered by Warren Buffett, chairman 
of Berkshire Hataway, in a letter to shareholders (as quoted by the 
Washington Post, March 6, 2003): “Derivatives are ﬁnancial weapons 
of mass destruction ... The dangers are now latent -- but they could 
be lethal.” These divergent statements echo the concerns that have 
recently been raised regarding the holdings of hedge funds and their 
counterparties in these transactions.
A somewhat different concern has been raised concerning 
the liquidity of hedge funds’ portfolios. While there is a fair amount 
of evidence suggesting that hedge funds tend to concentrate their 
holdings in assets that are relatively illiquid (see, e.g., Kambhu et al., 
2007), there is also recent suggestions that the correlation of holdings 
across hedge funds may also be increasing. Increases of correlation in 
the holdings of assets that are already not very liquid can lead to ever 
greater redemption problems for these institutions.
A recent Wall Street Journal article (September 7, 2007) 
illustrates these concerns. The article documents the losses by one of 
Morgan Stanley’s funds, arguing that these added up to around $500 
million over the two week period from the end of July to the beginning 
of August, 2007. What is particularly interesting from the article is the 
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claim that not only do the funds themselves not know what triggered 
the losses, but that there is a widespread theory that “the proliferation 
of quant funds holding a lot of the same positions may have been a 
recipe for magnifying the losses.” On a related note, a recent study the 
European Central Bank (2006) ﬁnds that correlations in hedge fund 
returns has increased somewhat in the 8 year period since Long Term 
Capital Management failed in 1998.
These issues all raise the question of the possible exposure of the 
ﬁnancial system to the risks taken – and borne – by hedge funds. Banks 
exposure to hedge funds seems to be increasing. While this exposure is 
not enormous, there is much literature about how even small shocks 
can be greatly ampliﬁed through the ﬁnancial sector. For instance, the 
“ﬁnancial accelerator” models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) suggest 
falls in collateral value can make it difﬁcult for borrowers to tap into 
other sources of credit when their primary bank is forced to reduce 
lending. This ampliﬁes the size of the initial shock and causes it to 
propagate throughout the economy, leading to broader macroeconomic 
consequences.
Some suggestions for future research
Flannery (2007) argues that even if hedge funds were absent, 
other institutions would trade in a similar fashion. In other words, 
while important, hedge funds are merely displacing other ﬁrms rather 
than adding a new element to volume (and hence possibly volatility). 
For instance, it seems that the trading desks of investment banks have 
been losing market share to hedge funds in the market for ﬁxed income 
arbitrage. One question that naturally arises is whether anyone really 
knows what has been the aggregate effect of the growth of hedge funds. 
Has there been an aggregate increase in overall trading beyond past 
trends? Have hedge funds merely displaced existing institutions, or 
have they expanded way beyond what these institutions were likely to 
do? To what extent have issuers, such as corporations, responded to the 
increased demand for securities by issuing them in greater amounts?
A somewhat related question worth studying in future work is 
to look more closely at the time series evidence of hedge fund presence 
in the trading of the riskiest securities. While recent evidence suggests 
that hedge funds are fairly big players in these markets, do we know 
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whether they are becoming more and more specialized? At the same 
time, are they becoming less and less diversiﬁed? For example, with the 
well-documented recent collapse of the sub-prime ABS market, what do 
we know about how much is held and/or traded by hedge funds? Is this 
possibly growing trend to hold riskier, more opaque securities a growing 
cause for concern?
Concluding comments
Mark Flannery’s paper provides a great platform for discussion, 
as it highlights both the possible dangers associated with hedge fund 
activities as well as the positive role they can play. Perhaps in the end 
what comes out of this document is a better understanding that we in 
fact have little understanding of these institutions and of the positions 
they hold. But Mark’s work also suggests that we are learning and 
that there is much more work to be done to better understand what 
risk the growth of these institutions poses. In all, this makes for a very 
interesting read and for a well-thought out research project.
96 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY MARK FLANNERY
References
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler, 1989, “Agency Costs, New Worth, and 
Business Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 79, pp. 14-31.
Cole, R., G. Feldberg and D. Lynch, 2007, “Hedge funds, credit risk 
transfer and ﬁnancial stability” in Banque de France Financial Stability 
Review, pp. 7-18.
European Central Bank, 2006, Financial Stability Review.
Ferguson, R. and D. Laster, 2007, “Hedge funds and systemic risk” in 
Banque de France Financial Stability Review, pp. 45-54.
Kambhu, J., K. Stiroh and T. Scheurman, 2007, “Hedge Funds, Financial 
Intermediation, and Systemic Risk”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Economic Policy Review, forthcoming.
Introduction
In the pursuit of private proﬁts, hedge fund managers and 
investors generate both public spillover beneﬁts and public spillover 
costs.  The social beneﬁts occur because of the high volume of trading 
done by hedge funds, which provides increased liquidity in the ﬁnancial 
markets such as credit default swaps or catastrophe bonds; liquidity 
in these markets increases the ability of third-party ﬁrms to use 
these ﬁnancial contracts as risk-mitigation tools.  The social costs 
occur because of the degree and type of ﬁnancial leverage often used 
by hedge funds as part of their investment strategies; high amounts 
of short-maturity leverage can force hedge funds to wind down large, 
unproﬁtable positions quickly, resulting in ﬁre sales that can potentially 
destabilize ﬁnancial markets.   
In his essay, “The Role of Hedge Funds in World Capital Markets,” 
Mark Flannery describes what hedge funds are, how hedge funds work, 
and why, in some states of nature, hedge funds may introduce large 
amounts of instability into ﬁnancial markets.  Hedge funds are among 
the least regulated ﬁnancial institutions in developed economies, and 
as such, the net social beneﬁt from hedge funds is market-driven.  Is 
this outcome optimal for society?  Or could we improve social outcomes 
by interfering with this marketplace—that is, would the beneﬁts 
from increased regulation of hedge funds exceed the deadweight costs 
created by regulation?  This short note is a thought experiment about 
how imposing various “generic ﬁnancial regulations” on hedge funds 
might affect, for good and for bad, the efﬁciency and stability of ﬁnancial 
markets.
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Mark Flannery The Role of Hedge Funds in World 
Capital Market
Robert De Young
Capitol Federal Professor in Financial Institutions and Markets, School of Business, 
University of Kansas
Co-editor, Journal of Financial Services and Research
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Industry Deﬁnition
In order to regulate an industry, one ﬁrst has to deﬁne the industry. 
This is no trivial issue.  There is no standard working deﬁnition of a 
hedge fund, and more importantly for our purposes, there is no legal 
or regulatory deﬁnition of which I am aware.  However, as Mark points 
out in his essay, hedge funds do share some broad characteristics with 
each other.  For example, hedge funds are organized as partnerships 
comprised of a small number of qualiﬁed (i.e., wealthy) investors.  Once 
invested, these investors usually have limited access to their funds. 
And hedge fund managers typically pursue non-diversiﬁed investment 
strategies which are not disclosed to the public, and which are ampliﬁed 
by a large degree of ﬁnancial leverage.
Are these few parameters enough to establish a workable legal deﬁnition 
of a hedge fund—on which we could write regulations that apply strictly 
to the social spillover costs generated by hedge funds—but would not 
ensnare, say, private equity funds, REITS, or other investment vehicles? 
For now, let’s simply assume that we do have a workable legal deﬁnition 
of a hedge fund, and return to this problem of industry deﬁnition on 
another day.
Three generic regulatory policies
I am generally loath to advocate new regulations on ﬁnancial 
markets or institutions, so the reader should remember that this is a 
thought experiment, undertaken on the grounds of intellectual curiosity. 
Let’s consider three generic ﬁnancial regulatory approaches that have 
been used with some success to enhance the safety and soundness 
of ﬁnancial institutions in market economies: transparency so that 
markets can better monitor and discipline the ﬁnancial institution in 
question; diversiﬁcation so that poor returns from one investment are 
buffered by good returns from other investments; and leverage limits 
so that losses on less diversiﬁable investments can be absorbed without 
resulting in insolvency.  And here is the though experiment:  Are any of 
these generic regulatory approaches appropriate for hedge funds?  And 
if so, how would applying these regulations affect the public spillover 
costs and beneﬁts generated by hedge funds?     
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Transparency
Imposing greater transparency on hedge funds—say, by requiring 
hedge funds to reveal their on- and off-balance sheet positions—is a 
non-starter.  Hedge funds keep their trading strategies secret for a 
good reason: Once an investment manager ﬁnds a proﬁtable trading 
strategy, she wants to exploit it for the beneﬁt of her investors and her 
own professional reputation.  If her trading strategy was made public, 
entry by other investment managers would likely eliminate the market 
inefﬁciencies (pricing errors) upon which the trading strategy is based. 
Thus, transparency-based policies would eliminate or substantially limit 
the incentives for investment managers to search for proﬁtable trading 
opportunities, which would in turn reduce overall hedge fund activity 
and with it the positive spillover beneﬁts (i.e., increased liquidity in 
ﬁnancial markets) currently being generated by hedge funds.   
Diversiﬁcation
Most hedge funds have a single investment strategy, which is 
not surprising: How many proﬁtable investment ideas can we expect 
one investment manager to dream up?  As a result, individual hedge 
funds are extremely undiversiﬁed.  However, there is substantial 
diversiﬁcation across the population of hedge funds.  One way to reduce 
the spillover (ﬁnancial instability) costs generated by individual hedge 
funds is to harness this industry-level diversiﬁcation.  When one hedge 
fund is under pressure to quickly unwind a large position, a ﬁre sale 
could be avoided if each of the other hedge funds (which are presumably 
not under pressure, because they have different trading strategies) 
stood ready to purchase a small amount of the assets being sold.
To avoid coordination and free-rider problems among hedge 
funds, one could harness the cross-sectional diversiﬁcation by creating 
a liquidity fund.  Each hedge fund would contribute to the fund—use 
your own favorite tax scheme—and the fund would stand ready as an 
emergency counter-party to help contributing hedge fund unwind and 
avoid a ﬁre sale.  The securities purchased by the fund could be sold off 
gradually in the future, avoiding large price ﬂuctuations and ﬁnancial 
market instability.  Thus, a liquidity fund formalizes and systematizes 
Mark’s following statement: “[A] downward price spiral can be avoided if 
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other investors have equity available and will purchase the sold assets 
with only a limited price decline.” 
Of course, there are a number of related problems that would 
have to be addressed to make this policy a workable one.  For example, in 
the absence of a functioning market, some mechanism would be needed 
to determine the asset prices.  And the very existence of the liquidity 
fund could create moral hazard incentives, encouraging hedge fund 
managers to lever-up and take even greater risk.  Regarding these two 
problems, one should note that the objective is to maintain the liquidity 
and stability of ﬁnancial markets, not the solvency of troubled hedge 
funds.  Choosing asset prices that impose some losses on the troubled 
hedge fund, and establishing a credible policy of letting equity holders 
go bust, will greatly defuse the moral hazard problem.
Also, one should note that a liquidity fund would institutionalize 
the ad hoc actions taken by individuals and institutions to provide 
market liquidity in the past—for example, the quelling of the 1907 
banking panic by J.P. Morgan (the man, not the ﬁrm), the temporary 
rescue of LTCM coordinated by the Federal Reserve in 1998, and 
the current efforts of the U.S. Treasury to encourage private ﬁrms to 
stabilize the asset-backed commercial paper market.  
Leverage limits
I was struck by the following statement in Mark’s essay:  “Because 
markets are generally quite efﬁcient, identifying expected proﬁt opportunities 
is expensive.”  At ﬁrst, this seems like a truism that does not even need to 
be stated.  But upon further consideration, I now realize that this is a very 
powerful statement that, at its core, allows us to explain why hedge funds 
use so much ﬁnancial leverage.  To illustrate this realization, I will use the 
famous (to economists) story about the $20 bill lying on the street...
A labor economist and a ﬁnancial economist are walking down 
the street, when the labor economist sees a $20 bill lying on the opposite 
sidewalk.  The labor economist says “let’s go over there are pick up 
that $20 bill, and donate it to a good charitable cause.”  The ﬁnancial 
economist replies “Don’t bother.  There is no $20 bill on the sidewalk.” 
The labor economist, befuddled, says “Of course it is there.  I can see it 
with my own eyes!”  To which the ﬁnancial economist ﬁnally says “The 
$20 bill can’t possibly be lying on the sidewalk.  If it were, someone 
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would have already picked it up.”  
Now, this story works only because the currency in question was 
a $20 bill—that is, a large enough prize to be worth the effort of crossing 
a busy street.  The story makes no sense for a dime or a penny.  We walk 
right past pennies all the time without picking them up....that is, unless 
we are a hedge fund, in which case we are willing to pick up a penny as 
long as we have enough leverage ﬁnance to make it a proﬁtable endeavor. 
High leverage is a key driver of hedge fund risk, and is perhaps the 
main underlying reason why a failed hedge fund investment strategy 
can destabilize markets.  With little equity capital on hand, a ﬁre sale 
creates losses large enough to bankrupt the hedge fund.
But let’s perform one last thought experiment:  Imagine that a 
leverage limit is imposed on hedge funds.  The leverage limit would be 
binding only for the “penny-picking” hedge funds, that is, for trading 
strategies generating such small margins that high ﬁnancial leverage 
in necessary to deliver a reasonable return on investment.  All else 
equal, these are the hedge funds most likely to have to unwind their 
positions quickly.  
So arguably, a leverage limit would be welfare-enhancing, because 
it would eliminate hedge funds that generate only small amounts of 
market surplus and are most likely to destabilize ﬁnancial markets. 
And this would not be a large percentage of hedge funds: Mark reports 
(from various sources) that less than one-in-ten hedge funds use 90% 
leverage ﬁnance.  Mark also writes that “Indeed, operating without a 
capital cushion would reﬂect quite poor risk management.”  If the highly 
leveraged funds are also the most poorly managed, as Mark suggests, a 
leverage limit would replicate an efﬁcient asset allocation, without the 
collateral damage that can result from ﬁre sales and liquidity crises.   
A closing thought
I recognize that public policies that impose material costs on 
hedge funds—whether they be taxes that requires hedge funds to 
capitalize a liquidity fund, or constraints that require hedge funds to 
hold more equity capital—could be circumvented if hedge funds moved 
their operations out of the country imposing the regulatory costs.  So 
full international cooperation is a necessary condition for either of these 
policy proposals.  But that is a thought experiment for another day.   
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ﬁnancial integration under APEC. At the same time, it is important 
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ensuring that national policies will be well implemented with the view 
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1. Introduction
It is the current process of globalisation that offer an opportunity 
to reﬂect on the evolution of civilisation that started from the small 
entity of family progressed to tribes, city states and nations over many 
thousands of years. Since the 15th century, the process of globalisation 
has gradually started, as people travelled across the new world. However, 
it was during the 19th century that social scientists considered the ﬁrst 
wave of globalisation. It is now argued that the ﬁrst wave of globalisation 
started in 1868 or 1870. Since then we have observed migration of 
workers from some parts of the world to new places such as the US 
and Australia. We have seen the First and Second World Wars and the 
emergence of international institutions such as the UN, the IMF, the 
World Bank and the WTO. At the same time, we have observed the 
emergence of regionalism in different parts of the world, particularly in 
Europe. Furthermore, the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation ( APEC) 
has the potential to accelerate the process of regional integration in the 
Asia Paciﬁc region. It is also possible to see that regionalism may well 
lead to more effective globalism and the emergence of a more integrated 
global economy with effective international institutions. While there 
have been a few studies suggesting that globalisation has not contributed 
to economic growth, the recent study by Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei 
( 2006) provide good analysis of literature in this area and show that 
effective national institutions could increase economic growth and assist 
some nations to better integrate into the global economy.
The purpose of this paper is to review the process of globalization 
and look at the ways globalization has evolved and the way both developed 
and developing countries have reaped the beneﬁts of globalization. The 
paper also considers how economic growth has been contributing to the 
process of globalization. To this end, section 2 reviews the process of 
globalization, section 3 discusses the trends in growth indicators and 
compares GDP with the Human Development Index ( HDI) as a way 
of seeing the bigger picture of economic growth in different parts of 
the world; section 4 analyses some aspects of the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial 
globalization and section 5 concludes.
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2. Globalisation
According to the IMF work by Masson ( 2001), globalisation can be 
deﬁned as the increased integration of economies, reﬂected by increases 
in trade, capital, investment and migration ﬂows. Although there are 
marked increases in living standards associated with globalisation, such 
gains are not equally distributed worldwide. The movement of capital, 
ﬁnancial assets and ﬁnancial corporations from their domestic country 
to the rest of the world has been part of what is referred to as ﬁnancial 
globalisation. The process of ﬁnancial globalisation has been associated 
with an increase in foreign assets and liabilities position.
The second wave of globalisation started after the Second World 
War around the early 1960s and we are still in the second wave.
The ﬁrst wave of globalisation took place from 1870 to 1914. 
However, the First World War brought the ﬁrst wave of globalisation 
to an end. Rajan and Zingales ( 2003) refer to this episode as the Great 
Reversal “ period.
According to Masson ( 2001), the start of the 20th century saw 
rapid growth in world trade, attributable largely to falling transportation 
costs. Table 1 shows that between 1880 and 1910 the cost of ocean 
transport as a percentage of production costs for wheat fell by 13.5 per 
cent. Likewise, the cost of ocean freight fell by 35 per cent between 1920 
and 1930.
Table 1 - Transport Costs, 1830 - 1990
Sources: IMF, Masson (2001), Globalisation: Facts and Figures.
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Technological advances in communication have been at the 
forefront of further integrating economies throughout the world. As can 
be seen from Table 2, the price of a 3 minute telephone call from New 
York to London has dropped a staggering 99 per cent between 1960 and 
2000. Likewise, the price of a computer has fallen by 99.9 per cent since 
1960. Such technological changes have been signiﬁcant in the process of 
globalisation in an increasingly interdependent world.
Table 2 - Communication and Computer Costs, 1960 - 2000
Source: The same as Table 1.
With regard to the process of ﬁnancial globalisation, the empirical 
results of the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalisation have been inconclusive. 
For instance, Parasad et al ( 2003) show that the current data cannot 
indicate that ﬁnancial globalisation has contributed to stronger economic 
growth in developing countries and at the same time, some countries 
have experienced more ﬁnancial volatility. At the same time, there are 
some studies like Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad ( 2005) who found 
a positive relationship between ﬁnancial globalisation and economic 
growth. Furthermore, the latest work by the IMF (2006), by Kose, 
Prasad, Rogoff and Wei , indicate that ﬁnancial globalisation has had 
positive effects on the fortunes of some developing countries. However, 
this positive effect has been achieved due to the improvement in the 
process of reforms in the national ﬁnancial institutions.
3. Trends in Growth Indicators: GDI and HDI
In this section, the paper reviews and analyses some of the issues 
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with respect to the way economic growth has been measured in the past 
and the additional factors that should be put in place for more accurate 
measurement of economic growth. This paper adopts and also uses an 
IMF study by Craft (2000) in discussing historical trends in economic 
growth and issues related to growth and at the same time, uses more 
updated available data to further analyse some aspects of economic 
growth. Therefore, most part of this paper relies heavily on the work by 
Craft ( 2000) and uses the issues and concept developed in that paper. 
The rest of this section is mainly the summary of some aspect of Craft’s 
( 2000) work.
Since World War II, trends in growth of real GDP per capita 
has become a key policy objective in virtually all countries, a notion 
predicated on the belief that government policy has a signiﬁcant 
inﬂuence on long run growth outcomes. The key points which require 
concern and consideration relate to:
1. The relationship between economic growth and changes in 
living standards
2. The uneven pace and spread of economic growth between and 
within countries
The gap between rich and poor as measured in GDP terms has 
widened enormously since the late nineteenth century, representing a 
divergence between developed and developing nations. The levels of real 
GDP per person of many countries in 1990 were still much lower than 
those of leading countries in 1870. An average of $1336 GDP per capita 
for Africa in 1990 is still below the median of $1894 for countries in 
Western Europe, America and Oceania in 1870. This trend is further 
enunciated by the fact that 20.1 per cent of the non-American population 
in 1990 lived in countries where real GDP per capita as a proportion of 
the US level has fallen since 1950.
This apparent disparity in the levels of income is questioned by 
the emergence of alternative indicators of living standards other than 
GDP such as the Human Development Index (HDI). Such indicators 
have arisen from a growing acceptance that GDP growth is a limited, if 
not misleading, indicator of well being.
The HDI provides a broader indication of economic development, 
with its focus on the three main components of education, income 
and longevity. It offers an important perspective on changing living 
standards, alongside the narrow ﬁgures provided by GDP per capita.
We have been able to obtain the latest information about HDI and 
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compare it with the information reported in Craft (2000). As can be seen 
from Table A in the appendix to this paper, the HDI ranks are shown 
for the 2004 year. When this information is compared with the ﬁgures 
in Tables B and C that were originally reported by Craft (2000), one can 
see that there is clear evidence of progress since 1950 in the areas of 
literacy and life expectancy, particularly in developing countries. The 
HDI measure also shows much less divergence, partly because of its 
discounting of higher incomes and also because of its focus on social 
indicators such as mortality rates.
The HDI scores for all nations are well ahead of the 1870 scores 
for the leading countries of that time. Furthermore, there has been a 
signiﬁcant fall in the gap between average HDI levels in Africa and 
those of the advanced countries of Western Europe, North America and 
Oceania from 0.608 to 0.391.
The speed of this transition has been notably higher in recent 
times, with the average HDI gain for countries in a state of low human 
development between 1950 and 1995 being 0.350 compared with 0.212 
for the period between 1870 and 1913.
3.1 Twentieth Century GDP Growth
The data reported by the IMF, in the work by Craft (2000), highlight 
that twentieth century growth in GDP per capita has generally been 
much stronger than that prior to 1870. Regions such as India and Latin 
America have performed much better in the latter half of the twentieth 
century when compared with the U.K and U.S during the period 1820 
to 1870, where 1.5 to 1.8 per cent was approximately the maximum 
growth rate bar a few exceptions. It is notable that such growth rates 
represented a vast improvement from the growth rates experienced 
during Industrial Revolution Britain, where long run growth of 0.2 per 
cent was a good result. When viewed in a modern context, this period of 
rapid industrialisation reaped relatively limited growth when compared 
to the growth rates in a twentieth century world, characterising the 
vastly different foundations that modern growth is predicated upon.
Despite overall acceleration in real GDP growth in the twentieth 
century, this trend has not been consistent between and within countries. 
During the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, the United States was by 
far the leader in real GDP per person relative to Europe and Asia. This 
was due greatly to their successful exploitation of natural resources, 
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coupled with technological growth and educational standards that 
surpassed other nations. Their dominance has been subdued during the 
latter half of the twentieth century with OECD and Tiger economies 
catching up despite the continuing divergence in wealth between the 
richest and poorest nations.
Post war Europe has also bridged the gap because the reduction in 
barriers allowed for emulation of US technology and large investments 
in human and physical capital laid the foundations for strong growth. 
In addition, advantages that the US had gained from cheap natural 
resources and a large domestic market in the early part of the 
twentieth century were reduced due to European integration and trade 
liberalisation.
Data reported in Craft (2000) show that the last quarter of the 
twentieth century has seen proliﬁc growth experienced by East Asian 
economies, which have averaged 4.6 per cent growth between 1973 to 
1996 compared with the United States 1.6 per cent. At the same time, it 
should be noted that advanced nations such as the UK had the highest 
real GDP per person in 1900 but was 13th in 1996, whereas Japan ranks 
8th in 1996 compared to a dismal level in 1900.
3.2 Adjusted GDP as a Guide to Long Run Living Standards
The use of historical national accounts such as GDP growth as 
an absolute measure of living standards is too narrow to determine the 
progress of living standards. Numerous aspects of development such as 
mortality rates and labour inputs are not accounted for in the measure 
of growth in real GDP. It has been argued that it is both possible and 
desirable to include these components of well being into measures of 
economic growth.
The effect of incorporating improvements in mortality and hours 
worked per person substantially raises regular GDP growth rates. The 
trend since 1870 points to higher life expectancy and also to less hours 
worked per person, an important consideration for labour productivity. 
To illustrate, while the real GDP per capita in Latin America in 1996 
of $5155 was less than 60 per cent ahead of the UK level in 1870, real 
output per hour worked was over three times that of the UK in the same 
period. Thus, growth in GDP per capita may tend to understate the 
extent of economic development in countries such as the Latin America 
in comparison to the UK.
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Conversely, growth in terms of Net National Product (NNP) may 
also exaggerate growth in living standards in its neglect of factors such as 
environmental damage and depletion of non-renewable resources. Such 
factors may tend to overestimate the level of sustainable consumption 
in an economy. An empirical study reported by Craft (2000), suggests 
that depletion of non-renewable resources costs the world over 1 per 
cent of average consumption each year, a ﬁgure which necessitates a 
correction of NNP for capital depletion. This is also true of technological 
advancements, with the possibility of falling returns to R&D another 
reason to suppose that sustainable consumption has been growing at a 
slower rate than real GDP.
3.3 Sources of Economic Growth
The various measures of economic growth pose a potential 
problem in accurately presenting a measure of long run growth in 
the world economy. A useful technique, as reported in Craft (2000), is 
growth accounting, which attributes growth in terms of growth of factor 
and of total factor productivity (TFP). The basic formula used in growth 
accounting is as follows:
Δ Y / Y =     Δ K / K +     Δ L / L + Δ A / A
The growth rate of output (Y) is accounted for in terms of the 
contribution of the growth of the capital stock (ΔK/K) times the elasticity 
of output with respect to capital (   ), the contribution of the growth 
of the labour force (ΔL/L) time the elasticity of output with respect to 
labour (    ) and growth of TFP (ΔA/A).
A key issue is determining the extent to which TFP growth and 
other individual components affect overall economic growth.
Sources of growth
Table D reports the sources of growth over time for certain 
countries. The contribution of capital in the US and other countries has 
been much stronger in the times preceding the late twentieth century. 
This decline in capital’s contribution can be attributed to both rising 
capital to output ratios and falling shares of investment in GDP.
The contribution of labour inputs to growth has been the 
strongest in the US because of their high population growth. However, 
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it contributed less than 0.5 per cent per year in each period since 1913 
and declining work hours in other OECD countries has signiﬁcantly 
restrained the growth of labour inputs as a main source of economic 
growth.
The contribution from TFP growth, as Craft ( 2000) discussed, has 
been varied across and within nations. A broad summation of TFP growth 
is that it rose from the late nineteenth century through the Golden Age 
and then declined sharply in the recent growth slowdown. The effect 
of technological change on economic growth can be correlative with 
TFP growth. However, this assumption must be given weight to factors 
such as elasticity in the substitution between factors of production and 
economies of scales possibilities.
Rising TFP growth in the 1970’s correlates with spending on 
R&D and the US experience with TFP growth tends to suggest the link 
between it and the effect of technological change on growth. It is apparent 
that this link is not consistent however, as TFP growth understates the 
role of technology in the nineteenth century and overstates it in the 
mid twentieth century. This is a reﬂection on the switch between labour 
saving technological changes in the nineteenth century with the capital 
saving changes in the twentieth century.
A comparison of the effect of TFP growth for Africa and East Asia 
produces signiﬁcantly different results. Eat Asia has been experiencing 
fast growth whilst growth failure in Africa has seen GDP per capita in 
the continent declining over the last quarter of a century.
Table D shows negative TFP growth for Africa in the period 1960-
94. Investment in Africa has been held down by the high price of capital 
goods in protectionist economies whilst education levels have remained 
low.
Investment rates in East Asia have been high relative to historical 
norms and points to a strong contribution from capital towards growth. 
The stronger TFP growth in East Asia may reﬂect effectiveness in 
technology transfer which compares very favourably with other Third 
World experiences. However, when compared with European growth, 
East Asian growth has relied much more heavily on factor inputs, both 
labour and capital, and less on TFP growth than that of Golden Age 
West Germany.
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4. Beneﬁts of Financial Globalization
The current data indicates that only a small number of developing 
countries have been participating in ﬁnancial globalisation. The data 
reported by the IMF indicate that developed countries have been the 
most signiﬁcant beneﬁciaries of ﬁnancial globalisation, followed by 
certain emerging countries. According to Kose et al (2006) the recent 
data show that developed countries account for over 90 percent of the 
total outstanding foreign liabilities, only about 8 percent belongs to the 
emerging countries and the rest to other developing countries. Such 
data conﬁrms the work by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) regarding the 
patterns of ﬁnancial globalisation both in the 19th and then in the 20th 
century.
The capital is not ﬂowing to many developing countries due to 
a number of challenges that need to be addressed both at the national 
and international levels, even if some of them have relatively good 
education and health indicators. This makes both national governments, 
international institutions as well as the international community 
accountable to ensure that the process of ﬁnancial globalisation will 
gradually become universal and all embracing.
In the meantime, it is worthy to consider the composition and 
nature of capital ﬂows into developing countries. The current data from 
the IMF reported in Kose et al (2006) indicate that debt ﬁnancing is on 
the decline. We are also observing that FDI now accounts for more than 
50 percent of all capital inﬂows in the developing countries, followed by 
portfolio investment (12 percent).
Economic Growth
As discussed by Kose et al (2006), the relevant literature suggests 
that there is a positive relationship between economic growth and 
portfolio equity ﬂows. At the same time, there is an argument that FDI 
accompanied by increase in trade could be beneﬁcial. Furthermore, 
there is also an argument that there is a positive link between FDI and 
productivity.
However, as discussed by Kose et al ( 2006), the empirical work 
does not support conclusively that ﬁnancial integration is contributing 
to faster economic growth. This is in the context that all variables for the 
growth factors have been controlled for. One should, however, note that 
there is also the problem of endogeneity between ﬁnancial integration 
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and growth that remains problematic. At the same time, there is also 
the issue of how to lump together the countries, what methodology we 
should use, etc.
Volatility
Empirical results according to Kose et al (2006) do not support 
the fact that ﬁnancial globalisation has reduced the global risk sharing. 
At the same time, there is not much evidence that ﬁnancial globalisation 
has contributed to regional or ﬁnancial crises.
Co-movement
The empirical results reported by Kose et al (2006) indicate that 
once ﬁnancial and economic integration are well established, then we 
could see risk sharing beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration. However, at 
the present time, without a proper system in place for the process of 
integration, there does not appear to be much co-movement amongst 
some countries.
Despite inconclusive empirical evidence of the direct role of 
ﬁnancial globalisation on growth, empirical evidence shows that indirect 
effects of market liberalisation and deregulation of the national ﬁnancial 
markets, reforms of the national institutions do positively contribute to 
faster and more sustained economic growth.
It appears that sound national institutions could be essential in 
ensuring the ﬂows of foreign capital into countries. This in turn will 
increase the TFP (total factor productivity) which is one of the key 
contributors to the long term growth process. As could be seen from 
Table D in the appendix to this paper, for some countries TFP has been 
signiﬁcant and yet it is the reforms of the national institutions, reduction 
in corruption, transparency of the system, sound macroeconomic 
policies and a well trained work force that could ensure an increase 
in the ﬂow of foreign capital into developing countries. Figures A and 
B are an attempt to capture the process of globalisation and growth. 
It should also be noted that without a proper threshold where certain 
infrastructure and national reforms have been put in place, ﬁnancial and 
economic liberalisation may lead to more challenges such as volatility 
and sometime ﬁnancial crisis.
114 ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GLOBALISATION
Figure A
Two Views of Impact of Financial Globalization
on Developing Countries...
Source: IMF, by Kose, Parasad, Rogoff and Wei ( 2006).
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Figure B
... But There Are Thresholds
Source: The same as Figure A
The current literature on globalisation and economic growth 
may well be reﬂected in the above ﬁgures A and B. At the same time, 
the emergence of regionalism since the Second World War has created 
a new impetus to look at the process of globalisation and economic 
growth not only in the context of national institutional reforms and 
national accountability but also in the context of regional integration 
and its dynamic effects on the process of national institutional reforms 
for those countries forming that union. Furthermore, the role and the 
effectiveness of international institutions such as the UN, the IMF and 
the World Bank also come into question as a way of facilitating the 
process of national reform and coordinating the efforts of all nations.
Stulz ( 2005) argued, ﬁnancial globalisation will reduce the “ 
twin problems”, however the question is what are those factors which 
are capable of removing national bottlenecks as a way of removing 
limits to ﬁnancial globalisation. Li et al ( 2006) showed how corporate 
governance could be a major factor for ﬂows of capital and hence 
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ﬁnancial globalisation.
One of the factors that contribute to a reduction in home bias 
and hence an increase in ﬁnancial globalisation is regional ﬁnancial 
integration. The US integration in the 19th century and the recent 
regional ﬁnancial integration in the EU are examples that we could use 
to consider the effects of ﬁnancial integration on ﬁrms and other private 
investors’ activities.
With respect to the role of regionalism in the process of 
globalisation, one can note the emergence of the EU, APEC, ASEAN 
and NAFTA, as amongst the key regional collaborations. However, the 
most successful Post War integration was the process of integration 
amongst the European countries which ultimately led to the emergence 
of the EU. Moshirian ( 2006 and 2007) has analysed those factors that 
could accelerate the process of globalistion and lead to the emergence 
of effective international institutions. It should be noted that both 
national and international institutions should take responsibility for 
the challenges facing the 21st century, as the global economy is highly 
interdependent. Thus, by simply requesting national governments or 
people themselves to take full responsibility of what is happening in 
the current global society, one may be overlooking international forces 
and factors that equally and sometimes more have a role to play in the 
process of globalisation.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to consider those factors that 
contribute to the process of globalisation and economic growth. The 
paper has analysed the ways the process of globalisation has evolved 
since the 19th century. It has analysed different measures of economic 
growth and prosperity such as GDP and the Human Development 
Index. It has considered the role of Technology as a way of increasing 
productivity for sustained economic growth. The paper has analysed the 
beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalisation and the ways in which some nations 
have beneﬁted from the ﬂows of foreign capital. While the empirical 
research shows that globalisation has positive effects on economic 
growth, the overwhelming support for sustained growth is coming from 
reforms in national institutions. Those countries that have been able 
to embark on and sustain national reforms, including better corporate 
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governance and better banking systems have been able to beneﬁt more 
from the process of globalisation.
The process of globalisation started in the 19th century. We have 
observed a signiﬁcant change in the global economy since the Industrial 
Revolution. The Emergence of international institutions such as the UN, 
the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have contributed to the process 
of globalisation in the 20th century. At the same time, it is important 
to consider the role of more effective international institutions in the 
21st century. The process of regionalism has contributed to the process 
of globalisation, as we observe the way countries in Europe are working 
together with the EU or nations are trying to have more free trade and 
ﬁnancial integration under APEC. At the same time, it is important 
to see effective national institutions in place which are committed to 
ensuring that national policies will be well implemented with the view 
to ensuring that national and regional governments and institutions 
are also playing their role in the process of globalisation. Furthermore, 
individuals as national as well as world citizens should play their role 
in contributing to effective process of globalisation in such a way that all 
people and nations could beneﬁt from an increasingly integrated global 
economy.
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Appendix
Table A - Human Development Index
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR_2006_Tables.pdf
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Table B - The Human Development Index and its Components:
Long Run Estimates
Source: International Monetary Fund, Nicolas Craft, 2000.
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Table C - The Human Development Index and Its Components
Source: The same as Table B.
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Table D - Growth Accounting: Comparison of Sources of Growth 
(percent per year)
Source: The same as Table B.
The paper by Fariborz Moshirian on globalization and growth is 
broad in scope. To a large extent the paper is an overview of the literature 
on globalization and growth, with an emphasis on the effects of ﬁnancial 
globalization and the role of institutions. First two thirds of the paper 
is a journey through different strands of literature on growth effects of 
the process of globalization, in particular ﬁnancial globalization. Author 
gives a good, although not exhaustive, overview of the main ﬁndings.
In the last section, paper analyzes the way the ﬁnancial integration 
in Europe could be used as a model for increasing the ﬂows of foreign 
capital into developing countries. This comes almost as a separate paper. 
Although it deals with aspects of ﬁnancial globalization, this part of the 
paper is different by structure than the rest of the paper. It outlines, 
in much more detail, the author’s view on the single topic, rather than 
shortly describing numerous ﬁndings in the literature on globalization 
and growth, as is the case in the ﬁrst part of the paper. 
In fact, there are two papers. One, which is basically an overview 
of the ﬁeld, and the other, that deals with the ﬁnancial integration in 
Europe as a potential model for other countries. It might be better to 
separate them into two papers, as in the current format, none of them 
is given enough space to do what they want to or should do. Overview is 
given 15 pages, while “EU as an ﬁnancial integration model” only 7.
“Overview” part (ﬁrst ﬁve sections) brieﬂy reviews the process 
of (ﬁnancial) globalization, some beneﬁts of the globalization and role 
of institutions. It ends with the now prevailing “compromise” between 
globalization enthusiasts (let’s call them “Fischer”) and globalization 
sceptics (let’s call them “Stiglitz”): ﬁnancial globalization can be beneﬁcial 
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Fariborz Moshirian Aspects of economic Growth 
and Globalization
Boris Vujcic
Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Croatia
ˇ ´
124 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN
if good institutions and quality of governance is in place, together with 
ﬁscal discipline and macro stability. In other words, globalization will 
beneﬁt countries that do things well, and are already ripe for full 
opening-up to free movement of goods, capital and maybe even workers. 
Those that are not, should be careful how they pace opening-up.
Second part looks into the success of the European ﬁnancial 
integration. Moshirian analyzes the process of the ﬁnancial integration 
in the EU, to conclude that national institutions with right incentives 
more easily integrate into the global economy. They do it more efﬁciently 
and reap the beneﬁts of globalization better. The right incentive, or the 
big carrot in front of the transition country governments, is the EU 
entry with all its positive features for a transition economy - credibility 
effect, increased foreign direct investments and signiﬁcant inﬂows of 
grant money from the EU funds.
It is undeniable that the European (ﬁnancial) integration has 
brought beneﬁts to the EU member states. It started ﬁfty years ago, with 
the start of the free trade zone, and has gradually evolved into something 
that increasingly looks like the true single market. Latest steps are in 
the direction of the ﬁnancial integration with the introduction of the 
single currency, Financial Services Action Plan and Lamfalussy process. 
Financial integration in Europe is still not completed, and it will take 
more years before it can be compared to the ﬁnancial integration in the 
US, but already in the current format, it brings clear beneﬁts to the EU 
member states, i.e. citizens. 
The economic idea behind the process is that better ﬁnancial 
intermediation raises productivity growth and enhances consumer 
welfare. That theoretical proposition has been empirically tested and 
conﬁrmed. However, essentially, monetary/ﬁnancial integration is a 
political process, like the whole EU project.
How did the synchronization of real activity and ﬁnancial 
integration in Europe proceed? Increased synchronization of real 
activity started in the early 1980s, while increased integration in 
equities markets started in the early 1990s. Money market got fully 
integrated after the European Monetary Union was launched. Also, bond 
market integration was a big success. However, banking/retail market 
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remains fragmented, settlement system as well, home bias, although on 
a declining trend, is still pervasive. Recent study (IMF, 2007) shows that 
almost 0.5 per cent of lower productivity growth in euro-zone compared 
with the US, between 1996-2003, can be accounted for by ﬁnancial 
intermediation, while indirect effects may be even larger.
Financial globalization/integration implications for growth 
are still ambiguous, but most of the research ﬁnds positive impact 
of ﬁnancial sector integration in Europe on growth. Better and more 
complete ﬁnancial intermediation at lower cost raises productivity 
growth and increases consumer welfare. Through ﬁnancial integration 
Europe has reaped some, but not all, of these beneﬁts. More depends on 
a more complete integration, i.e. implementation of Financial Services 
Action Plan and Lamfalussy process, as well as more cross-border 
activity in the banking industry, which seems to be slowly gaining the 
ground with the start of ﬁnancial sector mergers and acquisitions in 
the “old” member states.  That process has proceeded much faster in the 
“new” member states, whose banking systems are already dominated by 
euro-zone banks. Therefore, “new” member states are reaping beneﬁts of 
ﬁnancial integration quickly, although that process carries some risks 
as well.
As De Nicolo and Tieman (2005) point out, if a more integrated 
Europe is becoming more prone to systemic risk, then across-the-board 
policies to limit risk taking or at least limit the effects of risk taking on 
ﬁnancial institutions and the real economy might be needed. On one 
hand ﬁnancial integration is beneﬁcial for the EU, but on the other, 
problems of supervising risks in an integrated environment seem 
bigger than supervising individual banks, and the question is if the 
supervision, in its current format, is fully enabled to deal with them in 
a most efﬁcient way.
Recent ﬁnancial market turmoil demonstrates to some degree 
contagion effects, i.e. risks of ﬁnancial globalization. Supervisors will 
need to monitor more closely systemically important parts of the market, 
transparency in the market, in a sense of risk distribution will need to 
be increased, and the role of rating agencies will come under scrutiny of 
regulators as a consequence. In essence, this is not very different from 
what has been happening in the past in the ﬁnancial markets. Financial 
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innovations were often followed by regulatory measures to contain the 
risks associated with it. Financial market developments, including 
ﬁnancial market integration/globalization, over the last decades have 
helped better functioning of the markets and more efﬁcient risk sharing, 
but new risks have also emerged that have to be dealt with. 
Recent empirical evidence on the effects of globalization on the 
output volatility - growth relationship demonstrates that growing 
international trade and ﬁnancial integration has weakened this 
traditionally negative relationship (Kose et al.). Also, ﬁnancial market 
integration helps growth in the EU (Guiso et al.)
 
With developing countries, however, it is much more difﬁcult to 
empirically establish a positive link between ﬁnancial globalization and 
growth. One of the problems is that they are much more vulnerable 
to shocks/crisis some of which are enhanced by globalization, and the 
negative impact of shocks on growth is not the effect of small repeated 
cyclical deviations, but of large drops below output trend. The volatility 
due to a crisis and not due to normal times harms the economy’s long-
run growth performance. 
Why are developing countries more vulnerable to shocks? 
One reason is a lack of ﬁnancial development. Lower the ﬁnancial 
development, less efﬁcient is a resource allocation and risk sharing 
among individuals. Therefore, more vulnerable the economy will be. 
Other reason might be institutional underdevelopment which 
usually implies weak regulatory structures, corruption, legal uncertainty 
etc. Also, inadequate macroeconomic policies, i.e. inability to conduct 
countercyclical ﬁscal policies, poor monetary/exchange rate management, 
uncontrolled ﬁnancial market liberalization are not independent of weak 
institutions. And they all make countries more vulnerable to shocks or 
even provoke crisis if they create wrong incentives.
It is often the case that developing countries are highly 
dependent on few commodities which makes them more vulnerable 
to price shocks to those commodities, while developed countries are 
more diversiﬁed and, therefore less sensitive to such shocks. Another 
reason why developing countries are more vulnerable to shocks is their 
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technological disadvantage. In agriculture, for example, more developed 
countries use more machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation etc. while 
in manufacturing they use better more complex technologies and more 
varieties.
In the empirical research the effects of one aspect of globalization 
- trade openness - on volatility-growth link appear quite ambiguous, but 
could hardly lead to policy advice to close the economy to trade. However, 
it demonstrates that developing countries could also be negatively 
affected by globalization, due to their higher vulnerability to terms of 
trade shocks or high capital ﬂow volatility, which is often associated 
with opening up of the economy in a globalized environment.
At the lower levels of development crises are more likely to be 
induced by supply/demand shocks like TOT shocks in commodity 
markets, while at intermediate levels of development they are more 
likely to take some form of BOP/Banking/Currency crisis, which can 
again be induced by adverse supply/demand shocks, or/and by poor 
macroeconomic/regulatory management.
Typically, these factors that make countries more vulnerable to 
shocks come in bundles, i.e. they are correlated. 
From the above list of causes of vulnerabilities it follows that, in 
order to deal with vulnerabilities that might arise from globalization, 
most often one has to deal with growth issues at large.
And what are the policies to deal with possible negative impact 
of globalization/crises? Bottom line is, that after a long detour through 
empirical  research and some theory - the globalization/volatility/
growth literature brings us right back to basic policy issues: how to 
build institutions, how to sequence reforms, how to improve governance, 
political economy of ﬁscal policy etc.
Economists know very well that we need to build competent 
institutions, robust ﬁnancial and regulatory systems, ﬂexible labor 
markets, run countercyclical ﬁscal policies, eliminate corruption, 
diversify exports, output and tax base etc., but it is much less obvious 
why, in so many cases, it does not happen. Most of the growth literature 
leads us to the history and geography as main explanations why some 
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countries are better able to cope with those issues, while others are not 
(which would seem to be a too good excuse for policymakers).
One can also ask to what extent is CEE success incentive based, 
and to what extent it is explained by “distance to Bruxelless” and 
“common history”? Empirical literature on growth usually leads us to 
later as the main explanation why these countries did so well during 
the transition.
Of course, politics is extremely important (politicians rule the 
world, not the economists) but, what makes politics change?  When we 
look at the growth literature we end-up, again, with the same answer 
- history and geography. That is, I know, quite discouraging answer 
to important questions, and should never be used as an excuse for 
policymakers, but that is where decades of growth literature take us. 
Globalization cannot change the history, but is affecting geography. 
That’s why it is so important. 
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Objective of the Paper
• To review the globalization literature as it relates to growth and how 
the process has evolved over time.
Why the Interest in Globalization?
• Financial markets have been liberalized dramatically in many 
countries over the last three decades.
• What should be the effects of ﬁnancial liberalization?
• Theoretically ﬁnancial liberalization should improve the allocation of 
capital and increase economic growth.
• The growth effects of ﬁnancial liberalization, and therefore arguably 
one of the most important beneﬁts, have not been easy to demonstrate 
in cross-country data.
• At the same time, worries persist that ﬁnancial liberalization may 
result in higher volatility.
Approach of the Paper
• Examines two globalization phases
  • 1870 to 1914
  • Early 1960s to the present
• Deﬁnes Globalization
• Examines the Trends in Growth Indicators: GDP and HDI
• Beneﬁts of Financial Globalization
• The Role of National Institutions in Contributing to Economic Growth
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• Regional Financial Integration as a Contributor to Globalization and 
Growth
Globalization
• The important question is: What is Globalization?
Globalization can be deﬁned as the increased integration of economies, 
reﬂected by increases in trade, capital, investment and migration 
ﬂows Masson (2001).
• The 1st wave 1870 to 1914 –driven by reduction in transportation 
costs.
• The 2nd wave started in early 1960s and continues today –driven by 
technological advances.
The Earlier Globalization
• One of the strengths of this paper, and among other things that 
separates it from other survey papers is the examination of the ﬁrst 
globalization wave
• This is important in that valuable insights can be gained by 
policymakers and academicians by comparing and contrasting the 
two waves
  • A more in-depth comparison of the two would be helpful in 
providing a deeper understanding of globalization, and therefore 
to betterunderstand the current globalization.
  • One of the reasons that we study history is to learn from it 
-what works and what does not work so we can avoid the 
previous mistakes.
  • Thus an important question is: What have we learned from 
previous wave that would help policy makers in the present 
globalization wave?
  • For e.g., earlier wave was much more successful in terms of 
leading to economic growth than the more recent wave -do we 
have any insights as to why this is the case?
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The Second Globalization Wave
• The Primary focus of the current paper is a discussion of the second 
(current) globalization wave
• Characteristics of the second wave
  - Signiﬁcant technological changes
  - Financial globalization
  - Open government policy
Second Globalization Wave
• The paper alludes to the fact that one of the issues with conducting empirical 
research that examines the effects of globalization is trying to establish 
cause and effect among the three aspects of the current globalization wave 
listed previously -i.e., the issue of endogeneity (more about this later)
  • Although the paper does speak about the second wave, given 
its importance more discussion on this issue as it pertains to 
the previous three aspects of the current globalization would 
be beneﬁcial. By doing so we would be able to get additional 
insights as to the underlying cause of the unevenness of growth 
across countries.
  • Important questions that it would help us to answer, among 
others, are: Does globalization success or lack thereof depend 
on the extent of ﬁnancial integration? Is there a ﬁrst mover 
advantage in terms of ﬁnancial liberalization?
Impact of Globalization
A summary of the impact of the current globalization wave is as follows:
  - Less money is ﬂowing from rich countries to poor countries –in 
fact just the reverse is observed
  - Economic growth has been at best modest -only a small number 
of developing countries have in fact experienced signiﬁcant 
economic growth
  - Total factor productivity has not increased
  - FDI now accounts for more than 50 percent of all capital 
inﬂowsin the developing countries
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Measurement of Globalization Success
• Important insight of this paper is that a possible reason that the 
results have been less than overwhelming is that the metric being 
used is too narrowly deﬁned
• Metric typically used is GDP growth
• A preferred metric is HDI
Measurement of Globalization Success(contd.)
• Increased discussion of HDI would be helpful. This should include 
among other things:
  • A More complete deﬁnition
  • The reason that this measure is preferred in comparison to 
other more comprehensive measures than GDP
  • How does it stack up to other measures
  • If possible a discussion of the impact of the different components 
of HDI–this would provide possible additional insights as to 
why this globalization wave has been less than successful
Other Measurement Issues
• The paper also emphasizes the issue of endogeneity and how it can 
lead to faulty inferences
• For instance, did technological advances lead to ﬁnancial globalization 
or vice-versa?
• Several recent papers have tried to address this issue:
  Levchenko, Rancière and Thoenig (2007) use: (i) both de jure 
and de facto measures of globalization; and (ii) a difference-
in-differences approach along with propensity score matching. 
They do not ﬁnd strong evidence that ﬁnancial globalization 
signiﬁcantly affects economic growth but do ﬁnd that 
liberalization increases the volatility of output
  • Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2007) use a dynamic panel 
data approach and also do not ﬁnd strong support
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The Long-run (?) Effect of ﬁnancial Globalization
(Taken from Levchenko, Ranciere, and Thoenig, 2007)
Figure 1. The Time Evolution of the Effect of Financial Liberalization
Effects (contd...)
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Effects (contd...)
A More Recent Approach to Examining the Economic Impact of 
Globalization
• One way to address this important question (th eimpact of 
globalization) is to go beyond country-level analyses and delve deeper 
into the data.
• Papers that have followed this approach are Gupta and Yuan (2007) 
and Levchenko, Rancière and Thoenig (2007)
• Following the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998, AER) these papers 
use industry-speciﬁc data to investigate the particular microeconomic 
channels by which ﬁnancial liberalizations may facilitate economic 
growth
Industry Evidence
• Results of Gupta and Yuan (2007) suggest that:
  • Liberalization beneﬁts some industries more than others
  • Industries that are more dependent on external ﬁnance and 
industries that experience a greater reduction in the cost of 
capital grow signiﬁcantly faster following liberalization
  • Industries that face better growth opportunities do not appear 
to beneﬁt from liberalization
  • The increase in growth occurs mainly through an expansion in 
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the size of existing ﬁrms rather than through the entry of new 
ﬁrms
Industry Evidence
• Levchenko, Rancière and Thoenig (2007) also ﬁnd that the development 
is uneven across different sectors. In addition they ﬁnd that:
  • Decomposing the positive growth effect into channels,  ﬁnancial 
liberalization raises entry of ﬁrms, total employment, and 
capital accumulation
  • No evidence  that ﬁnancial liberalization impacts productivity 
growth
  • Where effect is present the impact is temporary rather than 
permanent
  • The only persistent effect is on competition: the impact of 
ﬁnancial liberalization on the price-cost margin a measure 
of markup increases progressively for the  ﬁrst few post-
liberalization years, and remains signiﬁcantly negative.
Implications of Results
• Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), among others, indicate within the 
context of a neoclassical framework that the gains from liberalization 
in terms of capital accumulation are actually quite small
• Thus, if  ﬁnancial liberalization is to signiﬁcantly impact growth, 
productivity growth must also increase
• Although growth of output, employment, and capital accumulation 
increases, albeit temporarily the preponderance of evidence is that 
productivity growth is not affected
• This therefore is a possible explanation why the pro-growth effect of 
ﬁnancial liberalization has been so difﬁcult to detect empirically in 
cross-country studies
Implications of Results (contd.)
• Possible explanations for the lack of productivity growth:
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  • First, the relaxation of ﬁnancial constraints resulting 
from liberalization leads to entry by ﬁrms which are less 
productivethan the average. Financial liberalization matters 
most for the less productive  ﬁrms, which are  ﬁnancially 
constrained.
  • The second explanation relies on the empirical  ﬁnding that 
markups decrease signiﬁcantly with liberalization (Levchenko, 
Rancière and Thoenig (2007) ). If innovation occurs through 
prospective entrepreneurs attempting to undertake projects, 
the reduction in markups and therefore proﬁts also lowers the 
incentive to innovate.
  • Through this pro-competitive mechanism, relaxation of ﬁnancial 
constraint has the effect on TFP growth that is opposite of 
whatis normallypresumed
The Role of National Institutions in Contributing to Economic 
Growth
• An important aspect of this paper and which is a focus of the recent 
literature is the role of national institutions in fostering growth
• The paper does a very good job in tying the literature together given 
the various aspects and types of institutions that exist across the 
many countries
• The consensus is that national institutionsconstitute an important 
factor in the process of sustained economic growth and the attraction 
of foreign capital
• What would be interesting and an important insight that can be 
provided by this paper is whether national institutions also played an 
important role in the earlier globalization wave
Is Regional Integration the Answer?
• One of the aspects of this paper that separates it from other survey 
papers is the discussion of regional integration and its impact on 
globalization
• The paper points out the importance of regional integration and how 
it facilitates globalization success
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• It suggests that this may be the way to overcome the various 
impediments to successful globalization –it then identiﬁes the EU as 
an example of the importance of regional integration in reaping the 
beneﬁts of globalization
• Other regional integration has been less successful in leading to 
growth of the lesser developed country –e.g., NAFTA and Mexico
• This then raises the question: What is it about the EU that makes it 
successful?
The Beneﬁts of Regional Integration
• What are the beneﬁts of regional integration?
  • It facilitates risk sharing by lowering the barriers that prevent 
this from happening
  • One of the most important barriers is home bias
  • This is not only important for risk reduction in asset portfolios 
but also for consumption smoothing
  • In theory, one of the main beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalization is 
that it provides increased opportunities for countries to smooth 
consumption growth in the face of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in 
income growth
  • With well-developed domestic ﬁnancial markets, economic 
agents within a country can share risk among themselves. 
However, insuring against country-wide shocks requires 
openness to ﬁnancial ﬂows that would allow agents in different 
countries to pool their risks efﬁciently
  • Thus, ﬁnancial globalization should generate welfare gains by 
reducing the volatility of aggregate consumption and also by 
de-linking national consumption and income (see, e.g., Kose, 
Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2006)
Risk Sharing
• Theoretically, one of the main beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalization is that 
it should allow for more efﬁcient international risk sharing. Thushow 
international ﬁnancial integration has affected the evolution of risk 
sharingpatterns is an important aspect of the impact of ﬁnancial 
138 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN
globalization
• The evidence (see, e.g., Kose, Prasad, Terrones (2007)) is that there is 
at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly 
nowhere near the levels predicted by theory
• Only industrialised countries have attained better risk sharing 
outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing 
countries have, by and large, been shut out of this beneﬁt
• The most interesting result documented in the literature is thateven 
emerging market economies, which have witnessed large increases in 
cross-border capital ﬂows, have seen little change in their ability to 
share risk
• Importantly neither the composition of ﬂows nor country 
characteristics—including policies, institutions and ﬁnancial market 
development—can explain why emerging markets have not been able 
to realize this presumedbeneﬁt of ﬁnancial globalization
The EU and Risk Sharing
• The current paper highlights the work of DeSantis and Gerrard (2006) 
in showing the successful reduction of home bias in the EU
• Giannone and Reichlin (2006) document an increase in the extent of 
risk sharing among European countries during the early 1990s when 
ﬁnancial integration in Europe started gaining momentum
• Their results are stronger at longer time horizons, implying that 
these countries have used ﬁnancial markets more effectively to insure 
against relatively more persistent shocks
• Sørenson, Yosha, Wu and Zhu (2006) analyze the relationship between 
home bias and international risk sharing. They document that the 
extent of international risk sharing among industrial countries 
has risen during the late 1990s while home bias in debt and equity 
holdings has declined
• They ﬁnd that there is a positive association between foreign portfolio 
assets and the extent of income risk sharing. In addition, they document 
that FDI holdings and the degree of consumption risk sharing appear 
to bepositively correlated
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Interpretation of the Evidence
• One of the issues mentioned in the paper is that of a threshold effect 
-that is in order for countries to reap the beneﬁts of globalization they 
have to achieve a certain level of integration
• This is a possible explanation for the success of the EU because, in 
general, industrial countries that are substantially integrated into 
global ﬁnancial markets seem to enjoy the risk sharing beneﬁts of 
ﬁnancial globalization
• This suggests that, in order to reap the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration 
in terms of improved risk sharing, developing countries need to become 
more integrated into global ﬁnancial markets
Achieving the Threshold Effect
• How can this be achieved: The paper suggests that an important 
facilitator of this is to have a common currency
• Beneﬁts of a common currency –Interest rate risk is a priced thus 
having a common currency reduces the risk premium
  • Francis and Hunter (2003) show that following the adoption of 
the EU the foreign exchange risk exposure of stocks is reduced
  • Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2006) show that following the 
introduction of the euro, volatility spillovers across both stock 
and currency markets are reduced
  • Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2007) show that following the 
adoption of the Euro both the price of risk and the exposure to 
currency risk isreduced
• Thus the cost of capital is reduced
• Although not mentioned in this paper, I contend that an important 
beneﬁt of a common currency is the gaining of trust among the 
countries belonging to the EU.
• Although its importance is long accepted in the management literature 
only recently has it come to the forefront in the ﬁnance literature 
(see, e.g., Chuido, Sapienza, and Zingales (2007) and Helliman et al. 
(2007)
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1. Introduction
Economic growth, especially its long-run sustainability, has long 
been a focal point of academic researchers and policy makers.  Numerous 
attempts have been made to provide a long list of factors that may 
have an impact on economic growth.  Pioneering work on endogenous 
growth by Romer (Romer 1986), Lucas (1988) and others emphasizes 
the role of knowledge as an input to production.  In their models, it 
is the technological advancement and industrial innovation that drive 
long-run growth (Grossman and Helpman 1994).
In addition, since at least the time of Schumpeter (1932), 
the process of industrial innovation has been seen as important to 
the economy.  Schumpeter wrote of the renewing power of “creative 
destruction” in which new technologies had the potential to disrupt and 
even replace existing industries with superior products and services. 
When Schumpeter wrote about innovation, he clearly intended to 
emphasis not only the “destruction” aspect of creative destruction, but 
the “creative” part as well (Freeman, 1982).
In the ﬁeld of economics, research on endogenous growth theory 
sparked many empirical studies exploring how and to what extent 
innovation might contribute to economic growth.  Empirical evidence 
points out the fact that innovation tends to make signiﬁcant contributions 
to growth, and there are also signiﬁcant spillover effects of innovative 
activities (Cameron, 1998).  In this paper, we aim to extend this line 
of research by arguing that not only the quantity but also the quality 
of innovation matters in promoting economic growth.  Furthermore, 
we are interested in investigating whether the effects of innovation on 
economic growth largely depend on the economic structure and stage of 
development in different countries.
In the models of Romer (1986, 1990) and Stokey (1995), among 
others, industrial innovation activities are an important determinant 
of economic growth due to their direct impact on the production process 
and also due to positive externalities.  Scholars have also argued 
that “national innovation systems” — which include aspects of how 
intellectual property is protected and how research and development 
(R&D) is funded — is a major contributor to innovation activities 
(Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 1982).
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Though technological change forms the engine of long-run growth, 
accumulation of other types of capital will still play an independent role 
during a transitional phase (Grossman and Helpman 1994).  This notion 
implies that how innovation activities can be translated into different 
rates of growth is closely linked to the variation of economic structures 
and policies (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).  In this paper, we make use 
of a global patent database to construct our measures of innovation and 
empirically examine the proposed research questions. We use a panel of 
data to investigate the potential relationship between measures of the 
innovations, both quantity and quality, and economic growth.  Based on 
a sample of 58 countries for the period 1980-2003, our empirical results 
indicate that those countries that increase the level of patenting also 
witness a concomitant increase in economic growth.  Furthermore, we 
have some evidence that countries hosting ﬁrms with higher quality 
patents also have higher economic growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a 
brief review of related literature.  Section 3 explains our data collection 
and discusses some methodology issues.  Section 4 presents our empirical 
results.  In Section 5, we summarize, discuss and conclude.
2. Literature rewiew
Questions about the sources of economic growth have fascinated 
economists for many years.  Neoclassical growth models posit that 
the rate of return on investment is a decreasing function of per capita 
capital stock, and per capita outcomes across different countries should 
converge to a steady state in the absence of exogenous technological 
change.  However, these predictions are somewhat inconsistent with 
observations from the real world.  Without a doubt, technological 
advancement has become a major factor behind economic growth by 
providing a new means to combine raw materials together in production. 
It is unrealistic to attribute all the unexplained part of economic growth 
to exogenous technological shocks.
Several studies attempt to incorporate industrial innovation 
into models to explain economic growth.  Romer (1986) showed that 
knowledge with increasing marginal productivity could be an input in 
explaining long-run growth.  In a competitive economic environment, 
intentional investments in innovation activities are motivated by 
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market incentives (Romer 1986; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Stokey 
1995).  Treating technological changes as endogenous, Romer (1990) 
presented a model of the growth rate being determined by the stock of 
human capital, even though new technology is assumed to be no better 
than old (horizontal product innovations).  Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
developed a model in which vertical innovations make existing products 
obsolete, becoming the underlying source of growth through “creative 
destruction.”
The innovation process has its own externalities.  The accumulation 
of technological advancement enlarges the knowledge base and makes 
sequential innovations available (Stokey 1995).  Knowledge ﬂows and 
technological spillovers across economic agents beneﬁt all ﬁrms including 
rival ﬁrms as well (Griliches 1992).  Even when technological spillovers 
do not exist, an agent does not appropriate all the social gains from her 
innovation unless she can price-discriminate.  In addition to the efforts 
made by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, academic research funded by public 
resources in universities and other institutions provides substantial 
inputs and spillovers into the innovation process (Fagerberg 1994).
Innovation activities do not only directly inﬂuence economy-wide 
productivity, but also promote economic growth through spurring new 
business formation, which will further promote employment growth 
and other outputs (Kirchhoff 1994; Wennekers 1999).  Innovation 
encourages and facilitates entrepreneurs to create new organizations 
in order to enter certain industries characterized by an entrepreneurial 
technological regime (Audretsch 1995).  This indirect mechanism has 
been supported by empirical evidence (Francis, Hasan and Wang 2007; 
Kirchhoff, Newbert, Hasan and Armington 2007).
Summarizing the above, innovation can be considered important 
for potential economic growth.  So what evidence do we have that it is 
linked to growth, and at what levels of analysis? Various studies have 
been conducted at the level of individual ﬁrms, industries as well as 
countries.  Cameron (1998) surveys the existing literature on this topic 
and concludes that the majority of these studies ﬁnd a strong and positive 
link between innovation and some measures of output (Mansﬁeld 1980; 
Griliches and Mairesse 1986).
Meanwhile, many other studies attempt to investigate the spillover 
effects of innovation.  For example, David and Helpman (1995) and 
Bayoumi, Coe and Helpman (1999) have documented that international 
trade can greatly raise a country’s total factor productivity.  There are 
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many reasons for this, but one factor could very well be knowledge 
transfer due to international trade.  However, there is a limitation for 
such spillovers across countries.  Audretch and Feldman (1996) ﬁnd that 
innovation spillovers tend to be localized in the sense that industries 
with a prevalence of knowledge spillovers have a high propensity to be 
clustered.  For example, there may be important barriers to knowledge 
ﬂow between even European countries (Maurseth and Verspagen (2002) 
and Bottazi and Peri (2003)).
How to precisely measure innovation is an important issue in the 
empirical endeavor to explore the effect of innovation on growth.  In the 
existing literature, research and development (R&D) expenditures are 
widely used as a proxy for innovation partly because of the availability 
and reliability of data (Griliches 1980; Mansﬁeld 1980; Audretsch and 
Feldman 1996).  Many other researchers intend to use alternative 
measures of innovation such as patenting activities.  Despite several 
major problems associated with using patent data, there are at least 
three reasons why patent statistics can be an important economic 
indicator of innovation (Griliches 1990) and thus the fascination of 
economists in academic research.  First, patenting databases are 
generally more available and richer in the sense that patents are public 
documents with detailed information on the background of assignees 
and their activities.  Second, patents can be viewed as the output of 
inventive process and link together R&D activities and productivity. 
Finally, using patent data, we are able to construct both quantitative 
and qualitative measures of innovation activities, and trace the citation 
records to better gauge the spillover effects of technology changes.
To our best knowledge, there are no comprehensive studies 
examining innovation and economic growth in a cross-country setting 
using patent data (Maurseth and Verspagen 2002; Bottazi and Peri 
2003).  In this paper, we try to ﬁll this void by constructing a cross-
country sample, and address some unanswered questions with the help 
of a recently available global patent database.  Particularly, we attempt 
to add knowledge to existing literature by focusing on the effects of both 
quantity and quality of innovation on economic growth.  Additionally, 
we explore the impact of innovation at different stages of development 
for different countries.  
The above leads to the following two hypotheses:
H1 The higher the level of innovative activity, the higher the rate 
of economic growth in an economy.
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H2 The higher the quality of innovative activity, the higher the 
rate of economic growth in an economy.
3. Methods
Empirical research using cross-country data has provided much 
insight on the role of institutions in promoting economic growth (King 
and Levine, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rousseau and Wachtel, 
2000).  However, as mentioned above, very few cross-country studies are 
associated with any potential association between direct measures of 
innovation and growth.
Data sources
The data set was constructed from a number of sources. We started 
with the US Patent database available from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and examined the country of both the inventor and 
the assignee.  Work by Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) and 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999) suggest that patent data can be considered 
one measure of innovation. Unlike an exogenous technological shock, 
intentional investments in R&D are driven by proﬁt incentives.  Among 
other forms of protecting intellectual property, economic agents are likely 
to ﬁle patents to protect the property rights generated by their private 
investment in R&D.  Moreover, patent documents themselves contain 
references to prior patent documents and inﬂuential innovation tends 
to be heavily cited.  Patent citations can thus in some circumstances be 
interpreted as knowledge ﬂows from one invention to another (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Fogarty, 2000; Jaffe et al., 1993; Duguet and Macgarvie, 
2005),1 and can be used to identify those innovations with a breakthrough 
impact. Therefore, patent data to gauge the size of innovation as well 
as the quality of innovation. We combine observations from countries as 
described below, so we have one observation per country per year.
 GDP and other macroeconomic data for the countries are taken 
from the World Development Index (WDI).  R&D ﬁgures for individual 
ﬁrms inside countries were obtained from the WorldScope database.
1 Note: the structure of the US national innovation system in which the applicants supply 
many prior art references leads to this interpretation.  However, it should be noted that 
in the European Patent Ofﬁce, the examiners provide the prior art citations and thus any 
knowledge ﬂow interpretations are unwarranted (Harhoff, Hoisl, and Webb 2006).
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Variables
Descriptive statistics and variable names are shown in Table 1, 
and Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the variables. The mean 
real GDP growth rate is 2.03 percent and the standard deviation twice 
as large. The explanatory variables also show a great deal of variation. 
Their range indicates that there are outlier observations though no effort 
was made to exclude such observations other than to include ﬁxed effects 
for countries in some regressions. Interestingly, the simple correlations 
with the growth rate of GDP are all modest. The level of GDP is highly 
correlated with capital formation and moderately correlated with FDI, 
RNDGDP, and TPATR (deﬁned below).  Interestingly, the correlation of 
the level of GDP is not as highly correlated with the Technology Index 
(also deﬁned below).
Dependent variables
Our dependent variable, growth, is the growth rate of real annual 
per capita GDP in the country.  The variable is deﬁned as the change 
in the log of real per capita GDP. Real per capita GDP is deﬁned as per 
capita GDP deﬂated to the base year of 1980.
Indpendent variables
A major challenge in this paper was to determine what an 
appropriate proxy was for innovation.  In the past, scholars have used 
R&D as a measure of innovative activities and in ﬁrm-level studies 
argued that R&D is more of an input to the actual output (Schmookler, 
1966).  Teece (1986) proposes that “an innovation consists of technical 
knowledge about how to do things better than the existing state of the 
art.” One criterion of a patent is “commercial applicability,” which points 
to the need for patent protection as a kind of insurance policy against 
appropriation (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001); further, counts of the 
number of patents have been used as a proxy for innovation (e.g., Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001) with recognition of their limitations.
We employ both R&D and Innovation variables in our estimates. 
The actual R&D variable considered, RNDGDP, is the total research 
and development expenditure in the country as a ratio to the GDP of 
the country.  In cases where such number was not available e.g., Egypt, 
we simply summed the R&D spending of all ﬁrms reporting in the 
WorldScope database.  Second, we took the actual number of patent 
granted to a respective country regardless of where the patentee actually 
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resided as long as the company was headquartered in the country.  In 
other words, if Siemens were the assignee of a patent in the US patent 
database, regardless of whether the lab itself was in China, the patent 
would be assigned to the country Germany, which is where Siemens is 
headquartered.  In our paper we operationalize the variable by taking 
the number of patents granted per million dollars of R&D.
Next, we focus on the quality aspect of the innovations.  The most 
appropriate measure would have been to get a quality measure based 
on Hall et al.’s (2002) method, i.e., forward citations of each patent 
relative to other patents in its technology class in that year, aggregated 
up to the country level.  We were somewhat successful in gathering 
the citation numbers for most of the sample countries; however, after 
careful evaluations we could not defend the reliability of the numbers. 
Therefore we took an alternative variable, USAR, deﬁned as the Ratio 
of Patents Granted in the USA as a proportion of total patents granted 
by the country in a given year as the quality proxy for innovation. Our 
assumption is that the patent applications of foreign countries granted in 
the US are usually signiﬁcant innovations and represent relative quality. 
We also estimate another quality variable, which we call Magic in the Air 
(MAGIC) by regressing R&D on innovation and taking the residual from 
this regression.  Our perspective here is that while it is plausible that 
innovation is a product of R&D, it is also possible that innovation may 
come to an organization or to a country beyond the proportion of the R&D 
spent due to several spillover effects from other unobserved variables.
Control variables
We use a number of independent variables popularly used in 
the literature in cross-country growth estimations.  Initial GDP Values 
are useful to understand the relative changes from sample countries 
exhibiting a wide range of development stages. Capital Formation 
(GCAPFORM) and Literacy Rate (LITRATE) are common proxies for 
capital and human capital, respectively, of the countries.  So is Government 
Spending (GCONGDP).  Exports and Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) are considered crucial to economic growth.  We also include a 
Technology Index variable to control for the technological sophistication 
of the respective countries.  This index was developed from a number of 
variables: electric power consumption (kwh per capita), ﬁxed line and 
mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people), personal computers (per 
1,000 people), radios and telephone sets (per 1,000 people).
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Statistical approach
Our model builds on the approach to growth equations introduced 
by Barro and Levine (1991). As mentioned earlier, the baseline equation 
includes crucial variables such as the convergence effect (log of initial 
real GDP), the human capital investment variable (literacy) and the 
export ratio (openness). We also add a few other relevant variables. 
The baseline regression provides a reasonable framework for analyzing 
growth in a cross-country environment.  We then add measures of 
research and development and innovation (patent) proxies.  We start 
with OLS regressions that are shown in Table 3 with robust standard 
errors.  Table 4 follows the same procedure except the dependent 
variable takes three-year averages of growth as the measure of country 
growth.  All estimates control for year and country ﬁxed effects.  It 
is well known that OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent when 
there are dynamic effects and simultaneities in the speciﬁcation. To 
account for these effects, the recent literature (e.g., Levine et al., 2000, 
Beck et al., 2000) has employed the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) technique developed by Arellano and Bond and others for panel 
estimation.  While not reported here, we did employ this technique as a 
robustness check with nearly identical results.2,3 
2 The Arellano Bond GMM technique is speciﬁcally designed to address the econometric 
problems induced by unobserved group-speciﬁc effects and joint endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in lagged-dependent-variable models, such as growth regressions. 
Similar to Levine et al. (2000), we employed an augmented GMM procedure outlined in 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed in Blundell and Bond (1998), which combines 
the regression in differences with the regression in levels (see Bond 2002).  We used the 
two-step GMM instead of one-step because two-step is asymptotically more efﬁcient, 
meanwhile we also compensated for the potentially downward biased two-step standard 
errors by making a ﬁnite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by 
Windmeijer (2005).
3 There are two tests to test the validity of the instruments, as suggested by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  The ﬁrst is the Sargan test or Hansen 
test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by 
analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process.  We 
conducted the Hansen test because the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity 
or autocorrelation while the Hansen statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step 
GMM criterion function, is. The second test is the autoregressive (AR) test, which examines 
the hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated in both the difference regression 
and the system difference-level regression. By construction, the differenced error term is 
allowed to be ﬁrst-order serially correlated, but the second-order serial correlation of the 
error term will violate the assumption of the GMM procedure.
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RESULTS
Tables 3-4 show the results of our regression analyses.  Each 
column in the table represents a different model.  Let us begin with 
Table 3, which shows results for per capita GDP growth in relation to 
innovation and growth variables.  Table 3 is grouped into three different 
groups, with three models per group. As discussed above, the ﬁrst six 
rows of the table contain control variables considered to be important 
in the economic growth literature, plus the control variable Technology 
Index, plus ﬁxed effects for Year and Country, as shown in Models 1, 4, 
and 7. The ﬁrst three models are for the entire combined sample of all 
58 countries over the 25-year period.  The second and third set of three 
models split the sample along the lines of income level of the countries, 
with Models 4-6 showing the results for upper-income countries and 
Models 7-9 showing results for the lower-income countries.
Each of the regression tables shows the same model speciﬁcations. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses in all the 
regression tables and *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. The ﬁrst equation reported in Table 3 column 
1 reports the baseline model. The second equation shows the baseline 
growth model augmented by the two measures of innovation related 
variables, RNDGDP (Research and Development as a proportion of GDP) 
and PATR (Patents Granted per Million of R&D Spending).  Similarly, 
equation three (column 3) introduces a different proxy for innovation 
(MAGIC) that takes the residual from a separate regression where 
TPATR is regressed on RNDGDP.  The next six columns follow the same 
order for the two sub-samples.  We also estimate a similar regression 
excluding the USA from the sample (not reported, but highly similar 
results). We see that the baseline regression provides some evidence of a 
convergence effect. As the OLS annual and three year equations shows 
(Table 4) the convergence effect is mostly signiﬁcant although it is 
insigniﬁcant in the high- and upper-middle-income country subsample. 
In both annual and three-year average OLS estimations, Gross Capital 
Formation (GCAPFORM) and FDIGDP variables are consistently 
statistically signiﬁcant.  The openness or Export variable is positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant in a few of the regressions.
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Coming to our hypotheses, the ﬁrst hypothesis proposed that 
innovation activities are important for ﬁrms’ economic growth.  This 
is seen by looking at the second model in each subset of the data (i.e., 
Models 2, 5, and 8 in each of the two tables).  As shown in the tables, 
the ratio R&D Expenditures to GDP has a positive and statistically 
signiﬁcant relation with growth in per-capita GDP.  Likewise the ratio 
of Total Patents Granted to Total R&D Expenditures is positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant, indicating an association with GDP growth. 
The ﬁrst measure, as discussed above, can be considered an innovation 
input measure, while the second measure may be considered an 
innovation output or innovation efﬁciency measure.  Thus we see that 
innovation input and output are associated with GDP growth virtually 
across the board. Although coefﬁcient estimates and conﬁdence levels 
vary somewhat from equation to equation and across tables, the 
overall picture is supportive of the fact that innovation does matter in 
explaining economic growth. Turning to coefﬁcients on the measures of 
RND and innovation variables, we see that RNDGDP has a relatively 
small coefﬁcient, while TPATR has a larger coefﬁcient that is positive 
and statistically signiﬁcant.
The second hypothesis has to do with whether quality innovation 
output matters.  This is shown in the same models as above, plus the third 
model of each subset of the data (i.e., Models 3, 6, and 9 in each of the 
two tables).  As discussed previously, we take the Proportion of Patents 
Granted in the USA as a kind of patent quality measure at the country 
level.  Overall, there appears to be some support for this hypothesis: the 
coefﬁcient of our quality measure is often, but not always, positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant.  However, when we add the variable MAGIC, 
which represents a kind of factor in innovative output unexplained 
by the R&D spending, the Proportion of Patents Granted in the USA 
always becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.  The overall interpretation 
offers support for Hypothesis 2, that quality innovation output leads to 
even higher growth than average innovation output.
In sum, our results show that after controlling for the year and 
country-speciﬁc effects, a strong, positive link between innovative 
success and economic growth.
Robustness tests.  In order to boost conﬁdence in our results, we 
performed various robustness tests in addition to the GMM techniques 
outlined above in the footnotes.  These additional robustness tests 
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address two important issues.  First, we investigate whether the use 
of the results are consistent if we examine different sub-samples, such 
as whether the country is known as an “emerging” or a “developed” 
country market.  We also added some additional independent variables 
used by some authors in the growth literature as control variables, e.g., 
bank credit to private sector as a proportion to GDP and also private 
sector to GDP ratio.  In these cases above we found strong support for 
our hypotheses.  Moreover, we substituted the quality of innovation 
variable, proportion of patents granted in the USA, with a new proxy: 
total number of forward citations of the total granted patents.  We could 
not get consistent data for all sample countries for all sample years. 
However, we still found a signiﬁcant association between our focused 
independent variables and the dependent variable that supports the 
two hypotheses.  In summary, in all instances examined, there were no 
alarming qualitative changes to our conclusions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we ﬁnd that the quantity of inventive activity, as 
well as its quality, are associated with economic growth.  We may be 
able to say that based on OLS results, countries that have higher levels 
of patenting activity — as well as those whose patents primarily are 
ﬁled in the US — tend to be the countries with higher growth rates. 
Furthermore, it seems based on panel regression and country ﬁxed 
effects that countries that increase the level of patenting activity — or 
increase the proportion ﬁled in the US — tend to be associated with 
increases in the growth rate.  Thus we ﬁnd results consistent with both 
our hypotheses.
One question this raises is one of reverse causality.  That is, how 
do we know that more patents lead to economic growth, rather than 
countries with high economic growth leads to ﬁrms that have more 
proﬁts to invest, which they then spend on patenting activities?  Or it 
could be that patenting in the US actually leads to higher returns than 
patenting in the home country due to the size of the US market, which 
leads to more proﬁts for the ﬁrm, leading to growth in the home country 
(i.e., it is not a question of quality at all, more of path dependency). 
These questions are difﬁcult to tease apart empirically but in future 
work we will try and experiment with lagged patenting activity and 
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ways of distinguishing quality.
Another question that this research raises is related to the locus 
of the inventive activity itself.  For example, outsourcing has been a 
hot topic in the early 2000s.  Is it possible that a country may have 
much innovative activity but the economic growth occurs outside that 
country?  Put another way, how do we know that if a multinational 
ﬁrm has R&D centers in various countries, the beneﬁts ﬂow only to 
the country in which the ﬁrm is headquartered?  Thus one limitation 
of our study is the inability to tease apart a more ﬁne-grained tracing 
of patenting and economic behavior.  However, for a broad picture, the 
results seem remarkably consistent and clear.
The public policy implications of the results are also clear.  While 
Lerner (2002) warns that strengthening intellectual property protection 
does not do much to spur patent applications in countries with 
already advanced systems, it would seem logical that countries with 
weaker systems could get many more applications by strengthening 
their intellectual property rights. Of course, simply applying for more 
patents does not necessarily translate into either more patents granted 
or higher quality patents.  Certainly, a country should not lower its 
standards when it comes to granting patents.  Maybe governments 
should subsidize the fees or even award prizes for successfully applying 
for patents in the US?  The US will not lower its grant standards so 
the overall quality level should remain relatively constant.  However, 
the increased innovation activity to get past the application hurdle and 
perhaps win the prize may lead to higher economic growth for the entire 
country.
It would seem that, based on the results of this study, the Lisbon 
program of simply attempting to raise the level of R&D spending in 
each European country may not be the most efﬁcient way of increasing 
economic growth.  At a minimum, we may consider it to be part of a 
multi-pronged approach that includes RNDGDP as one piece.  As we 
know, the goal of most economies is not more R&D spending per se, but 
rather a higher rate of growth and national wealth that is presumed 
to result from such investment. As Griliches (1990) pointed out, “Not 
all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented, and the 
inventions that are patented differ greatly in ‘quality’ in the magnitude 
of inventive output associated with them.”  Furthermore, while RNDGDP 
was certainly in there statistically speaking, we cannot discount the 
statistical signiﬁcance of MAGIC as well.  The sort of institutions and 
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culture around patenting and innovation is not at all explained by R&D 
spending.  Perhaps national governments should focus some of their 
attention on raising the “magic in the air”?
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. N refers 
to country-year observations for 58 countries during the sample period 1980-2004. 
GDPPCGR: Annual Growth Rate in per capita Real GDP is the change in the natural 
logarithm of real per capita GDP. GCAPFORM: Gross pribate capital formation of a given 
sample year  GCONGDP: Government consumption to GDP is the expenses in a given 
year by the government to the GDP.  EXPGDP: Exports to GDP are deﬁned as the ratio 
of total exports to GDP.  LITRATE: Literacy rate of the labor force (secondary education). 
FDIGDP: Foreign direct investment to GDP is the total FDI incoming to the country in 
a given year to the GDP.  TECHINDX: Technology index is an index developed from a 
number of variables: electric power consumption (kwh per capita), ﬁxed line and mobile 
phone subscribers (per 1,000 people), personal computers (per 1,000 people), radios and 
telephone sets (per 1,000 people).  RNDGDP: Total R&D to GDP is the total research and 
development expenditure at the country level to the GDP.  TPATR: Total number of patent 
granted as a proportion to per million dollars of research and development expenditure. 
USAR: Ratio of patents granted in the USA as a proportion of total patent granted by the 
country in a given year. RESIDUAL is the residual from the regression estimate of the 
variable TPATR on RNDGDP.
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Annual Growth Rate in per capita
Real GDP – GDPPCGR
1162 0.02031 0.04753 -0.19730 0.26550
Gross Private Capital Formation to GDP 
- GCAPFORM
1162 0.23426 0.09559 0.03450 0.68000
Government Consumption to GDP 
- GCONGDP
1162 0.19010 0.07523 0.06530 0.54450
Exports to GDP - EXPGDP 1162 0.39678 0.27090 0.05060 1.70000
Literacy Rate for Labor Force - LITRATE 1162 0.89633 0.14516 0.44170 0.99730
Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 
- FDIGDP
1162 0.02982 0.05718 0,00000 0.79340
Technology Index - TECHINDX 1162 0.02906 0.00453 0.01170 0.03570
Research and Development (R&D) 
Expenditure to GDP – RNDGDP
1162 1.27869 0.93115 0.01550 5.08010
Total Number of Patent Granted to R&D 
Expenses – TPATR 
1162 0.00870 0.04774 7.74863E-9 0.87655
Proportion of Patent Granted in the USA 1162 0.11392 0.47591 0.0002528 8.50000
Residual of the Estimation of TPATR on 
RNDGDP - RESIDUAL
1162 0.01679 0.01309 -0.02760 0.09810
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix
Table 2 presents correlation coefﬁcients and the associated Bonferroni-adjusted 
signiﬁcance levels of each correlation coefﬁcients (in the parentheses).  The deﬁnitions of 
the variables are same as in Table 1.  * indicates signiﬁcance levels of less than 5%.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Annual Growth Rate 
in per capita Real 
GDP – GDPPCGR 
1.00000
2 Gross Private 
Capital Formation to 
GDP - GCAPFORM 
0.16980 1.00000
3 Government 
Consumption to 
GDP – GCONGDP
0.03983 0.08832 1.00000
4 Exports to GDP 
- EXPGDP
0.03482 0.00256 0.06380 1.00000
5 Literacy Rate 
for Labor Force 
– LITRATE
0.02789 0.13442 -0.02380 0.09410 1.00000
6 Foreign Direct 
Investment to GDP 
– FDIGDP
0.10368 0.22147 0.03835 -0.03940 -0.02124 1.00000
7 Technology Index 
- TECHINDX
0.01751 0.18591 -0.17518 0.09552 0.71552 -0.01968 1.00000
8 Research and 
Development (R&D) 
Expenditure to GDP 
– RNDGDP
0.08338 0.21168 0.15261 0.10031 0.25009 -0.00850 0.21609 1.00000
9 Total Number of 
Patent Granted 
to R&D Expenses 
– TPATR 
0.08387 0.10218 0.04737 -0.06981 0.01602 0.01599 0.05029 0.56900 1.00000
10 Proportion of Patent 
Granted in the USA
0.06472 0.02186 -0.07967 -0.03915 0.04472 0.01043 0.03495 0.06706 -0.01404 1.00000
11 Residual of the 
Estimation of 
TPATR on RNDGDP 
- RESIDUAL
0.18116 0.02224 -0.06074 0.05245 0.03602 -0.13353 -0.00190 -0.11999 0.02882 0.04040 1.00000
162 INNOVATION, PATENTING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Table 3: OLS Regressions of real per capita GDP growth, annual data 
 
Table 3 presents the OLS regressions of real per capita GDP growth based on the annual 
data at country level with White heteroskesdastic-consistent standard errors. The 
dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth, and we include log of initial per capita 
real GDP, gross private capital formation, government consumption, and literacy rate 
as the base variables in the regressions.  Deﬁnitions of variables are same as in Table 
1.  N refers to number of  observations included in the estimation.  Absolute values of t-
statistics of the coefﬁcients of the independent variables are reported in parentheses.  *, 
**, *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Combined Sample High Income and Upper Middle Income Countries Lower Middle Income and Low Income 
Countries
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -0.01522       
(1.39)      
-0.01324        
(0.91)
-0.03545***
(2.65)
-0.02586
(1.28)
-0.00850
(0.33)
-0.03328
(1.34)
-0.01840
(0.78)
0.00396
(0.14)
-0.05407**
(2.09)
Log of Initial per 
capita 
Real GDP 0.17159***
(5.78)
0.16173***   
(5.45)      
0.16427***
(5.61)
0.08423
(1.26)
0.05852
(0.89)
0.09413
(1.42)
0.17986***
(5.39)
0.16748***
(5.03)
0.16814***
(5.11)
Gross Private Capital 
Formation to GDP 
- GCAPFORM
0.07597***   
(5.05)
0.06283***   
(3.54)     
0.06690***
(3.81)
0.08513***
(2.96)
0.11848***
(3.06)
0.07573**
(2.05)
0.07017***
(3.91)
0.06016***
(2.96)
0.06985***
(3.45)
Government 
Consumption to GDP 
- GCONGDP
0.01195        
(0.62)      
-0.01216        
(0.59)
0.02006
(1.06)
0.02617
(1.00)
0.03184
(1.24)
0.02388
(0.92)
-0.01176
(0.37)
-0.04934
(1.45)
0.00687
(0.22)
Exports to GDP 
- EXPGDP
-0.00399        
(0.78)      
-0.00464       
(0.91)      
-0.00233
(0.46)
0.05286**
(3.27)
0.06751
(4.03)
0.04966***
(3.05)
-0.00010068
(0.02)
0.00195
(0.35)
-0.00286
(0.52)
Literacy Rate 
for Labor Force 
- LITRATE
0.01295  
     
(0.94)      
0.02303   
     
(1.63)
0.01180
(0.84)
0.01680
(1.11)
0.02356
(1.52)
0.01438
(0.91)
0.00576
(0.19)
0.02287
(0.75)
0.01492
(0.50)
Foreign Direct 
Investment to GDP 
- FDIGDP
0.04682*
(1.91)
0.04396**    
    
(1.80)
0.02945
(1.21)
0.07013*
(1.81)
0.07839**
(2.05)
0.05412
(1.38)
0.03885
(1.23)
0.03703
(1.18)
0.02099
(0.67)
Technology Index 
- TECHINDX
0.5378  
      
(0.12)      
0.84362    
    
(1.55)
-0.20175
(0.44)
0.55489
(0.76)
0.29565
(0.41)
0.65095
(0.90)
-0.53740
(0.67)
1.22272
(1.26)
-0.89607
(1.12)
Research and 
Development (R&D) 
Expenditure to GDP 
– RNDGDP
-
-
0.00596***   
(2.86)      
-
-
-
-
0.04900***
(3.29)
-
-
-
-
0.00745***
(3.04)
-
-
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Total Number of 
Patent Granted 
to R&D Expenses 
– TPATR
-
-
0.05993**   
     
(2.10)      
-
-
-
-
0.66293**
(2.55)
-
-
-
-
0.05616*
(1.91)
-
-
Proportion of Patent 
Granted in the USA
-
-
0.01077**    
   
(2.43)
0.00432
(1.01)
-
-
-0.01037
(1.08)
0.00162
(0.19)
-
-
0.01068**
(2.02)
0.00322
(0.64)
Residual of the 
Estimation of 
TPATR on RNDGDP 
- MAGIC
-
-
-
-
0.60578***
(5.69)
-
-
0.59235**
(2.44)
-
-
-
-
0.62703***
(5.21)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1104 1104 1104 213 213 213 891 891 891
Adj R2 0.0586 0.0690 0.0863 0.1327 0.1783 0.1502 0.0478 0.0594 0.0756
F-statistic 10.81    9.18    12.58 5.63 5.60 5.16 7.39 6.62 9.09
Combined Sample High Income and Upper Middle Income Countries Lower Middle Income and Low Income 
Countries
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Table 3 (cont’d)
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Table 4  OLS Regressions of real per capita GDP growth
(three-year average data)
Table 4 presents the OLS regressions of real per capita GDP growth based on the three-
year average at country level with White heteroskesdastic-consistent standard errors. 
The dependent variable is the three-year (non-overlapping) average of real per capita 
GDP growth,  and all independent variables are the initial year of the three year period. 
Deﬁnitions of variables are same as in Table 1.  N refers to number of observations included 
in the estimation.  Absolute values of t-statistics of the coefﬁcients of the independent 
variables are  reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.
Combined Sample High Income and Upper Middle Income Countries Lower Middle Income and Low Income 
Countries
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant 3.86383***
(14.63)
4.03468***
(11.64)
3.53749***
(10.81)
4.78798***
(10.33)
4.43726***
(7.47)
4.11694***
(7.18)
4.14249***
(6.99)
4.99805***
(6.86)
3.85798***
(5.85)
Log of Initial per capita 
Real GDP 2.72599***
(3.65)
2.39201***
(3.22)
2.69081***
(3.61)
2.57977
(1.55)
2.22400
(1.36)
2.83687
(1.73)
2.66218***
(3.17)
2.26971***
(2.70)
2.61936***
(3.11)
Gross Private Capital 
Formation to GDP 
- GCAPFORM
2.07589***
(5.56)
1.76376***
(4.07)
1.76784***
(4.05)
2.34161***
(3.70)
1.83580**
(1.99)
1.26978
(1.48)
1.98389***
(4.34)
1.85058***
(3.68)
1.84231***
(3.63)
Government 
Consumption to GDP 
- GCONGDP
0.11604
(0.24)
-0.66747
(-1.30)
0.14007
(0.29)
-0.44693
(-0.74)
-0.55213
(0.91)
-0.61284
(1.01)
0.11469
(0.15)
-1.09825
(1.29)
0.22305
(0.28)
Exports to GDP 
- EXPGDP
-0.09416
(0.76)
-0.10837
(-0.88)
-0.08379
(0.68)
-0.04732
(-0.12)
(0.10707
(0.26)
-0.09141
(0.24)
0.10608
(0.78)
0.15314
(1.13)
0.09328
(0.68)
Literacy Rate for Labor 
Force - LITRATE
0.30239
(0.93)
0.58012*
(1.73)
0.39671
(1.18)
0.26531
(0.77)
0.56782
(1.57)
0.40105
(1.10)
-0.13958
(0.20)
0.27600
(0.37)
0.02568
(0.03)
Foreign Direct 
Investment to GDP 
- FDIGDP
0.31606
(0.57)
-0.39339
(-0.72)
-0.40012
(0.72)
-0.13129
(-0.16)
0.10102
(0.12)
-0.20793
(0.25)
-0.61725
(0.85)
-0.64472
(0.89)
-0.67705
(0.93)
Technology Index 
– TECHINDX
2.01547
(0.18)
29.20565**
(2.19)
1.90260
(0.17)
36.38881**
(2.16)
37.13478**
(2.18)
39.02464**
(2.36)
-2.00394
(0.10)
48.39928*
(1.93)
-1.35824
(0.07)
Research and 
Development (R&D) 
Expenditure to GDP 
– RNDGDP
0.17593***
(3.44)
0.53435
(1.54)
0.20077***
(3.23)
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Table 4 (cont’d)
Combined Sample High Income and Upper Middle Income Countries Lower Middle Income and Low Income 
Countries
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Total Number of Patent 
Granted to R&D 
Expenses – TPATR
1.86896**
(2.46)
17.93237**
(2.26)
1.174008**
(2.21)
Proportion of Patent 
Granted in the USA
0.26791**
(2.39)
0.14254
(1.29)
0.22257
(0.92)
0.32863
(1.56)
0.23013*
(1.70)
0.08970
(0.68)
Residual of the 
Estimation of TPATR on 
RNDGDP - MAGIC
3.96748
(1.40)
11.42539**
(1.98)
2.37844
(0.73)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 823 823 823 227 162 162 661 661 661
 Adj R2 0.0486 0.0679 0.0511 0.1080 0.1465 0.1384 0.0365 0.0544 0.0351
 F-Statistics 7.00 6.99 5.92 3.78 3.76 3.87 4.57 4.80 3.67

Let me start by thanking the organizers for inviting me to the 
Fifth Colloquium and presenting me the opportunity to discuss this 
paper by Hasan et al on innovation and growth. This is an enjoyable 
piece of work, very thoughtinspiring and has the right appetite to dig 
very deep and very hard to get to what I think is the key empirical 
problem in this particular context of the relationship between innovation 
and growth, namely that of measuring the quantity and especially the 
quality of innovations and the innovation process in general. I also think 
that the authors take the effort to do serious panel data econometrics 
with a multitude of models, as is more or less standard in similar panel 
data exercises, and with a host of robustness test to cross check the 
sensitivity of the estimation results. However, after being safely carried 
through the empirical analysis, I came to the concluding comments and 
found, to my surprise, that the authors are very cautious in drawing 
deﬁnite conclusions from their analysis. This may be understandable, 
once it is recognized that, in effect, the authors have made the ﬁrst pass 
with their model on the large international data set and that ﬁrmer 
conclusion will probably follow once further work on the speciﬁcation 
and estimation of the models have been performed. In my comments, I 
will ﬁrst walk through their analysis starting from the hypotheses to be 
tested on data followed by a very short description of the model(s) the 
authors take to the data and the methodology they use to estimate the 
model(s) to as well as the data itself. Finally, I say something about the 
conclusions.
There is a strong belief among the profession that successful 
innovation spurs economic growth. I cannot ﬁnd particularly strong 
reasons to ﬁght against this commonly held belief. I think it all start 
from entrepreneurs taking the necessary steps to innovate whenever 
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there is room for cost saving innovations or innovations that makes you 
different from your competitors. I will come to this point later. However, 
at this point it should be noted that not only the quantity of innovation, 
but also, and maybe even more importantly so, the quality of innovation 
is important for growth. This (theoretical) observation is well in line 
with the recent literature on the relationship between innovation and 
economic growth and, I would add, stands in equal footing with the idea 
that the quality of institutions is important for growth as continuously 
emphasized by the literature on endogenous growth. This is what Hasan 
et al. are after in their paper, where they set up their model so that they 
can test for the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the quality of 
innovations to economic growth on data that is carefully collected to 
make it possible for them to seek empirical evidence for the maintained 
hypothesis.
The authors do not introduce any formal economic model that 
explains the link from the quality of innovations to growth or that 
justiﬁes the (form of the) empirical model that they estimate. Instead, 
they take a literature review and draw on existing literature to come up 
with estimable equations that incorporate, importantly, proxies for the 
quality of innovations as regressors. More speciﬁcally, these estimable 
models build heavily on growth equations of the Barro-Levine type. 
These growth equations are then estimated on panel data 
consisting of country speciﬁc time series of GDP growth, proxies for the 
quality and quantity of innovations and a healthy number of control 
variables. Also, the initial level of the GDP is controlled for in the 
empirical analysis, which implies that the analysis also controls for 
catching up effects in the data. Estimations are performed using either 
annual of three year average growth rates of the GDP. The authors 
start with the OLS estimation, which is almost an industry standard 
nowadays. As usual, there is the possibility in dynamic panels that the 
OLS estimators are inconsistent so that alternative estimation methods 
should be entertained. The authors do so by running a set of alternative 
GMM estimators through the data. As a consequence a set of robustness 
checks is incorporated in the empirical analysis.
The authors use basically three sets of data. On the one hand, 
they use US patent data set, available from the NBER. Secondly, they 
collect GDP and other macro-data from the World Development Index 
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and lastly, they extract ﬁrm level R&D information from WorldScope 
database. The data covers 58 countries over the period 1980-2004.
As far as the estimation results are concerned the authors ﬁrst 
point out that the unconditional correlations between GDP growth 
and the various r.h.s. variables of the empirical models are sometimes 
surprisingly low. However, both the quantity and quality of innovations 
fortunately come out as statistically (and economically) signiﬁcant. 
Also, OLS and GMM estimation results agree on this. These results are 
robust to the measure of GDP growth, ie. they survive using both annual 
and three year average GDP growth as the relevant growth measure. 
Finally the level of technology also seems important for growth as it 
comes out statistically signiﬁcant.
So the result are very much in line with one’s priors that the 
quantity and, in particular the quality of innovations matter for growth. 
However, looking closer at the estimation results, one observes that the 
R2s of the estimated models are extremely low. Of course, these statistics 
tend to be low very often when cross section data on individuals is a 
nontrivial part of the data set (58 cross section observations vs. 24 time 
series ones). But it suggests that a lot of the variation in the observed 
GDP growth rates remains unexplained by the alternative model that 
the authors estimate. Visually, this would come up starkly, if the authors 
could develop graphical tools to illustrate the goodness-of-ﬁt of their 
models. Also, and this is my main point, patents are still very noisy 
measures of innovations, be it either quantity of quality of innovations, 
particularly from the point of view of growth. The underlying reason is 
that ﬁrms do a lot of hoarding when it comes to applying for patents 
for innovations. They hold a portfolio of patents wherefrom they try 
to seek the ones that are commercially the most successful ones. On 
the other hand, it is not entirely unrealistic to think that by hoarding 
patents or holding a portfolio of patents ﬁrms can build a technological 
buffer against their competitors and probably at the same time protect 
the core of their technological ideas that constitute the cutting edge of 
their business. The other side of the coin is, then, that maybe many, or 
even most of the patents actually never end up generating successful 
commercial activity or being used in production.
An aspect of the empirical model speciﬁcations that strikes me 
as surprising is that all of the estimated speciﬁcations are linear. Why 
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insist only on linear effects? Actually all of the analysis is not strictly 
speaking linear as the authors split the sample according to income 
levels to check whether they get different results in poorer and richer 
countries. Anyway, at more general and certainly intuitive level, some 
of the variables could in fact impinge upon growth in a nonlinear way, 
which, could be approach by including interaction terms as regressors to 
the r.h.s. of empirical model. Nonlinear or more speciﬁcally interaction 
effects may be particularly relevant when one thinks about the growth 
effects of innovation in different ﬁnancial environments. Even though 
ﬁnancial system share an increasing number of common features across 
countries, important differences remain. Furthermore, the quality and 
sophistication of the ﬁnancial system, e.g. in a country, is also em-
phasized by the recent thinking, particularly by Aghion and Howitt1, 
on the relationship between innovation and growth. The implication of 
this to the present paper could be to try to incorporate measures of the 
quality of the ﬁnancial system in the estimated growth equations.
A related point is that innovations may be necessary but not 
sufﬁcient for growth. Recent research e.g. by Prescott and Parente2 
has argued that good quality (policy) institutions combined with 
knowledge and innovations spur growth. Finally, there is the question 
of the causality between innovations and growth, an issue touched by 
the authors towards the end of their analysis. So, which way does it 
really go? Aghion’s recent writings may be relevant also at this point 
as he argues that the nature of innovation activity in ﬁrms depends 
on the distance of individual ﬁrms to the technological frontier. More 
speciﬁcally, ﬁrms further behind the frontier tend to imitate their 
technological superiors. Note that these ﬁrms or countries may turn 
out to be catching up countries, so that what we see in the data is that 
these ﬁrms are active innovators and grow rapidly. Once we approach 
the technological frontier, ﬁrms tend to innovate in order to escape 
competition from their rivals. This last point may be important, as some 
of the results not only in the paper, but also more generally, do suggest 
that the effects of the (quantity and quality of) measured innovations 
1 See e.g. P. Aghion and P. Howitt “Appropriate Growth Policy: A Unifying Framework”, 
working paper, De-cember 2005, and also “Growth with Quality-Improving Innovations: An 
Integrated Framework”, by the same authors, working paper, September 2004.
2 S. Parente and E. Prescott “Barriers to riches”, MIT Press 2000 pushes this argument 
most forcefully.
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on growth tend to be smaller, even statistically insigniﬁcant in high 
income countries. It is ﬁrms wanting to escape competition – the idea of 
monopoly rents – and to stay on the frontier that explains innovations, 
which, in turn, sustains growth. Otherwise continuing with the existing 
technology compromises ﬁrms’ proﬁts. 
Anyway, this is an enjoyable paper. It should be read by everyone 
interested in growth economics.
  

Introduction
Let me ﬁrst congratulate the organizers for putting together this 
interesting and important conference on Money, Derivatives, Innovation, 
and Growth and for inviting me to comment on the interesting and 
innovative paper authored by Hasan, Tucci, and Zazzara. On many levels, 
the subject matter of this paper is non-controversial in the sense that 
many in the economics profession including major policy institutions 
have converged on the notion that long-run economic growth depends 
on the creation and fostering of an environment that encourages 
innovation and the productive application of new technologies, especially 
new technologies of the general purpose variety that undergrid lasting 
and signiﬁcant economic transformations. That innovative activity 
underpins economic productivity and growth can easily be seen, since a 
country’s real growth in gross domestic product can be approximated by 
the sum of the country’s labor force growth (or growth in hours worked) 
and labor productivity growth (or growth in output per hour worked). 
Both components of this relationship are impacted by innovation. 
Innovations such as third shifts and telecommuting can impact hours 
worked as can improvements in medical care since the growth rate 
of the labor force will be impacted. Regarding productivity growth, 
innovations and improvements in the quality of capital equipment 
and the capital stock more generally, worker education, management 
processes, and computing and information processing equipment are 
just a few of the ways that innovations can impact productivity growth. 
A natural corollary is that countries that generate innovation create 
new efﬁcient productive technologies and encourage the adoption of 
these new technologies tend to grow faster than those that do not.
The literature on the determinants of real growth rates points to 
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numerous factors that explain, in part, why countries grow and prosper 
and the relationship between technology and economic growth has been 
captured in a vast number of formal models over the past 60 years or so. 
Early neoclassical models like Solow’s treated technological change as 
an exogenous variable, with long-run economic growth dependant only 
on exogenous technical change. Others generalized and added to the 
Solow model, endogenizing technology with concepts such as learning-
by-doing, and showing that long-run economic growth critically depends 
on population growth. Other contributions related technology growth to 
some speciﬁcation based on amount of labor resources devoted to the 
development to new technologies and ideas. More recently, models in 
the endogenous growth literature all tend to share the characteristic 
that a sustained increase in the amount of resources devoted to the 
creation of new technologies leads to continued increases in economic 
growth.
This relationship between the resources devoted to the creation 
of new technologies or innovation and economic growth is examined in 
the Hasan, Tucci, Zazzara paper. The added twist or innovation in the 
paper is that the authors also examine how the quality of innovations 
resulting from the expenditure of resources on developing new 
technologies impact economic growth. If one accepts the tenets of the 
extant endogenous growth literature (see Hasan, Tucci, and Zazzara for 
references), it would be expected that the more intense are a country’s 
expenditures on developing new technologies, the higher should be 
that country’s rate of economic growth. Correspondingly, the better 
the quality of the innovations generated by the higher expenditures 
on developing new technologies, the better should be economic growth. 
These are the hypotheses tested in the paper for a cross section of 58 
countries over the period 1980 – 2003.
A Caveat Regarding the Relationship between Productivity 
Growth and Innovation
The view leading to the two hypotheses examined in the paper is 
well received, being the logical outcome of a tightly developed theoretical 
framework. However, I should point out that despite the attractiveness 
of this approach and framework, there is a contrasting relationship 
between the state of technology and productivity growth that has come 
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to be known as the productivity paradox or the great productivity 
slowdown—in reference to the slowdown in productivity growth that 
occurred during much of the postwar period. Although there are some 
explanations for the slowdown in productivity growth from the early 
1950s to the early 1980s, it remains a puzzle as to why productivity 
growth slowed down in the advanced countries in the world despite 
signiﬁcant increases in the state of technology.
I raise this issue only to alert the reader that despite the logical 
consistency and well developed hypotheses ﬂowing from the endogenous 
growth literature, the time series evidence does not provide strong 
support for much of the theory for a large part of the post-war period. 
Fortunately, the Hasan, Tucci, Zazzara paper does not have to confront 
this paradox since the time span over which the hypotheses are tested 
is outside the slowdown or paradox period. Clearly, if the logic of the 
endogenous growth model is to hold, it certainly had better hold during 
the years following 1980 when we experienced unprecedented increases 
in productivity growth (especially in the developed economies of the 
world) lead by signiﬁcant advances in technology and the application 
of new and existing technology—particularly as it relates to the use 
of information processing equipment (computers, telecom, the internet, 
etc.)—to all aspects of business including the way in which processes 
are organized and managed. Not only have we observed signiﬁcant 
capital deepening and increases in labor quality since the early 
1980s, we also have seen increases in multifactor productivity growth 
(commonly associated with innovations like new approaches to supply 
chain management, more efﬁcient business management structures 
and processes, and the like) during this period.
The paper is successful in that the empirical results provide 
convincing support for the hypotheses outlined and tested by the authors 
and the endogenous growth model more generally. Hence, on this basis, 
the authors have made a positive contribution to the literature by 
providing answers to the important questions posed in the paper.
Some Issues, Comments and Suggestions for Future Research
As noted above, the authors are quite successful in their analysis 
and in establishing empirical support for their main hypotheses. Given 
this success, how might one provide constructive suggestions to the 
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authors for improving their analysis as they continue with this research 
program? In this regard, I would like to make several suggestions. First, 
from a philosophical viewpoint, I believe that it would be interesting to 
examine the relationship between economic well-being of the residents 
of a country and innovation using a broader measure of economic well-
being than the real gross domestic product growth per capita. Second, 
I would like to suggest that more attention or thought be given to the 
variables used to measure the intensity of a country’s investment in 
innovation as well as the quality of these innovations. While the variables 
used to measure innovation intensity and the quality of innovation are 
reasonable (and novel in the case of the quality measure), they never-
the-less could suffer from certain drawbacks as outlined below.
Measuring Economic Well-Being
What should be the dependent variable in so-called country growth 
regressions? As is the case for this paper, the literature typically uses real 
GDP growth per capita as the relevant measure of a country’s economic 
well-being or economic progress. This is understandable given that this 
measure is easily computed and is available for every country of interest. 
However, from a philosophical point of view, there may be better more 
comprehensive measures of a country’s economic progress or well-being. 
GDP is the sum of the money values of all ﬁnal goods and services produced 
in the domestic economy during a given year. Thus, it does not include 
sales of intermediate goods and services, it only includes work done in 
the country, and only market activity is included. Clearly, since there are 
not well developed markets for environmental quality or health, these 
beneﬁts are not included in the typical GDP measure. The same applies 
to other quality of life indicators such as life expectancy or education 
levels. There is ongoing work being conducted on developing better more 
comprehensive measures of economic well-being. For example, the UN’s 
Human Development Index (HDI) is one such index. This index combines 
GDP per capita with life expectancy at birth and with school enrollment 
measures to derive a broader measure of well-being. Other indexes are 
being developed with the same goal: to provide a more comprehensive 
measure of economic well-being. Hence, it would be interesting to see if 
the results of the paper continue to hold when such measures are used. 
Thus, I would encourage the authors to explore their hypotheses relating 
the intensity of innovation expenditure and the quality of the resulting 
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innovations using a broader measure of well-being.
Measuring Innovation and Its Quality
Turning to the key independent variables used in the paper—the 
ratio of research and development expenditures to GDP, total number of 
total patents granted, and the number of patents granted in the U.S.—I 
would also like to make a few observations and encourage the authors 
to continue to work on improving their measures of the amount and 
quality of innovations coming out of a given country.
The research process is a truly multidimensional process 
characterized by knowledge creation and involves activities and outcomes 
that are inherently difﬁcult to measure. Despite this, expenditures on 
research and development are most often used as a measure of the input 
into the innovation generation process. Since research can involve basic 
research, applied research, and experiential development, it is difﬁcult to 
draw a clear distinction between these concepts and even more difﬁcult 
to know if and when each of these types of activities are actually included 
in the ﬁgures reported for research and development expenditures in a 
given company or country. Similarly, education and training that are 
critical to the success of an innovation but their expense are typically 
not included in research and development expenditures. Other examples 
of items that can be critical for the success of an innovation but may not 
appear as a research and development expense include market research, 
acquisition of complimentary products or licenses, product design, trial 
production, training and tooling up. The point here is that research and 
development intensity measures (like R&D/GDP) may be too narrow if 
they do not capture these type activities.
Another caveat that should be noted regarding the use of research 
and development intensity measures is the fact that R&D intensity in a 
country depends directly on the industrial mix of the country. Countries 
with high R&D intensive industries will naturally have higher 
aggregate R&D intensity measures. This would argue for controlling 
for the industrial mix present in the sample countries. Furthermore, 
low technology industries with low R&D intensities innovate none the 
less, so we really need a way to measure the technology that these ﬁrms 
acquire for innovation purposes (since they do not engage in direct 
research and development in the traditional sense). This is especially 
the case in service industries.
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Patents (total number and number granted in the U.S) are also 
a key variable used in the empirical analysis in the paper. While the 
choice of patents as the key measure of a country’s innovation activity 
is well established in the literature (patent data is consistently reported 
across countries and over time), I nevertheless would like to encourage 
the authors to continue to reﬁne their measure(s) of innovation. As 
useful as patents data are for measuring innovation quality, it must be 
remembered that patents are an indication of invention and not necessarily 
innovation. Patents mark the emergence of a new technical principle and 
not an economic or commercial innovation. As a by product of the legal 
process, many patents are intrinsically of little technological or economic 
signiﬁcance. Hence, to use patents as the only indicator of innovation 
certainly misses the many non-patented inventions that actually lead 
to innovations that are of economic signiﬁcance. In addition, some 
types of technology are not patentable but are crucial to the innovation 
activities associated of companies and there are thousands of patents 
that are never translated into viable products, processes, or innovations. 
Clearly, there is much room of the creation of more robust measures of 
innovation. Finally, the use of patents at the country or industry level can 
undoubtedly be obscured by the strategic behavior of ﬁrms. For example, 
many ﬁrms will not commercialize patents but may use them instead to 
prevent competitors from patenting ideas and using them.
Controlling for Other Factors in Growth Regressions
Several control variables are included in the growth regressions 
employed in the paper. These variables are important and appropriate. 
However, it might be interesting to introduce other control variables 
that typically do not appear in growth regressions but that might 
be important factors. The list of these other factors can be long, so I 
would only ask that in future extensions of this paper that the authors 
examine some of these variables (ruling out those that do not make for 
appropriate controls). A few of these potential variables include:
• the quality of the legal structure of the country and rule of law
• degree of patent protection
• independence of the central bank
• degree of ﬁnancial deepening (presence of derivative markets 
and their liquidity)
• degree of corruption
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• size and scope of the venture capital industry
• ease of starting small business
Conclusions
I conclude my comments by noting that authors have written a 
very nice paper that examines an interesting and important topic. The 
paper breaks new ground in its analysis of the impact of the quality 
of a country’s innovations on its real GDP growth rate per capita. The 
results of the paper should provide researchers in the ﬁeld with the 
seeds for further inquiry into the relationship between a country’s 
economic growth rate as measured by real GDP per capita (or well-
being) and the amount of resources that are spent in the country in the 
pursuit of innovation. Given the ﬁndings in the paper, the next step for 
the authors, in additional to improving the measures of innovation and 
its quality, is to discuss in detail some of the prescriptive public policy 
implications that are implied by the analysis. Surely, policy makers will 
likely embrace policy proposals that promise to improve the overall 
quality of life for their countrymen.

1. Introduction and summary
On January 1st 2008, after many years of preparation and 
simulation (5QIS), Basel II is due to become operational as the new 
international supervisory capital standard for banks. In Europe this 
will happen through the overall industry implementation of the CRD, 
to which the comments made in this paper refer. 
Financial turmoils in the Summer 2007 show the merits of the 
general principles underlying the new international supervisory capital 
standards for ﬁnancial intermediaries: measurement and management 
of overall portfolio risks and imposition of capital cushions to cover for 
unexpected losses.
However, market developments also revealed technical deﬁciencies 
and shortfalls of existing models, notably with reference to the central 
role of ratings as determinants of risk and hence of regulatory (and 
economic) capital.
The purpose of this note is two-fold. Firstly, through a highly 
stylized representation, it offers an analytic review of market disruptions. 
Secondly, it argues that the implementation process of Basel II should 
contain sufﬁcient degrees of ﬂexibility, to avoid the potential emergence 
of credit restraints as a consequence of adjustments which will have to 
be made to ensure the quality and soundness of the transposition.
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After this introduction, the paper is structured in ﬁve paragraphs 
focused on the lessons to be drawn from market turmoil in terms of 
improvement in the current capital standard. 
The ﬁrst three sets of considerations are of technical nature and 
address deﬁciencies which have surfaced in the new capital standard 
paradigm. As will be clariﬁed, the interaction between credit and 
liquidity risk is at the forefront of recent turmoils. More speciﬁcally, 
the distinction has to be drawn between monetary liquidity, market 
liquidity and funding liquidity risk. The modeling of these interactions, 
to assess economic and regulatory capital needs, requires careful new 
consideration. 
The fourth argument - procyclicality of Basel II - is well known 
and has been thoroughly debated, but not necessarily satisfactorily 
settled, as will be argued mainly through a simulation exercise.
The four points can be summarized as follows:
(i) The rating of complex structured products, which was 
fundamentally assigned to the evaluation by credit 
agencies, has proved inadequate, and it is hardly possible 
to agree on a new sound approach in the very short-term.
(ii) The risk assessment of credits granted by banks to 
hedge funds/private equity funds was also questionable, 
notably as a result of the interposition of off-balance sheet 
instruments (SIV’s/conduits globally accounting in June 
2006 for total assets of some $ 400 billion) which in many 
instances had now to be brought back to banks’ balance 
sheet.
(iii) More generally, the ﬂow of funds from “capital” supervised 
intermediaries (banks, investment banks, insurance 
companies, ﬁnancial conglomerates) to alternative asset 
managers/intermediaries (hedge, equity, sovereign funds) 
reveals a potential weakness in the ﬁnancial stability 
architecture. Beyond the general agreement on the lack of 
inside, non standard, information on the most innovative 
sectors/processes of the ﬁnancial system, the need for 
183Rainer Stefano Masera
transparency and some degree of supervision on the new 
intermediaries is especially clear as a result of the trend 
(temporarily stopped) for alternative asset managers to go 
public. This makes them automatically subject to securities 
supervision, and hence to transparency standards.
(iv) Many analysts and practitioners have drawn attention to the 
dangers of potential procyclicality of Basel II. This is another 
strong argument to enact the system with sufﬁcient degrees 
of ﬂexibility when the downside risks to the economy have 
deﬁnitely increased1, and at the same time the (necessary) 
recent rate cuts by central banks may raise inﬂation fears, 
with many commodities at multi-year highs.
Other concurrent considerations insist on the signiﬁcant changes 
taking place in the analysis of rating models of Specialty Finance 
Providers and of banks actively involved in the structured subprime 
market (notably after the Northern Rock and Alliance ad Leicester 
episodes in the UK, Ikb in Germany and the American Home Mortgage 
and the NetBank cases in the US), and to the need to review deposit 
insurance schemes across countries. 
More broadly, recent turmoils are also the result of the generalized 
stretching of leverage in the past few years. This process, too, revealed 
weakness in the Basel II standard which requires correction.
Low, or very low, interest rates, ample liquidity and very easy 
reﬁnancing, good economic fundamentals and low rates of default (ref. 
slide I and II) lead to a sharp narrowing of credit spreads across asset 
classes. In spite of repeated warnings, the overriding attempt to maintain 
high yields prompted continuing increases in leverage, without paying 
attention to fundamentals of asset classes.
Financial engineering helped create new forms of leverage in 
world ﬁnancial markets (eg. SCP, CDOs, CLOs, Conduits, SIVs, PM), 
well beyond the mortgage subprime sector in the US.
The Summer crisis in this segment, with perspective and actual 
1 See O’Neill (2007) and Rogoff (2007).
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defaults had a tsunami effect on all leverage markets. The abrupt 
swing towards a strong decline in desired leverage, together with acute 
funding shortages led to massive sales, again quite independently of the 
fundamentals of the different asset classes. The pendulum swang in a few 
weeks from one extreme to the other in the global repricing of risk, with the 
overshooting typical of ﬁnancial markets and with profound and lasting 
implications for regulated intermediaries, and their capital needs.
A brief section is therefore speciﬁcally devoted to examining ways 
and means to ensure appropriate symmetric ﬂexibility to the capital 
standard during the transposition phase.
The following paragraphs address, in turn, the points previously 
made. The ﬁnal section contains some concluding remarks.
2. The rating of complex structured products
Securitization and structured ﬁnance are perhaps the most 
innovative and fastest growing areas of global ﬁnance. They combine 
product, process and institutional innovation: derivatives, notably credit 
derivatives; banks’ on and off-balance sheet positions, SIV’s and conduits, 
equity and credit capital; specialty providers and hedge funds (Appendix).
These actors play a key role in the transfer of credit and liquidity 
risks. Recognition of the overall positive impact of these processes 
was accompanied by preoccupations, expressed also by international 
agencies, on certain features of the evolving system, which would 
have required corrective actions. A quote from a publication by the 
IMF in the Summer of 2005 is indicative: “Concerns have been raised 
that some market participants may not fully understand the risks in 
complex structured products. Observers are also questioning whether 
the structured products are transferring risks to the institutions best 
able to bear these risks or to the institutions that are least regulated.
...Because rating agencies derive substantial revenue from structured 
transactions and advisory services, participants questioned whether rating 
agencies were adequately managing potential conﬂict of interest2”.
2  IMF Institute, 2005, vol. 9.
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Let us brieﬂy recall some key features of structured ﬁnance 
innovation which have revealed points of weakness in the Basel II risk-
to-capital ﬁlters.
The new wave of synthetic (derivative) securitization in global 
ﬁnance is by no means circumscribed to the operation of specialty 
providers, and notably mortgage banks. The trend to market-based, 
securitized credit management strategies hinges on the gradual 
transition in operating models of large global banks, which shifted from 
buy-and-hold to originate-structure-warehouse-distribute balance sheet 
management.
Thus, in parallel to the adoption of the new accounting standards 
(IFRS), large complex global ﬁnancial groups witnessed a rapid rise of 
fair-value assets, which now represent on average more than the 50% 
of total assets.
This clearly heightens their credit and liquidity risk volatility 
exposures, also because fair value is often, incorrectly, equated with 
market value, also in the presence of market failures.
The repackaging of cash ﬂows transforms the risk, return, and 
liquidity features of portfolios. Typically, a bank would sell a loan 
portfolio to an off balance sheet special purpose vehicle (or a conduit, or 
a structured investment vehicle). The entity, in turn, would sell claims 
on the underlying portfolio, by repackaging processes. 
The claims would be grouped into distinct tranches, with different 
risk and return features. They would typically range from AAA to sub 
investment grade and straight equity. Often the AAA part could account 
for some 60% of the issue, and equity for 10%. 
Let us focus on a crucial further link of new structured ﬁnance: 
ABCP (asset backed commercial paper). Large banks are primary issuers 
of this paper, which is sold to sponsored conduits/vehicles together with 
an engagement to provide back-up liquidity. SIV’s also issue directly CP 
(ref. slide III and VI).
In July-August, when the preoccupations arose on the possible 
use of ABCP to ﬁnance mortgages, the reﬁnancing of commercial paper 
became suddenly very difﬁcult. The back up liquidity dried up and 
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many banks had to take conduits on balance, with a dramatic increase 
in liquidity and credit risks.
Speciﬁc mention must be made of leveraged loans and CLOs. 
Beyond the mortgage subprime market, also the market for leveraged 
loans was nearly blocked in August. Huge amounts of de facto frozen 
loans piled up in the balance sheets of international banks, whose 
capital requirements rose sharply.
We recall that the combined total of the leveraged loans markets 
on the two sides of the Atlantic amounts to some $1 trillion (ref. slide V).
Signiﬁcant increases in the pipeline of new emissions are being 
recorded especially in the United States (ref. slide VI), where CLOs 
represent around 60% of the institutional market for leveraged loans. 
In September/October the market is gradually opening up again. Banks 
devalue (30%-40% credit enhancement), and package outstanding loans 
and sell them in tranches to the market. 
Demand is coming back not only from hedge and sovereign funds, 
but also from institutional investors, for high ratings.
The ﬁrst new important syndication was represented by the 
$26.4 billion loan granted in October to the private equity fund KKR to 
ﬁnance the buyout of FistDataCorp.
3. The new scenario of interactive credit and liquidity risks
Another important point that needs to be considered regarding 
the valuation of complex products under a stressed liquidity scenario 
refers to the heterogeneity of valuation approaches used. They can 
produce wide ranges of outcomes for more complex products. Under 
illiquid market conditions the discrepancies of such prices increase 
further, price information becomes less reliable and key assumptions 
and inputs to the models might not hold: the entire RAP approach 
becomes blurred.
“Mark-to-model” techniques, generally used by core banks 
(including hedge funds sponsored by banks) and their counterparties, 
may not have fully captured the potential losses embedded in some of 
the less liquid and more exotic positions in structured products like 
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CDOs. This uncertainty determined an evaporation of liquidity in the 
CDO secondary market. In turn, this heightened the uncertainty about 
the distribution and severity of subprime exposures throughout the 
structured credit market.
Model-based valuations exposed banks and their counterparties 
to basis risks in terms of hedging strategies. If, under stressed market 
conditions, there is mismatch between valuation estimates of an 
exposure’s true risk proﬁle, hedging inefﬁciencies become relevant. 
These drawbacks determined signiﬁcant and unanticipated hedge 
adjustments in illiquid markets. In cases where complex products 
themselves are used as hedges, a switch to more liquid but less effective 
hedges has, anyhow, exposed ﬁnancial institutions to growing basis 
risks and related losses. 
The complexity of assessing risk, valuation, and capital 
requirements of CDO’s has long been recognized (Dufﬁe and Gârleanu, 
2001). Gordy (2005) more recently drew attention to weaknesses of 
existing arrangements. These problems were apparently overcome 
by relying on rating agencies’ assessment and rating. The mentioned 
deﬁciencies of their approaches surfaced abruptly during the summer. 
In particular, risk mitigation offered by margins and collateral was far 
less than estimated through models.
We are speaking of a very large pool of assets: taken together 
ABS and MBS represent over one-third of the US debt market. Also in 
Europe issues in the securitized market in 2005-2006 were as high as € 
300-400 billion per year3.
Basel II introduces a risk sensitive treatment for banks’ 
securitisation exposures, whether the bank is an originator or an 
investor. In fact, under Basel I, there was a ﬂat capital charge (8%) for 
securitization exposures, regardless of the risk. A regulatory incentive 
was thus created for banks to structure and distribute lower risk assets 
while retaining higher yield risk assets. The ﬂat charge could severely 
understate the actual credit risk. 
3  Total losses on mortgage loans can be estimated in the region of $ 200 billion.
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With reference to the backup liquidity lines that banks provide 
to sponsored or third party asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
conduits, there was typically no capital charge under Basel I, as these 
lines tend to have a maturity of less than one year. 
However, the lessons coming from the recent turmoil suggest that 
there are areas of the Basel II framework that should be strengthened 
and adjusted. For example, the transparency on whether a risk transfer 
had occurred or which exposures are pulled back on to the balance sheet, 
is an important point to be analyzed. Many events risk weights should 
be reassessed in relation to the actual experience of the credit turmoil. 
Recent events pose some important questions also in terms of the 
boundary between the trading book and the banking book. For example, 
a large number of banks purchased commercial paper issued by ABCP 
conduits that they sponsored in order to assist the rolling of the paper. 
Banks usually book the ABCP purchased in the trading book to exploit 
the relatively lower regulatory capital charge, even though it may not 
be possible to sell the paper in the market. An issue to be clariﬁed is 
whether an instrument that cannot be sold in the market is eligible for 
inclusion in the trading book.
All these aspects require a signiﬁcant reassessment of existing 
models (Pillar I), but also of Pillar II, notably in relation to the interaction 
of credit and liquidity/funding risks4 (ref. slide VII).
4. Banks’ credits to alternative asset managers: overall risk 
measures
In theory, and according to many risk models, credits provided 
by banks to hedge funds and private equity funds appeared relatively 
risk free. The risk, as was claimed, was ultimately born by sophisticated 
“qualiﬁed” investors in the funds, i.e. investors willing and best able to 
bear selected risks. The principle of caveat emptor would clearly apply, 
4 It may be recalled here that detailed, quantitative warnings on possible negative 
interactions between credit and liquidity risks and of inadequacies of existing models to 
estimate default probabilities in the subprime market came for instance from Moody’s 
KMV: “Analyzing the subprime market fall out using EDF credit measurers”. April 2007.
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and would additionally justify the very different supervisory regime, 
and also the lack of transparency of such funds.
Other broader geopolitical considerations may also have played a 
role in suggesting the apparent lack of active interest by supervisors in 
establishing a regime of transparency5.
As of August 2007, it may be estimated that the new pools of 
global money (alternative asset managers) comprised three main 
categories: beyond private equity ($ 1 trillion) and hedge funds ($ 2 
trillion), sovereign wealth funds can be estimated to have more than $ 
2.5 trillion assets under management.
It is however difﬁcult to separate the different categories, also as 
a result of the close interactions between sovereign wealth and other 
segments of the market6. For instance, according to Chinese press 
reports, sovereign Chinese investors went into the sub prime mortgage 
market through the interposition of SIV’s, and important investments 
were made in the IPO of Blackstone.
As indicated, the listing of alternative asset managers created 
a supervisory problem: the opaqueness and the lack of knowledge of 
aggregate positions may be inconsistent with the requirements of public 
companies7.
 
In spite of their spectacular growth in terms of numbers and 
aum in the past decade8, hedge funds still account for a small share of 
5 The need for greater transparency in respect of hedge funds’ operations had been 
repeatedly stressed in the past. I take the liberty of recalling what I wrote on this subject 
in 2005: “A good example of overall improvement of market information is related to efforts 
to increase transparency of hedge funds. Reference can be made to Plusfunds, which 
calculates on the Bermuda Stock Exchange the net asset value, relevant risk measures, 
stress tests and concentration indices of listed hedge funds.
This model should become an established norm”. (Masera 2005, p.125).
6 See Savona (2007) and Masera (2007).
7 For an excellent analysis of problems and perspectives of the hedge fund industry see 
Flannery (2007).
8  Estimates of hedge funds growth are given in the table below.
Hedge Funds Growth
Years Number of funds $ / Trillion
1990 500 0.04
2000 4.000 0.5
2006 9.500 1.6
2007 June 10.000 2.0
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total aum. But they have a large (often over 50%) share in more risky 
ﬁnancial markets, notably CDOs and lower-rated tranches of ABS.
Available information suggests that a vast majority of hedge 
funds operate with adequate capital cushions. This is predicated on the 
sound market principle of not being forced to sell desirable positions 
in a falling market. Practically all important hedge funds operate with 
average leverage below 90% of their maximum. Hence, the unwinding 
of speculative positions need not be immediate, with the risk of 
exacerbating market volatility.
Moreover, most loans made by broker dealer large banks to hedge 
funds are covered by adequate security arrangements, with variable 
margins imposed. However, the liquidity risks linked to collateral must 
not be neglected, with the possibility that the value of collateral falls 
short of requirements and counterparties need to provide additional 
marginal at relatively short notice. Recent events saw a loss of value 
in collateral, notably for hedge funds, that led to margin calls and 
sometimes an unwinding of positions and/or closure of the fund, which 
ampliﬁed pressures in markets. 
These points may require further clariﬁcation.
Banks and investment banks interact with hedge funds in 
many ways, including prime brokerage relationships. The provision 
of services entails trading and execution, clearance and custody, 
technology. A critical part of the overall relationship is the extension 
of credit through: short term ﬁnancing for leveraged positions, trading 
counterparty exposure, security lending, ﬁnancing through margin 
loans and repurchase agreements. Contingent liquidity arrangements 
can also lead to counterparty credit risk.
As a result, CCRM (counterparty credit risk management) 
represents the principal line of defense between capital regulated 
intermediaries and alternative asset managers, notably hedge funds. 
Margining and collateral practices provide the main buffer to cover 
credit exposure. 
The system appeared robust and well tested. But the summer 
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2007 experience showed unexpected deﬁciencies under severe stress. 
More speciﬁcally, variation margins9 and initial margins10 
should have ensured adequate collateral to cover not only the current 
replacement value of the contract loan in the case of counterparty 
default, but also the potential change in value in the contract between 
the time of default and the time at which the trading position can be 
liquidated. 
The stress period of the Summer showed, however, that banks 
holding large exposures to hedge funds that defaulted, of anyhow, 
operated in markets where prices fell rapidly, reduced their credits 
also to credit worthy borrowers. The collateralization of credit exposure 
was not enough to mitigate the risk. The sudden decline in asset prices, 
triggered, for example, by the unwinding of a highly leveraged hedge 
fund, reduced value of  collateral, or generated liquidity risk and further 
price declines via variation margins as investors sold into the falling 
market to meet margin calls. Such declines in collateral values, if sharp 
enough, casted doubts on the assumptions relied upon in stress testing 
and risk management and caused dealers to become more risk averse in 
their credit decisions. 
This is consistent with academic research: according to the 
“ﬁnancial accelerator” model popularized by Bernanke, Gertel and 
Gilchrist (1999) a fall in asset values may reduce collateral values 
and thus the ability of ﬁrms to borrow, which ampliﬁes the impact of 
the initial shock. To the extent that bank-dependent borrowers cannot 
access alternative sources of funding, investment and economic activity 
will be curtailed until new relationships are formed, transparency is 
established and information recreated. These mechanisms identify an 
important avenue through which hedge funds can create systemic risk, 
i.e. by affecting the ability of regulated markets and intermediaries to 
provide efﬁciently credit to the real economy. 
9 Variation margin is the amount of collateral or cash offered to a dealer to cover past 
changes in the value of the counterparty’s position (current exposure). If market price 
declines lead to a deterioration of the mark-to-market of a position, margin calls are 
triggered.
10 Initial margin is a speciﬁc amount of collateral designed to cover potential future 
changes in the value of the contract (potential future exposure). 
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Many important hedge funds are indeed suggesting that more 
transparency and better information would be in the interest of the 
industry. In any event, as was made clear in the above analysis, two 
issues should be addressed.
The ﬁrst is a better separation between on and off balance sheet 
operations of banks, especially to discipline the possible risks of balance 
sheet capital requirements, as a result of contingent lending/liquidity 
commitments.
The second refers to a more transparent/common system of 
margining in respect of bank loans to hedge funds. Weaknesses of 
current arrangements contributed to the difﬁculties encountered in 
interbank markets. Precisely because of the opacity of the system, 
direct liquidity injections by central banks encounter difﬁculties, and 
can imply conﬂicts of interest11.
5. Basel II and procyclicality
The issue of potential procyclicality of the Basel 2 capital standard 
is well-known and has been amply debated by the academic community, 
market operators and, evidently, supervisors themselves12.
Three main areas have been identiﬁed as especially relevant for 
treatment under Pillar II:
(i) risks considered under Pillar I, but not fully captured by 
the process. These refer in particular to credit concentration 
risk, which can arise from:
 - signiﬁcant exposure to an individual counterparty or 
group of related counterparties;
 - credit exposure to counterparties in the same economic 
sector and/or geographical region;
 - credit exposure to counterparties whose ﬁnancial 
11 The LTCM affair was different, because it affected a single operator.
12 For a review of the literature and proposals to dampen cyclical features see Masera 
(2005) and (2006). 
193Rainer Stefano Masera
performance is dependent upon the same activity or 
commodity;
 - indirect credit exposure arising from a bank’s active 
credit management activities, notably through 
derivatives and structured ﬁnance processes.
(ii) factors not taken into account by the Pillar I process (e.g. 
interest rate risk in the banking book, and business and 
strategic risk).
In particular, interest rate risks in the banking book covered 
under Pillar II include:
(iii) repricing risk between assets and liabilities;
 - repricing risk between the hedge fund and the 
exposure;
 - prepayment/early redemption risk.
(iv) factors external to the banks, notably business cycle 
effects.
A bank’s capital varies with business cycle; capital should be 
adequate to avoid shortfalls also under the stress of tests pertaining to 
adverse cyclical developments.
Stress scenarios are selected because, even if they have a very 
low probability of occurring (tail events) they often are illustration of 
the scale of disturbances that occur in extreme cases. This is one of the 
more general critique of VaR measurements13.
The recent experience shows that the statistical and model 
frameworks currently available are inadequate to assess meaningfully 
certain types of stress scenarios, notably to cover for the interactions 
between sponsor banks, SIVs and hedge funds.
As indicated, SIVs and conduits typically fund themselves through 
the issue of short-term ABCP, and buy longer term risky securities. The 
maturity gap and the fear on the quality of notes issued by some SIVs 
13 See Masera and Mazzoni (2007).
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created a funding mismatch. This in turn may force SIVs to sell assets 
and thus prompt further declines in prices, which would ultimately hurt 
sponsor banks and thus require more capital.
This led, at the beginning of October, a group of large American 
banks (Citigroup, Bank of America and JP Morgan) to create a $75 
billion debt fund to allay fears of a downward security price spiral.
Beyond the above considerations, which require speciﬁc attention, 
with a view to assessing variations of capital requirements over the 
cycle, a simulation exercise was undertaken on the basis of a large 
bank’s asset and liability structure.
More precisely the capital required was calculated for a bank’s 
credit portfolio under current Basel I rules from 1983 to 2006. Changes 
in the credit quality of the portfolio were calculated on the basis of 
Moody’s historical annual rating transitions.
Large swings were observed in capital requirements. For a bank 
following IRB methodology, capital need could change by more thank 
50% (from 6.1 to 9.3% over a 5-year period - ref. slide VIII).
As indicated, the business cycle impact on capital is further 
ampliﬁed by the fact that the cost of raising capital is likely to increase 
in business downturns. A strong correlation (73%) of credit spread and 
rating downgrade to upgrade ratio established this fact.
In principle, capital markets and optional structures can be used 
as a way to dampen cyclical effects. In particular, contingent capital 
could augment a bank’s capital position during speciﬁc conditions14. 
This could help address the issue of procyclicality (ref. slide IX).
However, under today’s highly perturbed market conditions, 
these schemes may be very difﬁcult to operate. Additionally, supervisors 
themselves have to assess the full implications of contingent capital 
structures (ref. slide X).
14 Some $ 100 billion of lower-tier-two bank’s capital is estimated to be the hands of SIV’s, 
which may be forced to disinvest under current circumstances.
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More generally, while it is very important to provide sufﬁcient 
liquidity to the market under current circumstances, this cannot 
represent a lasting solution to prevent cyclical slowdowns.
This paper is strictly focused on the issue of Basel II 
implementation, but it cannot go without notice, that, in the eyes of 
many observers, including the author of this note, the lax monetary 
policies of the Fed between 2001 and the summer of 2004, the doubtful 
reﬁnancing schemes in real estate (e.g. ninja and piggy-back loans) 
and the aggressive monetary and exchange rate policy of the Bank of 
Japan (e.g. carry trade) contributed to the real estate bubble, and the 
successive crisis15.
The speciﬁc supervisory issue addressed in this note refers to the 
fact that, since July 2006, prices of residential real estate have been 
constantly falling in the US, with clear signs of excess supply in the 
market, without strong risk signals from existing capital standard 
models, and without preemptive measures being taken. This, no doubt, 
owed to the opaqueness and the complexity of the innovative ﬁnancing 
processes described here. 
6. Some suggestions for the transposition process
The need for ﬂexibility in imposing capital requirements at the 
onset of Basel II has always been recognized, however, the primary 
concern of supervisors was centered on the fact that, especially with 
reference to advanced internal models, risk capital might result too low.
Paradoxically, this appeared the principal preoccupation of Rating 
Agencies. They argued (2006) that this would represent a major insufﬁciency 
of the Basel II regulatory approach: signiﬁcant Basel II related declines in 
capital adequacy, especially with the application of advanced models by 
large banks, would have resulted in negative rating outlooks.
It should be observed that the preoccupation of weakening the 
15 Unsustainable global imbalances are also the result of the pegging exchange 
arrangements of emerging currencies vis-à-vis the dollar, with the consequent huge 
increases in reserves, ﬂowing to sovereign funds.
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capital base with Basel II applied also to banks adopting standard 
models and prompted restrictive measures to be enacted with the onset 
of the new system.
As for the basic approach for operational risk, banks using the 
BIA must hold capital equal to the average, over the previous three 
years, of 15% of positive annual gross incomes.  With regard to the 
standard approach to credit risk, past due loans for more than 90 days 
will be risk weighted similarly to default exposures. Additionally, it will 
become more difﬁcult for banks to reduce the capital charge through 
collateral admitted by credit risk mitigation techniques. 
Pillar II through ICAAP, SRP, and provisions for risks not treated 
under Pillar I, add-ons, capital ﬂoors, and also pillar III were instruments 
introduced to guard against this type of risk.
The arguments developed in this paper concur in underlying 
the need for adequate ﬂexibility in the initial phase of operation of the 
new capital standard. The thrust of the analysis developed here shows, 
however, that, under current conditions, this ﬂexibility should be allowed 
both ways, with the pendulum swinging towards possible ease.
As a consequence of market turmoils, and of the need to remedy 
restrictively technical deﬁciencies, a scenario of possible “excessive” 
capital requirement can also be envisaged. Corrective instruments 
should be available to cushions the emergence of undesired and 
unwarranted conditions of credit crunch.
It would clearly be unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to 
examine such measures in detail. This is evidently an area where the 
comparative advantage lies in the wisdom, experience and technical 
skills of supervisors.
I will therefore limit myself to sketch some simple hypotheses, 
from a principles’ point of view. The aim is to encourage the ability of 
regulators to agree transitional phased implementation of Basel II 
and of CRD, where sensible. In particular polarized positions (model 
recognition or refusal) should be, if possible, avoided in a situation where 
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advanced model require, as explained, signiﬁcant changes/reﬁnements. 
To start with, symmetrical movements could be envisaged in 
terms of existing arrangements of add-ons and ﬂoors.
Symmetric ﬁlter techniques could also be introduced. More 
precisely, appropriate ﬁlters would lead, from a given overall risk 
position, to a capital absorption (Tier I and Tier II) which could be 
appropriately graduated up/down16.
Other measures could consist in giving the supervisory 
authorities the possibility, on a case by case basis, of shifting structured 
assets from the trading to the banking book. This would be restricted 
to situations when the difference between mark-to-market and mark-
to-model becomes very high, as a consequence of market failures, i.e. to 
conditions where fair values are not expressed by market prices.
Finally, more ﬂexible capital structures could be examined, 
and, eventually accepted by the supervisory authorities. As indicated, 
regulatory capital requirements under Basel II are dynamic and highly 
risk sensitive. As a result, the level of procyclycality of each bank will 
drive the volatility of its capital requirements.
Banks are expected to adopt a prudent approach to regulatory capital 
maintenance levels by holding a sufﬁcient amount of regulatory capital to 
cover their most substantial loss over the previous 25-year period.
Additionally regulators will require banks to stress test their 
capital base against selected risks such as interest rate movements. 
Contingent capital could also be used to buffer such risks.
Under Basel II, unfavorable market conditions will cause a 
simultaneous increase in capital requirements, and potentially a 
decrease in Tier II issuance capacity. In other words, a fully leveraged 
capital structure will be hit hard as increasing capital requirements 
may not allow the bank to raise additional Tier II capital. In addition, 
raising incremental Tier I capital at this stage will be expensive and 
16  A proposal along these lines was made by Gordy (2004). For an alternative scheme see 
Masera (2005).
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probably less than straightforward.
Consequently, banks that are highly pro-cyclical (i.e. those with 
the most dynamic capital requirements) could take two measures to 
reduce the impact of this procyclicality.
Increase Tier I/Tier II ratio (subject to applicable regulatory 
limits) such that the Tier I capital (the loss absorbing capital cushion) 
is greater than under Basel I. Hold a percentage of Tier II capital in the 
form of Contingent Capital.
In this regard, to the extent that the overall quantum of Bank’s 
capital decrease under Basel II, an increase in the proportion of “Higher 
quality” Tier I to Tier II capital combination with a layer of Contingent 
Capital can also be seen as relatively conservative.
7. Conclusions
Through prompt action by central banks - notably the FED, the 
ECB and the BE - the structured ﬁnance crisis has been effectively 
managed. The risk of snowballing mutual negative interactions 
between the different operators/markets has been reduced, in spite of 
the opaqueness/lack of information/points of weakness which emerged 
in certain key areas.
The lack of reliability of credit ratings of structured products 
and the complexity in modeling, and assessing, the interplay of credit, 
liquidity and funding risks and collateral management represent a 
crucial feature of recent events, and require careful analysis.
The turbulence in ﬁnancial markets subsides, but fragile 
conditions may well remain in the next few months.
The crisis in the US subprime mortgage market took place in a 
period when signs of weakness in US demand were already manifest, 
notably in housing, but also more generally: with US productivity 
growth falling, and with unit labour costs rising.
All these factors suggest that a “sensible regulation” approach 
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should be adopted in the critical phase of implementation of Basel II.
The risk sensitive regulatory capital standard is a very positive 
development for banks and beneﬁts will extend to insurance companies 
as a result of Solvency II.
Enhanced risk management across global ﬁnance will be fostered, 
as the quality and robustness of intermediaries’ management systems, 
the efﬁcacy of supervision, and improved rating processes by agencies 
will concur in creating a better overall environment.
However, a strict, rigid enforcement of Basel rules two months 
from now might undermine the huge work done, as a result of the 
considerations developed here. A period of ﬂexible phasing in is therefore 
suggested. In this period, joint (supervisors and market players) work 
would permit to overcome the technical difﬁculties and deﬁciencies 
which clearly emerged in certain areas of the overall architectural 
design17.
To resume the points made in this note, the rating driven approach 
of Basel II revealed weaknesses which should be promptly corrected. 
The areas of work can be declined according to three principal technical 
headings: stability, liquidity, counterparty risk, which can be separated 
for illustrative purposes, but are closely intertwined:
 • Stability. Asset classes with the same rating can be characterized 
by highly different economic risk, as a consequence of the 
different stability of the rating itself.
 As has been indicated, an A-rated corporate loan and the A 
tranche of a CLO based on corporate loans have a different 
risk, mainly as a result of leverage inherent in the structured 
operation. This is especially true for the more complex 
structured credit products;
17  A more general problem should also be addressed. Current credit rating models, and 
the associated transition matrixes, are constructed on the basis of evidence extracted from 
a world where traditional banks (buy and hold) played a key role of delegated monitoring 
throughout the life of the loan. Are the estimated statistical models sufﬁciently robust 
in the new paradigm of originate and distribute? In other terms, do alternative asset 
managers create a discontinuity in the credit rating (PD & EL) processes?
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 • Liquidity. Asset classes with the same rating present different 
economic risk characters as function of their liquidity. While 
liquidity and funding risks should be modeled separately, 
for simplicity’s sake we can deﬁne here liquidity as the gap 
between mark-to-market and mark-to-model. As has been 
shown, a clear lesson of the August crisis was the signiﬁcant 
dislocation on super senior tranches. These created losses for 
intermediaries precisely because of the difference between 
m-to-ma and m-to-mo, and not because of a change in the 
true risk proﬁle of the underlying. The same applies to SIV’s 
notes.
 • Counterparty risk towards unregulated “alternative” 
ﬁnancial intermediaries. The issue here is whether, in order 
to capture correctly this risk, a distinction should be made 
with respect to capital regulated intermediaries, notably in 
the evaluation of collateral margins. As indicated, synthetic 
collateral structures model built and marked to model 
proved inadequate and undermined liquidity. Large spread-
related losses spilled over to create credit-related losses with 
signiﬁcant P&L repercussions. This destroyed conﬁdence on 
the entire rating approach to SCP.
  Finally, as a result of lasting effects of the Summer 2007 crisis, 
generalized shortages of bank capital may be expected by year-end and 
well into 2008. Thus, even excluding the onset of cyclical slowdowns, 
innovative and ﬂexible capital markets solutions would have great 
advantages.
Access to capital markets in respect of Tier 1 and Tier 2, may be 
impaired / strained for a longer than expected period. More speciﬁcally, 
(i) hybrid capital is likely to be more costly than on average in the past, 
(ii) more assets will have to be shifted to the balance sheet, (iii) a backlog 
built up in the assumption, which is not likely to be veriﬁed, of a return 
to normality in terms of price / availability of capital. Finally, also as a 
result of IFRS accounting rules, (iv) it is more difﬁcult for structured 
loans to be shifted from banking to trading books. 
In sum, important areas of regulatory revision must be foreseen. 
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Overregulation would be counterproductive. What is advocated here 
is a cooperative effort by authorities and market operators to correct 
weakness according to a principle based approach.
The speciﬁc, operational, directions of the important work ahead 
have been indicated in this note, in particular:
 • Rating determination mechanisms and rating stability should 
be critically reassessed and reformulated, notably to model 
the interactions between credit, liquidity and funding risks;
 • Transparency standards should be improved, especially for 
some market participants18;
 • Leverage mechanisms should be reconsidered with a view 
to preventing excesses which surfaced in some cases, with 
adverse repercussions for the whole ﬁnancial industry;
 • More active, innovative and ﬂexible capital management 
techniques should be examined and, to the appropriate degree, 
endorsed.
More generally, a satisfying, lasting solution to the above issues, 
and notably to the question of leverage, can hardly be reached without 
macroeconomic adjustments. Aggressive low interest rate and weak 
exchange-rate policies inevitably concur to high leverage and fuel 
ﬁnancial bubbles.  
18 The importance of overall transparency to protect the international ﬁnancial 
architecture has been, in principle, recognized and stressed by the supervisory authorities. 
A quote by Alan Greenspan is illuminating: “Extensive efforts of recent years to bolster our 
international ﬁnancial structure through enhanced regulatory supervision have too often 
proved ineffective. Fortunately, there are good reasons to believe that properly structured, 
the markets themselves can provide the self-correcting discipline that is so necessary to 
ﬁnancial stability. However, for markets to perform this job, participants need to have 
information about counterparties and market leverage, for example, and this information 
must be relevant, timely, and accurate. A high level of transparency in the way domestic 
ﬁnance operates and is supervised is essential if investors are to make more-knowledgeable 
commitments and supervisors are to judge the soundness of such commitments by the 
ﬁnancial institutions that they supervise” (Greenspan, 2000). However these statements of 
principle were not followed by any concrete steps.
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There is also a clear need for a more integrated approach to 
capital regulation and supervision. The more and more mathematically 
sophisticated risk models must always be accompanied by the 
supervisors’ intimate understanding of the intermediary under control, 
which obviously requires full transparency and information, also on the 
links with non-capital supervised intermediaries.
Support should therefore be given, also at ofﬁcial level and 
notably by the FSF, to the changes recently proposed by the Hedge 
Fund Working Group (Hfwg) in London to improve transparency and 
information in the sector through a voluntary system.
As indicated, the principle is that of voluntary compliance, funds 
not adhering will have to “explain” their reasons to the market.
The measures envisaged foresee disclosure on: evaluation 
criteria, risk management systems, degree of leverage and uniﬁed codes 
of corporate governance. The ﬁnal operational report should be out by 
January 2008.
The phasing-in period advocated here would thus be helpful also 
to improve market transparency, and to move towards a more open 
framework for the operation of global hedge funds. More generally, 
a ﬂexible implementation is warranted to avoid risks of adverse 
procyclicality at a time when slowdown of growth may manifest itself 
(ref. slide XI) and signs and developing of a loosing credit downturn. 
Innovative capital market solutions which could have great advantages, 
also to cope with capital cyclicality may be difﬁcult to implement in a 
very short term time horizon.
In sum, the suggestion made here is not to delay the overall 
regulatory process, rather to phase in ﬂexibility a major component of 
the exercise, while more transparency and better understanding are 
achieved on key features of global ﬁnancial intermediation.
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Appendix
Structured Finance and CDOs
A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is a general term that 
refers to an investment-grade security backed by a portfolio of bonds, 
loans, mortgages or other assets.
A CDO is assimilated to an ABS instrument (Asset Backed 
Securities); i.e. a structured ﬁnance product where receivables from a 
designated asset portfolio (collateral) are securitized in order to create 
balance sheet liquidity. 
In a CDO the collateral is represented by speciﬁc classes of assets: 
i.e. commercial, personal, leveraged loans CLO (Collateralized Loan 
Obligation), bonds CBO (Collateralized Bond Obligation), mortgages 
CMO (Collateralized Mortgage Obligation). 
With such transactions a portfolio of assets is transferred from 
the balance sheet of the originator (sponsor) to a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) which reﬁnances itself by issuing securities on this reference 
portfolio to capital markets (investors) at a margin. The proceeds of the 
offering are used by the SPV to pay the transferred portfolio of assets 
to the originator and to cover the costs associated with the execution of 
the transaction (ﬁg.1).
In a CDO, securities are issued at two or more levels called 
tranches or tiers. Each tranche reﬂects a different degree of risk and 
rate of interest (usually tranches are divided between senior, junior or 
mezzanine and subordinated or equity). Both interest and losses are 
allotted according to investor seniority (i.e. senior tranche, like senior 
debt, has ﬁrst claim on the collateral’s cash ﬂows to cover its interest 
and principal payments. Junior tranche has second claim while the 
equity claims the residual). 
Since their creation in the mid 80’s, CDOs have experienced a 
remarkable growth thanks to their particular appealing to both sponsor 
and investor, becoming today one of the key components of the structured 
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ﬁnance market. 
From a sponsor point of view the issuance of CDOs is driven by 
the desire to: reduce regulatory capital requirements, lower the cost of 
funding, manage risk, increase lending capacity and diversify funding 
sources. On the other side, investors are attracted by CDOs for different 
reasons including participating in new asset types, capitalizing on 
market dislocations or transfer of credit risk.
Generally CDOs are divided in three major classes, depending on 
how they are structured, valued or managed: cash ﬂow CDOs, synthetic 
CDOs and market value CDOs.
Fig.1 Structure of a conventional collateralised debt obligation
(*) May be retained by the sponsor
Cash ﬂow CDOs are structured vehicles that issue different 
tranches of liabilities and use the net proceeds to purchase the pool 
of assets. The cash ﬂows generated by the assets are then used to pay 
back investors in sequential order from the senior investor to the equity 
investor. 
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Also Synthetic CDOs are structured vehicles but in this case they 
use credit derivatives to achieve the same credit-risk transfer as cash 
ﬂow CDOs, without physically transferring the assets. SPV issues notes 
to the investors and sells credit protection on a reference pool of credits. 
The money paid by the investors is then held by the SPV to either repay 
the investors or to pay the buyer of the credit protection, should an 
asset in the reference pool default. The credit-protection buyer pays a 
periodic premium to the SPV that, together with the interest earned on 
the money held by the SPV, is used to pay interest to the investors. 
In a Market value CDOs, SPV issues liabilities based on an 
advance rate. This rate is speciﬁc to each asset and to each tranche of 
liability, and is based on historical price or return volatility for each 
asset type. The collateral is then marked-to-market on a periodic basis, 
and if the aggregate pool marks breach the pool advance rates, the 
collateral manager must sell collateral and pay down notes to bring the 
advance rates back in compliance.
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Glossary
ABCP – asset-backed commercial paper
ABS – asset-backed security
BE – Bank of England
BIA – Basic Indicator Approach
CCRM – counterparty credit risk management
CDO – collateralised debt obligation
CLO – collateralised loan obligation
CMO – collateralized mortgage obligation
CP – commercial paper
CRD – capital requirements directive
ECB – European Central Bank
FED – Federal Reserve
FSF – Financial Stability Forum
GAAP – generally accepted accounting principles
HFWG – Hedge Fund Working Group 
HY – high yield
ICAAP – Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process
IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IPO – initial public offer
IRB – internal rating based
LTCM – Long-Term Capital Management 
MBS – mortgage-backed security
M-to-MA – mark to market
M-to-MO – mark to model
OAS – option adjusted spread
PD & EL – probability of default & expected loss
PM – prime brokerage
QIS – quantitative impact study
RAP – risk adjusted pricing
S&P – Standard and Poor’s
SCP – structured credit products
SIV – structured investment vehicles
SPV – special purpose vehicle
SRP – Supervisory Review Process
VaR – value-at-risk
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Slide I - Global Aggregate - Corporate - OAS
Source: LehmanLive.com.
1 Option adjusted spread (OAS) is the ﬂat spread over the treasury yield curve required 
to discount a mortgage-backed security’s (MBS) volatile coupon payments to match its 
market price.
Slide II - Historic default rates - US: Corporate
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Slide III - Structered Finance Innovations
1 Includes subprime mortgage loans. Prime (86%), subprime (14%); US mortgage debt 
outstanding ~ $10trillion.
2 Includes leveraged loans.
3 Under stress, possible reversal of credits to on balances, mainly as a consequence of (i) 
contingent liquidity facilities to ABCP; (ii) equity and non investment grade tranches.
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Slide IV - Simpliﬁed ABCP conduit(1)
1 An ABCP (Asset Baked Commercial Paper) conduit it tipically a SPV that buys and holds 
a range of ﬁnancial assets which are ﬁnanced through the issuance of ABCP. Conduits are 
generally established by banks, acting as sponsors, and providing credit enhancement and 
liquidity support.
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Slide V - Perspectives for the leveranged loan market
US ($bn) EUR ($bn)
Size of the leveranged loan market 500/600 200/300
Monthly issue of leveraged loans 50/60 15/20
Perspective calendar 200/220 25/30
Months required to absorb arrears 5-6 months 1-2 months
% of market size 40% 10%
Source: Lehman Brothers and S&P’s LCD
Slide VI - Leveranged loans market pipeline in the US
Source: Lehman Brothers High Yield Syndicate, S&P LCD
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Slide VII - Structured Finance under Stress
1 Signiﬁcant losses on ﬁrst/second tranches of structured operations. Downgrading of all 
tranches. Unwinding and distressed sales? Defaults.
2 Liquidity pressures and solvency strains, inadequate collateral.
3 Liquidity pressures and counterparty solvency fears. Monetary base market liquidity does 
not ﬂow to inter bank market. Generalised funding preassures also a result of involuntary on 
balance sheet accumulation of assets.
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Slide VIII - Capital Requirements Volatility: Example
Slide IX - Reducing Volability by Optimizing the Capital Allocation
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Slide X - Contingent Capital: Regulatory Rationale
Slide XI - Potentional effects of the credit crisis on global GDP
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